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LOT ZE'S METAPHYSICAL MONI SM DEFINED Ai'ID EVALUATED 
INTRODUCTION 
1~ The Purpose and Organization of the Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to p resent an a ccurate ac-
count of Lotze's argument for metaphysical monism, and to eval -
uate it. The s pecial interest of the paper is the metaphy sical 
status of the finite spirit . This Luportant topic is taken up 
in the final chapter, after the general principles of Lotze's 
monism h a ve been established.l 
The contents of the thesis are organized into three dis-
tinct develop~ents of thought, preceded by an introduction 
to Lotze's ph ilosophical method . The first development , con-
sisting of Chapter I, i s an examination of Lotze's primary 
axiolog ical convictions, which are the underlying founda t ions of 
his s ys tem as a whole . The second, including Chapters II and 
III, deal s with Lotze ' s argument for an all-embracing i mmanent 
and p ersona l ontolog ical Ground, · in whose s p iritual uni t y all 
finite being s e x ist and interact. The t h ird development, com-
prehending Chapter IV, i s a cons iderat ion of Lotze's reconcil-
iation of the uniqueness and freedom of the finite spirit with 
his monistic ontology of interaction. 
1. We o f cours e do not here simply presuppose Lotze t o be a 
hard and fast monist. The signific ance of his monism is made 
evident in our interpretation (in Cha pter IV) of h is doctrine 
of the independence of the finite s p irit . Our conclusion 
there is that Lotze i s a monist only as regards interaction. 
In regard t o t h e .indep endence o f the individual, Lotze seems 
to us to be quite clearly a personal pluralist. 
2. The Chie~ Sources o~ Investigation 
The chie~ sources used are the ~ollowing: 
1) Lotze's Microcosmus, ~irst published in three volumes 
in 1856 when Lotze was thirty-nine years old, is his earliest 
comprehensive vmrk. An English translation was made in 1 8 85 
by Elizabeth Hamilton and E. E . Constance Jones. Lotze's aim 
in this inspired masterpiece, according to his own expression, 
is to show hov,r mechanism is absolutely universal in the world, 
and yet how completely subordinate to a realm o~ ends or pur-
poses.l We ~ind a very ~ull account of his axiology throughout 
these writings. 
2) Lotze's System of Philosophy was to consist o~ three 
works: Logic, Metaphysics, and Practical Philosophy, Aesthet-
ics, and Philosophy o~ Religion. 2 Unfortunately, however, he 
died before h e could complete the third work, so his readers 
were d e prived of what was expected to be a systematic treatise 
on the axiology which is s o evident in the Microcosmus. The 
two-volume En glish translation o~ the Metaphysik, edited in 
1887 by Bernard Bosanquet, is a most important source for this 
thesis, especially as regards Lotze's ontology. 
3) A number of dictated portions of the lectures of 
Lotze, translated into English and edited by G. T. Ladd, are 
valuable for an insight into Lotze's most mature views. How-
ever, since they were printed posthumously, and really were 
1. MIC, I, xv-xvi; MIC, II, 724, 728. (Footnote a bbreviations 
are explained in the bibliography at the end of the thesis.) 
2. MET, I, vii. 
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not intende d for publication, they do not e xhibit the detail-
ed and e xhaustive character of the works which Lotze himself 
pub lished. 
Use has also been made of a lcicid article, entitled 
"Philosophy in the La s t Fol"'ty Years, 11 written by Lotze in 
English and published in The Contemporary Review in 1880, one 
year before he passed away. 
3. Lotze's Philosophical Method 
i. Early Convictions and Efforts. When Lotze began his 
ophy should be able to explain all particulars from one 
gen eral principle, and tha t Hegel had most adequately f u lfill-
ed the requirements. Lotze's fir s t e a rly conviction, t h en, vias 
that there was a definite unity in the world, but he writes: 
It seemed to me that only a Spirit vn~o s tood in the 
cent er of the universe vn~ich h e hims e lf had made, cou ld, 
with the lmowledg e of the final aim which he had g iven 
to his c r eat ion, make al l the pa~ticular parts of it 
p ass before him in the majestic succession of an unbro-
ken development.l 
He thus accepte d the unity of t h i ngs , but only vdth a g reat 
r es erve con c e rning the ability of thought to comprehend all 
of rea lity in i ts inne r mo s t connec t ions. 
His second e a rly convic t ion wa s that " inte llec tual life 
is more than thought."2 He believed that much g oes on in our 
thinking which c a n b e contempl at ed only f'rom without, and 
1. Art.(l880), 1 35. 
2. Art.(l880), 1 36 . 
========~=====~~==-~-~~~~==================================================~F========== 
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vhose contents cannot be re ~resented exhaustively. We find the 
world ''more wide and rich than thought which tries to follow 
its marvellous structure ••• "1 This conviction turned Lotze 
completely away from the Hegelian d ialectic, ·wi t h who se pur-
pose he w·as at 1'irst much in sympathy. 
Lotze's fir s t philoso phical efforts were directed toward 
shmving the untenability of the "vital force" theory of 
Schelling as an explanation of life. As a competent physiolo-
g ist, he contend ed for the acce ptance of a thoroughly mechanis-
tic view of organic life and even of the mind-body interac-
tion.2 Because of these efforts, Lotze was cons idered a materi-
alist by many thinkers; but he stre nuou sly denied this, and in 
his Microcosmus ma de his s tand unambiguously plain. 
ii. Science Versus Faith. When Lotze published the 
Mici"OCosmus (1856 ..;._ . ) , science was rap i dly clearing away old 
boundaries of thought, and was showing that increasingly many 
different kinds of phenomena were subject to unquestionable 
natural laws. Indeed, the advantag es of the inventions of 
science in practical life could only be gratefully accepted 
and enjoyed. However, in its rush for what it called "truth .for 
truth's sake, 11 science was denying the obligation to return to 
t he religious questionings of the hu.man heart. Appa rently, as 
Lotze suggested, scient ists feared that their precise notions 
would be di s turbed and rendered indefinite by the admission of 
1. MIG, II, 712. 
2. Moore, ELM, 5. 
the incalcu l a ble elements of relig ion. 
On the other han d, some thinkers were obstina tely cling-
ing to an i mmediate relig ious belie'.f, verified only by its 
con sonance with intens e personal de sires. Science was being 
completely set aside as an incoherent abstract maze, detached 
from the all-importa nt relig ious concerns of life. 
Into this situation, Lotze thrus t the Microcosmus in an 
at t empt to vind icate the reality of the s piritual needs of men 
and to reconcile the seeming contradiction between faith and 
science.l He aimed to show that science rested on a s surnptions 
which were by no me ans incon testable. It s f:mdamenta l elements 
of forces a nd l aws were not the ultima te t hrea ds of rea lity, 
for upon the exercise of keen insight they led back to the 
supersensuous reg ion of the hop e s and wishes of the h eart. 
Lotze pointed ou t t h at the ant ic i pat ions of faith always pre-
c e ded scientif ic systerna tization. Furthermore, wha t value cou ld 
there possibly be in an indifferent and repetitious reflection 
in cognition of the world as it e x isted? Lotze held that there 
could be no significance to s uch a nbarren reh ersal," if t h ere 
came no ht~an good, nothing by which it mi ght be more plain 
"wh a t we have to reverence as t h e true significa nce of e x ist-
ence, wh a t we have to do, and ·wh at to hope ."2 Science needed 
to justify itself by afford ing increa sing sati s f a ction to 
spiritual needs , which cou ld no long er be contemptuously 
1. Moore, ELM, 6-7. 
2. MIC, I, ix; Art.(l880), 153. 
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i gnored. 
However, Lo tze maintained that neither must stubborn f a ith 
oppose the recognition of a scientific view of the world, on 
the fe ar that freedom and poetry wou ld v a nish. On the cont rary, 
the enlarged prospects which science opened up revealed bound-
less re a l ms of poetry. And even relig ious conviction wa s b ene-
fitted. Lot ze writes : 
Th ese enl arg ements of knowledg e ••• have driven us to 
seek for and to find with greater i n tellectual effort •.. 
that which we c a n no longer r egard as near and dire ctly 
intu itable.l · 
iii. The Task of Philosophy. For Lo tze, the greater work 
of philosophy lay in a "regre ss ive inve s tigation," by vvhich it 
mi ght be d i s cerned vvhat p rincip l e could be reco gnized and used 
as "the living principle in the construction and cours e of t h e 
world."2 
Philosophy is the endeavor of t he human mind, after this 
wonderful world has come into ex istence and we in it, to 
work it s way back in thought and bring the facts of outer 
and of inner experience into connection, as f a r as our 
p resent position in the world allows.3 
Howev er , Lo tze writes t ha t h e never ch e r i shed the assurance 
t ha t speculation possessed "secret me a ns" of going bac k to t h e 
b e ginning of r e a lity a nd uncovering it s genesis and ne c ess ity.4 
He cons idered it a fruitles s at t empt to try to rea ch new and 
unique principle s of cert a inty. Descartes, for example, had 
gone bac k to the Cog ito a nd the criterion of clearness and 
1. MIC , I, xi v. 4. MIC, II, 718. 
2. Art .(l880), 1 35. 
3. TvUC, II, 718. 
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distinctness ; but these principles were of little use in judg-
ing the truth or f alsity of various part icular thoughts. 
Accord ing to Lotze, the fundamental principles of knowledge , 
contrary to Kant , do not belong to the mind a priorl 
a part _. from experience. Rather t hey are inn ate only in the sense 
t hat 11 there is a tendency constraining it (i.e. the mind ) at 
the suggestion of experience to develop these modes of concep-
tion.111 He says further: 
The nature of the mind is s o constituted that when i mpres-
sions of e xperience stir it, it is t h en unconsciously 
Lmpelled to a reactive operation , which consists partly 
in a definite combina tion in thought o f t h e manifold g iven 
in perce ption, partly in i n t uitive acts, whose i ncit i ng 
cau ses are still hidden from itself.2 
The only guara ntee that we c an h ave t h at t h e na ture of the 
mind permits a true representa tion of t hat to which it reacts 
is , Lotze thinks, a living f~ith that the unity of the world 
has somehow determined thought and being for one anoth er.3 In 
his answer to subjectivism, Lo tze g ives us in the following 
passage an importa nt insight into his methodology : 
In putting trus t in one COi:Jponent of ostens ible knowledg e 
while we t ake another to be erroneous we can be justified 
only by a cons i dera tion of the i mp o rt of the tvTO comPonents . 
We have to rejec t and a lter a ll the notions, which we bega n 
by forming but which c annot be maintained with out contra-
dic tion when our thoughts are systematized, wh ile they c a n 
without con tra d ict ion be rep l a ce d with others. As regards 
the ultimate princ iple s , however, which we follow in this 
criticism of our thoughts, it is quite true that we are 
left with nothing but the confidence of Re a son in itself, or 
the certainty of beli~f in the general truth that there is 
1. MIC , I, 227. 3 . Art.(l880), 140-141. 
2 . Art .(l8 80), 1 39. 
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a meaning in the world, and tha t the n a ture of that r eality 
which i nclu des us in itself, has g iven our s Pirit only such 
necessities of thought as h armonize with it.l 
Lotze refuses to g r ant tha t a knowledg e of the psycholog-
ical processes whereby i de a s fo1~ themselves has the slightest 
relevance to philosophical methodology. For him, it matte rs 
little where i deas come from; the important thing is to be .able 
to criticize them once t h ey arise and thus to progress towa rd 
11 the complete harmony of our rea son with itself and with the 
g iven f a cts, the only goal which is at all atta inable by us."2 
Therefore, of prime importance are ou r philosophical criteria 
of truth, which indeed must first be e s t a blished before any 
psychological hypotheses can be evaluated. This means that psy-
ch ology should be cons idered one of the last products, but cer-
tain ly not a starting - po int, of metaphysical investigat ion.3 
We see that for Lo tze any a priori attempt to formul a te 
~sed? Lotze' s interesting answer i s as follows : 
Any part of experience may serve for such a starting - point 
when it finds itself, in the s h a p e in which it i m..mediately 
presents itself, standing in contradiction to those inna te 
truths which we des ire to see controlling all reality, and 
which, even in the moment in which t h e observed fact con-
flicts with t h em, forc e thems elves upon our cons ciousness 
1. MET, I, 220-221. 
2. Art.(l880), 148. 
3. MET, I, 18. 
4. Art.(l880), 155; MET, I, 16. 
II 
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as indispensable postulates. This is the way in which, 
setting out from exuerience, ever~_r philo s ophy has in 
actual fact arisen.l 
In this mo st i mportant passage, Lotze shows clea rly how the 
11 innate truths," the religious and aesthetic tendencies of the 
h eart are welded into his all-inclusive empirical basis. 
Further progress in inquiry must, according to him, be 
conditioned by the peculiar nature of t h e t h ing under considera-
tion, and the method mus t at every moment adapt itself to the 
particular thing.2 The most important duty is 
t o pursue every fundamental thought one tries into all 
its possible consequences, in order to ascertain how f'ar 
~ts validity suffers no contradiction from rea lity, a nd 
at what point it s fruitfulness ceases.3 
Lotze cautions a gainst any rig id allegiance to a single uni-
ersal s peculative me thod. He believes ·tha t it c a n only lead 
a violence to concrete t h i ngs . Fictitious links wil l have 
o be made , forcefully to bring 11 the deeply-felt, but ill-
derstoon defects of the world11 into harmony wi th vvha t is pre-
u pposed. Everyth ing which does not a ccommodate itself to the 
thod mu st be i gnored. He sees in this tendency a des ire to 
thdraw from the disconcerting features of reality and its 
erfections, and, by the construction of a 11 log ical calculus,rr 
one s elf beyond the need of troubling to exercise 
a cuteness.4 
• Art.(l880), 150. See a lso 
LOG, I, 301 and MET, II, 
164-165. 
2. Art.(1880), 152. 
3. Art.(1880), 153 • 
4. Art.(1880), 150-152. 
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For Lotze, the world doe s not hang together in neat read-
ily deducible patterns, but instead is as an infinitely com-
plex texture so woven that all truths are at the same time in 
"every bit and fold of it. 11 Any strand may be made the subject 
of inquilJT , but at every instant the others with which it is 
indissolubly united must also be t a ken into account.l For I 
I 
human beings, who are completely isolated from a knowledge of j 
the greater part of the world texture, inquiry must always be I 
fragmentary. Therefo re, philosophy can only be ttmodest and 1 
terrestrial 11 and not "vast and co smic 11 in scope. Its task, I 
according to Lotze, i s only to p rovide a coherent ba s is for 
humble satisfaction in an optimis t ic faith.2 
4. Lotze's Meth od 
and the Modern Scientific Spirit 
Lotze's method is indeed terre strial compared to He gel's 
dialectical p rocess of knowledge, which is a necessary move-
ment of thought whereby the sou l traverses the ascending series 
of its ovm forms of consciousness, 11 like stages appoin ted for 
it by its own nature," and arrives at that explicit unity or 
concrete immedia cy of self-knowledg e which constitutes absolute 
knowledg e. 3 Nevertheless, his me thod is grounded on the same 
prima ry ideal which He gel es poused,4 and which in f a ct has in 
one form or another always been evident in the history of phi-
losophy, namely, the cosmic primacy of rational mind. Today 
1. Art.(l880), 153. 3. Hegel, PM, 135, 805. 
2. MIC, II, 718. 4. Knudson, POP, 378. 
as never before, that confi-dence . in this ideal which Lotze so 
admirably exemplified, is being denied by a very formidable 
sect of thinkers, whose distinguishing characteristic is their 
militant adherence to modern experimental method. Let us brief-
ly examine the nature of this opposition. 
Hans Reichenbach eloquently laments t he predicament of 
philosophy.l He says tha t the scientist lmows what it me a ns to 
sta nd on the co~non ground of a unive rs a lly accepted body of 
knowledge and to teach with "the proud feeling of introducing 
his students into a l"'ealm of well-established truth." In sad 
contrast, the philosopl!~r must always qualify his teachings with 
the clause na ccordingto the view of IJhilosopher .x •• • , 11 and 
even that cannot be made with universal consent because of the 
vexing problem of interpretation• Vihat have the scientific 
thinkers done to remedy this a pparently unbearable situation? 
They h a ve de cided that it is the task of true philosophy solely 
to clarify the concepts of science by logical analysis and to 
make metaphysical g eneralizations only within the rang e of ex-
perimental method. In effect, they have sought universa l re-
s pect for philosophy by subordinating it to science.2 
Some of the philosophical reformers have reduced the nee-
e s sary p rocesses of thought to the phys ical movements of corti-
cal cells. Thus, for example, R. B. vVinn, an eminent natural-
ist, argues that "idea lism is quite wrong in ascribing to 
1. Reichenbach, Art.(l948), 331. 
2. Russe~l, Art.(l947), 228. 
11 
rea lity the qualities of thought, as if reason created nature 
and not the other way around ••• 11 1 Others, like J. Dewey, the 
instrumentalist, regard thought as "biolog ical adaptive beha v-
ior, 11 whose u lti..rnate significa nce lies in its " prospective 
control of the cond itions of its erivironment."2 T. Laffe rty 
g ives a clear statement of this i dea of reason: 
We state the world in such a fashion that our statement 
will indica te consequences that will be there in experience. 
The statement is hypothetical in that it is yet to be test-
ed. • • and the distant object makes explicit the hy pothet-
ical r ealities in so far as it answers to the responses of 
the organism. It is to be noted that what answers to the 
hypotheses t h at guide us truly is not a 11 rational order" 
that mirrors the d ialectic of our thinking; wha tever 11 an-
swersll are observable existences in nature t hat are denoted 
by the conclusions of the hypotheses.3 
Another reduction of thou0ht is made in anth ropology and 
psy chology. Thought i s held to be a p rodu ct of subterranean 
roo ts , of irrational b iolog ica l impulses or emotional attra c-
tions and repulsions.4 Belief (e•g• theistic) is seen as the 
result of a persistent i n f antile paternal need, or the result 
of y earning on the part of the philoso l-'her for his ovm 11 best of 
all possible VJorlds. 11 In ou r a g e of ear-catching s logans, such 
p sychological terminology has great popular appeal. This is 
w. E . Rocking's ap~raisal of this tendency: 
Man sees darlmess as the reallty of his light. Explana-
tion is precisely inverted; the rational is understood 
only when it is seen as a manifestation of the irra-
tional.5 
1. Winn, Art.(l939), 293. 4. Blanshard, Art.(l945), 358. 
2. Dewey, Art.ll947), 467. 5. Hocking , Art.(l950), 11. 
3. Lafferty, Art•ll932), 207. 
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The logical positivists c ompletely separate the necessi-
ties of thought from factual existence. For them, there are 
only t wo kinds of meaningful propositions: 1) purely l9g ical 
and 2) factual (i.e. p ertaining to sense data). The former are 
truly necessary, but refer to nothing existent. The lat t er are 
not necessary. According to A. J. Ayer, 11 necessary propositions 
simply record our determination to use word s in a certain fash-
ion."1 And H. Feigl says that a sentence is factually meaning-
less if it contains "extra-log ical terms for which no experi-
ential or O_I:J erational definition can be p rovided.u2 Thus the . 
sou nd metaphysics will be wholly inductive, using the establish-
ed facts of science; but even so, thinks Feigl, its g eneraliza-
tions will lack adequacy and precision, and it will be only 
11 the risky, sangu_ine, disreputable extreme of science. tr3 Re-
garding the justification of induction, the logical emp iricist 
holds that trthe procedure o:f' induction. far from being 
irrational, defines the very essence of rationality." 4 E. Nage l 
g ives very plainly the rationale for separating log ic and :fact: 
For my o~~ part, it is only on the assumption t hat the 
statements of log ic express and h elp organize relations 
betwe en our meanings, and do not :formulate some ultimate 
stru c ture of all being , that I can make intellectual ends 
meet. For I do not know how else to reconcile the neces-
s a ry an.d a priori character of logical principles with 
the requirements of a consistent experimentalism concern-
ing all exis tential matters.5 
How shall we evaluate Lotze 1 s me thod in view -o:r this 
1. Ayer, LTL, 114. 4. Feigl, Art.(l947), 390. 
2. Feigl, Art.(l947), 384. 5. Nagel, Art.(l949), 31-32. 
3. Feigl, Art.(l947), 384-385. 
upheaval, v"fhich at most assigns idealistic metaph y sics to a 
realm of creative or imag inative art , wh ere knowledge is not 
integ rated, but only illuminated poetically by a kind of roman-
tic fanc y . H. W. Schneider lightly terms such 11 illu.minat ion11 of 
solid scientific knowledg e "metaphysical visio!l."l And accord-
ing t o A. Portmann , this "philosophical imagination" has its 
roots in 11 l 1 inconscient collectif , 11 a complex grou p of heredi -
t a ry n e rvous structures . Vfl1ere science marks the end of useful 
knowledge, there imag ination t akes up its primordial role a nd 
spea ks 11 a sa f a5on dans l'ancien langa g e des i mages qui es t le 
sien. 11 2 Must we then agree wi th Reichenbach that s cientifi c 
method alone is the path of a "sober study of truth," and is 
11 the inescapable consequence of an unprejudiced study of the 
history of philoso~hy~ • • the only successful path open to the 
ph ilosophy of the t wentieth century?u3 I f s o, Lo tze 's method 
certainl y must be discarded. We are , however, persuaded by a 
number ·of serious reasons that such a consequence is far from 
necessary or advisable . 
Firstly, when the s keptical views of anthropology are 
generali zed, t h ey h ardl y ma ke sense, but rather seem to reduce 
to nih ilism.4 If thought is con stra ined s olely by cortica l 
changes or by irrational impulses, t h en all theories, i n cluding 
the s e thems e lves, are useless and thov.ght can prove nothing 
objectively. Actually, however, these supposed i n fluences or 
1. Schn eider , Art .(l949 ), 409 . 
2. Portmann , Art .(l950) , 202. 
3. Reic henbac h , Art.(l948 ), 
346 . 
4 . Hocking , Art .(l950 ), 7. 
14 
constraints upon thought, as well as other 'facts' about con-
sciousness which seem so wholly acceptable to the scientific 
reforrners, are more correctly mat te rs of biased conjecture than 
of established experimenta l s cience.l 
Regarding logica l positivism, E. W. Hall and B. Blanshard 
nave conv incingl y contende<;l. that logic truly i mplies ontology .2 
Are there no ontolog ical i mplications in the fact that exist-
ence i s such that some propositions entail others? If log ic s 
are entirely conventional, then v1hy are there none in ·which the 
l avv of contradiction i s replaced by an arbitrary a l ternate? 
Bl a n s hard thinks that rrin the end all necess aT•y propositions 
must be taken to assert of existence, and no factual proposi-
tions are altogether cont ingent.n3 And Dr. E. s. Brightman re-
minds us of the i mportant but often overlooked truth t hat 
"there could be no log ic without a mind to think it. 11 4 
Mo r eover, in restricting meaningful fact to the sense data 
of e xperi ment, the scientific t h inkers make illegitimat e appeal 
to an axiological criterion. Vfuy is it not better to accept all 
the e xpe rience of our ~n~ole conscious life as meaningful fact? 
Experimental method is, to use an expression of James , too well-
buttoned and clean-shaven to speak for a stru_ggling universe of 
lif'e, death, ideals, and values. It requires us to dismiss the 
1. For example, C. C. Pratt, an eminent psychologist, g rants 
that modern p sychology has uncovered little regarding man's 
higher intellectual activities. Pratt, LMP , 166-167. 
2. Hall, Art.(l949), 25. 
3. Blanshard, Art.(l945), 368. 
4. Brightman, NV, 45. 
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primary problems and convictions of the whole p erson f o\1:'· ·the 
sake of complete f a ith in an a b stra ct thread of k:.f'lowl e de e t hat 
as y et barely encompasses a p ebble or t wo in the v a st s a nds of 
e x i s tence and f a ct. The abstra ct c h aracter of experimental meth-
od is evident in its p resuppositions ( a s enmnera ted by Dr. 
Bright man): a unifie d self, obser ved da ta in cons ciousne s s, the 
v a lidity of purpose and rea son, men ory t ha t permits recognition 
of p ast e xperience, an objective world, a temporal process, a n d 
a society of persons.l 
Th e a dh erents of scientif ic method are not properly jus ti-
fied on t h eir premi s es to classify sta tements of relig iou s and 
axiolog ical da ta as 11 emotive 11 and h e n ce f a ctually me anin g l e ss. 
Analy sis c a n neve r g r a sp values, and exp e r i ment c a n never re-
veal a relig ious order of thing s; and by the same token, both 
are e qu ally i ncap able of judg ing the non-e x is t ence o f v a lues 
a nd relig ion.2 That is, to isolate on eself in scientific me t h-
od i s to p reclude all judgment, p ro or con, rega rding anything 
other than sense exp e r ience. Therefore, when the experimenta list 
r e formers claim tha t scient ific meth od is best for philosophy 
they a re palpably i n consistent. Hov:ever, the scient ist c a nnot 
h elp but presuppose some objective values; for every experi-
ment is con ducted on the a s sumption t hat it h a s real value as 
a contribution to knowledg e or at lea st to t h e p ersonal enjoy-
ment of t h e experimenter. And in p r a c t ical life t h e scientist 
1. Brightman, Art.(l938), 1 36-143. 
2. Bright man, Art.(l920), 371-373. 
~ 
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as much as everyone else ac t s on the concrete reality of social 
and economic values. Yet these i mportant valuations cannot be 
supp orted by scientific methodology. 
Therefore, no arbitrary limita tion of reason can justify 
itself a s ~ method of philosophy. An adequate method must 
rather allow all of conscious experience to be considered mean-
i ngful f a ct; it must lead to what s. C. Pepper calls "a larg e 
a.'11ount of corroboration in the handling of the totality of evi-
dence.111 Experience may :bruly be e xplained only if science, as 
well as other limited fields, are included in a synopsis, in 
which an attempt is made to judg e of things as a whole. We must, 
as A. N. Vfuitehead urges, explore e xperience with synoptic 
h y potheses: 
The true method of philosophical con struc t ion is to frame 
a scheme of ideas the best that one can, and unflinchingly 
to explore the interpretation of experience in terms of 
tha t scheme ••• The i mport a nce of philosophy lies in its 
sustained eff ort to make such schemes explicit, and there-
by capable of criticism and improvement.2 
V!T'na t is needed is Lotze's confidence in reason, and a ·will to 
i understand life as a whole. This f a ith may not indeed lead us 
quickly into the promised land, but it at least leaves open the 
possibility that there is such a land with an acces s ible path 
leading to it, and makes thinking a momentous adventure. To 
deny this confidence may seem like sober scientific modesty, 
but, as Lotze perceived, it is really more a k ind of des pair, inl 
11. ~e?per, Art.(l943), 262. . 
1
2. Wrntehead, PR, x. See also Br1ghtman, 
discussion of synoptic method. 
IT£', 22-29 for a 
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which we may, at any point in our thinking when difficulties 
become too unbearable, shut ourselves off from the concrete 
world. Much thinking today reflects such despair. The modern 
scientific s p irit manifests an abundance of penetrating and 
often uncharitable expressions of aversions, but a lack of pos-
itive contributions to a philosophical understanding of life. 
Lotze long ago recognized this danger and urged a struggle 
against any doctrine which would impoverish faith without en-
riching knowledge.l 
We conclude then that Lotze's method exemplifies the true 
philosophical s pirit, and that, far from being invalidated by 
the truly marvellous advances of modern science, it is more 
than ever needed for a balanced interpretation of life as a 
whole. 
1. MIG, II, 718. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE AXIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LOTZE'S MONISM 
Lotze's metaphysical monism springs from two main strands 
of thought: the axiolog ical and the ontolog ical. However, these 
strands are not at all indifferent to each other. Lotze's argu-
ment rather consists in a remarkab le interwe aving, in which the 
two strands either explicitly or implicitly supplement and 
·strengthen one another at each point. In this chapter, we sha~~ 
consider the axiological aspect of this interweaving. Lotze's 
theme is that values (and hence also personality) are . of funda-
mental co smic significance, and that this implies a moni.stic 
personal Supreme Good. 
1. The Three Elemental Realms of Knowledge 
It seems, for Lot ze, that the source of the difficulties 
and doubts i nvolved in any view of the world lies in the recip-
rocal relations of three forms of lmowledge, not log ically de-
ducible one from another , yet upon which all judgments of real-
ity must be based. These three "elemental rea lmsn are the 
necessarily valid truths of thought , immediately g iven facts of 
re a lity, and determinations of wo rth.l 
i. Necessarily Valid Truths. In this clas s a re included 
such universal truths as t he log ical laws of identity and 
1. MIG, I, 417-418; MIG, II, 575; AES, 9-11. 
cont r a dic t ion, and mathematical intuitions of number, succes-
sion, etc. The s e nece ss ities of thought lead us to postulate 
one unive rsally v a lid order in nature , according to which cer-
t Hin defin'i te results necessarily- flow from certa in conditions .1 
Only on this basis is science possible. Even ideas of divine 
reality can s atisfy us only if they are in ha~nony with the 
binding force of these laws.2 But universal tr·uths have binding 
force only in application to an a lready ex isting reality . They 
tell us vnLat must follow from certa in condition s, but no actual 
occurrence of conditions can be deduced from them.3 
ii. I mmediately Given Facts of m~ality . VVhile the l a ;;-;r s of 
thought present thems elves as nece s sary but without con tent, the 
g iven contents of perception convers ely convey no evident neces-
sity. The actua l features of reality to which we are accustomed 
could just as wel.l exist in different forms or not at all.4 . We 
can see no rat ional necessity for the rea lization of a partie-
ular color. The content of sensat ions, holds Lotze, 11 is, and is 
as it is, by i mmediate revelation which we can but receive."5 
iii. Determinations of Worth. Finally, not only do we 
observe reality as active according to the e t ernal but indif-
ferent t~lths of thought, but reality also elicits from us 
judgments of worth. Vve cannot regard carefully even t h e most 
connnonpla ce phenomena without perceiving in them something of a 
1. MIG, 
2. MIG, 
3 . MIG, 
4. MIG, 
II, 
II, 
II, 
II, 
600. 
689. 
661. 
575. 
5. MIG, II, 662 . Dr. Brightman 
calls such ultimate contents 
"brute fact. 11 See Brightman, 
POR, 1 68 , 320. 
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f avoring or a disturbing influence upon our souls.l We see 
re a lity working toward ends, toward the fulfillment of which 
v a rious parts are brought together according to universal l aws.2 
Such worth determinations a re p o ss i ble only on the bas is of an 
orig i nal p ecu liarit y of the mind, by which we become aware of 
the v a l u e s in changing reality in terms of feelings of p leasure 
a nd pain.3 
2. The Nature and Function 
of Feeling in Value Jud@nent 
i. The Feelings of Pleasure and Pain. The states of pleas -
ure a n d pain should, a ccording to Lo tze, be sharply distinguish-
ed from bare sensations, which are "indifferent percep t i ons of 
a certain content."4 The mere relat ions of simu ltaneous i mpres-
sions or ideas do not of themselve s produce feelings . Rather, 
it is vnLen such relations act as stimuli upon the sou l as a 
whole tha t the soul rea c ts a ccord i ng t o its original and uni que 
c ~pacity for producing fe e lings . Lo tze says that it is 
a p robable hypothesis t hat feelings are the results a nd 
tokens of t he a greement or d is agreement between t h e exci-
tations produced~in us , and the conditions of our perma-
nent well-be i ng . 0 
The p owe r of i deas and sensat ions within us is due not s o nruch 
to t h e indifferent magnitude with which their content i s made 
known, but to their total effect of excitation or a g itation on 
the whole soul. Thus Lo tze wri tes : 
1. MIC, I, 241; PSY, 73. 4. PSY, 73. 
2 . AES, 10. 5. PSY, 74. 
3. MIC, I, 240. 
The streng th of the sensation is of far less moment 
than that which, in the conne ction of ou r memories, 
intentions1 and e xpectations, it me ans, indicates, or foret e lls. 
Now ·what are the forms of these re sults of a gitation on 
the s ou l? Lot ze classifies them into the two general designa-
tions of pleasure and pain. Pleasure is the feeling that arises 
u pon the occasion of "an exercise of possible functions with in 
the limits in which this exercise answers to the con ditions of 
the well-being and continuance of the \Whole."2 In oth er words, 
I 
in ~eeling pleasure the soul re a cts to stimulations wh ich har-
monlze with its di r ec t ion, condition, or form of "vital evolu-
tion, 11 and which promote its cons cious striving . · It b ecomes con-
scious of the exercise of its resulting functions as of an 
"enhanced v a lue in its ex i s tence. 11 3 On the oth er hand, pain is 
the fe e ling which results when a stimulus sets up changes or 
excitations vvhich oppo se the conditions of well-being. The soul 
then usually r eact s in an effort to overcome the attendant 
strife and d i stur bance.4 
Lotze assmnes t h at there is in some de gree a constant 
" e conomy of vital functions" or general conditions of well-
... 
being, so that the same stimu lus applied repeatedly would g ive 
rise to the same fe eling . However, in addition to this con stan t 
factor, t h ere a re present much more i mportant variable f a ctors 
·which condi t ion the intens ity of a feeling. Of g reat i mportance 
are t he n~mber and kind of connections which the feeling has at 
1. MET, II, 225. 3 . MIC , I, 240. 
2. MET,_ II, 225; PSY, 74. 4. MIC, I, 178-179, 240,. 
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the time with other feelings. And most important is the total 
s tate of fe eling at the instant when a particular feeling 
occurs. Lotze writes that the feeling has more or le ss value 
"according to the closeness or distance of its relationshi p to 
that which is moving our feeling at the moment."l 
But Lot ze cautions that thes e theoretical postulates are 
not to be t aken as descriptions of mechanism of feeling . It is 
not true t hat the soul first perceives its excita tions , then 
relates them to its conditions of well-being, and fina lly de-
cides wh ether to produce a feeling of plea sure or of pain.2 
Rather, t h e feelings arise i :r.nnediately from within "without l"e-
vealing the internal motion of the soul whence they spring. 11 3 
I Feeling s are exactly like colors or sensations, which, though 
they are certainly occas ioned by complex bodily processes, in 
their i nmediate appearance tell us nothing whatever con cerning 
those processes.4 
ii. Feeling in Cognitive Activity. Besides the activities 
of the sou l in idea ting on the bas i s of pe rceptions, and in 
r elating accordi ng to the necessary truths of t he understanding , 
Lot ze distingu i shes a higher co gnitive activity--that of reason 
a ppr eciat ive of worth.5 VJhe reas the f a culty t ha t Lotze calls 
"understanding" relates elements of reality indifferently and 
without any re gard fo:r any tota lity or unity, "reason" is 
1. MET, II, 226. 4. PSY, 75. 
2. PSY, 74. 5. MIC, I, 236, 244. 
3. l'!IIC, I, 241. 
~, -----------------------...... 
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guided by the idea "that the sum of reality can e x ist only as 1 
~ I, 
a perfect unity and totality."l 
As t h e style of architecture which we select for a build-
ing determines the way in which every part of it is t o be 
combined with every other, but leaves wholly undefined the 
final form of · the structure, the plan of Vihich, on the con-
trary, i s prescribed by the end it has to serve, so the 
principles of unders t anding eY~ibit to us the style of the 
world' s construction2 but not the form of the outlines of its completed whole. 
Lotze holds t ha t re a son requires the plan or end of the form of 
the world to be that which is a "guarant ee of the value of the 
l actual, 11 that in which the ultimate well-being of the individ-
lual is s ecured.3 ~Dd he thinks that 
in its feeling for the value of thing s and their relations, 
our reas on possesses as genuine a revelation as, in the 
p rinciples of log ical inves·tigation, it has an indispens-
able i nstrtooent of experience.4 
During all the efforts of the systematic scientific understan d-
i ng ( which in our day denounces Lotze's idea of reason a nd calls 
it uemotive 11 ), Lotze declares t hat reas on holds f ast to an 
"unquenchable trust 11 in the future.5 
But since the only basis for the a ffirmation by reason of 
a .c ertain form of the world is the feeling of the value which 
it finds in this form, g r eat caution is needed, for there are 
numberless circu1nstances by which reason may be deceived, 
through undisciplined habits of thinking, i ndividual peculiar-
ities, and limitations of experience. Thus, while Lot ze main-
tains that worth-determining reason is always t he "animating 
1. MIG:, I, 23 7. 4. MIG , I, 245 • 
2. MIC, I, 238. 5. MIG, I, 245. 
3. MIG , I, 244 • 
and quickening breath of all huma n efforts, 11 he admits that a 
conm1on norm is difficult to determine . He concludes t hat we had 
better be cont ent with demonstrating that the princip les of 
scientific understanding are t h e "explicable parts" of the in-
tellectual treasures of reason. The methods of understanding 
are not extr a neous to reas on, but proceed from it as the only 
methods that we mortals have of realizing , h owever i mperfectly, 
the re quirement of reason, namely, a harmonious world view.l 
iii. Fe e ling as a Basis for Art and Morality . The p ervad-
ing presence of feelings of the favoring or d i s turbing nature 
of the world environment is, a ccording to Lotze, the r e ason for 
much of our higher culture. Feelings are bases for i ma gination, 
from which spr i ng the creative impulses of art. Aesthetic 
a ppreciat ion and creation both lie in the 
delic a cy of appreh ension by which the mind is able to 
clo the the VT6rld of valu es in the world of forms or to 
become ins t inctive ly aware of t he happiness concea led 
under the enveloping forms .2 
In regard to mo r a lity, the s ame worth- determinations which 
we make c oncerning exte r nal r eality lea d us to . judg e of our own 
worth and significance, "of the ends we may hope to attain , of 
the dut ies which are incumbent upon us. 11 3 For Lot ze, moral ac;.. 
tion, if it is anything of v a lue, mu st produce a fe eling of 
pleasure in a being capable of enjoyment.4 But he denies that 
~ this is an advoc aey of hedonism, for there is no general 
1. MIC, I, 246 . 3 . MIC, I, 684. 
2. MIC, I, 244 . 4. O:PP, 19. 
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plea sure v;hich v1e may set up as a goal of action, and which can 
become actual as a p s y cholog ical s tate.l Just as motion or 
color in g 0neral cannot be seen, but only s pecific thing s in 
motion or definite colors, so also feeling s cannot be a ntic-
ipa ted as genera l forms. 
"Viill and desire themselves," Lotze states, "are what they 
are only by their consciousness of rela tion to something worthy 
I i~ their objects."2 Such relations, being in harmony or discord 
Wlth the state of t h e apprehending subject, re sult in fe e ling s 
of p leasu re and pain. For Lotze, the subsequent efforts to hold 
to pleasure and to avoid pain are "the only s pring s of all 
practica l activity." 3 He believes t h at the opposing Kantian 
idea of an altogether unconditioned object of worth s hoots be-
y ond the mark of tru th. 4 
For mora l norms, Lot ze would a p p e a l to t h e r u le of con-
science, which he holds has in a ll a g es provided landrnarks of 
rights and duties. But in addition, he believes t h at t h ough 
t h ere is an "inde s ti'u ctible core of good ••• inn s te in men's 
consciences," d i s ciplined reflect ion and education according to 
esta blished practical rules are necessa~J for a clea r insight 
into the general conditions which a r e to be held oblig a t ory.5 
3. The Good as Living Love 
Unify ing the Three Element a l Realms 
1ie now arr ive at t h e considerations toward which this 
1. OPP, 18 -19; MIG, I, 694-695. 4. 1·/IIG, I, 690. 
2. MIG, I, 688. 5. OPP , 22; MIG, I, 712-713 . 
3. l!II9, I, 688~ 
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expo s ition has be en moving , namely, the manner in v: hich Lot ze 
provides an objective basis for the validity of value deter-
minations. Lotze contends that so long as we must conceive o-r 
necessary laws, i nnnediate facts of reality, and i deas of worth 
as pointing to independent components of reality we have nei-
ther the unity needed for t heoretical progress nor the con-
fi~mation which our hopes re quire. For him, such indifferent 
i ndependence is thus unthinkable, and must g ive way to a con-
viction that t here is one origin from which the t hree fo~ms 
flow as as pects. This conviction cannot be veri f ied scientifi-
cally, for its basis is essentially t he "living f a ithu is such 
a 'hypoth esis.l 
The view that the world is a development of a blind force, 
·working according to universal laws, but devoid of good or evil, 
fails to make intelligible the rise of the light of value and 
goodness, holiness and beauty, out of the darkness of t h e 
source.2 And for Lotze it cannot be t hat the eternal and self-
evident truths, which h ave such meaning and authority in the 
world, are t h emselves based on a meaningless source. He believes 
t hat they are rather only the first consequences which the 
Living Me aning of all reality set in t h e pursuit of its ends 
in the ordering of wha t was worthy of such order. We cannot 
deduce reality from this Meaning, but can only imperfectly trace 
re ality to it,3 for vre stand not at the source and center o-r 
1. IviiC, II, 576. 3. MET, II, 319. 
2. MIG, II, 718. 
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reality, but 11 at the farthest extremities of its structure, 
loud with the whirl of machinery."l Lotze acknowledges the in-
exactness of his axiological conviction, but says: 11 I still feel 
certain of being on the right track, when I seek in t ha t which 
should be the ground of that which is."2 
Ins i ght into what ought to be will alone open our eyes to 
disc e rn what is; for there can be no body of f acts, no 
arrangement of things, no course of destiny, apart from the 
end and meaning of the whole, from which each part has re-
ceived, not only existence, but also the active nature in 
which it glories.3 
But is it pos s ible to form a more concrete conception of 
this living sou_rce of unity which f a ith affirms? In answer, 
Lotze beg ins with the facts t h rough which we form notions of 
good things. By- 1neans of feeling s we as sign value or goodness 
to a large variety of things. This sh ould lead us to seek for 
a universal character of goodness by virtue of which thing s 
occasion worth-determining feeling s within us. VJhat is this 
common element of goodness of which all good things partake and 
are reflections? Lotze's axiological f a ith enables him to 
affirm such a universal, not as a bare foTinal abstraction, but 
as a concre t e existent, which "i~ that which it indicates as a 
quality in the i ndividual real thing ."4 
Now good things or actions do not exist as such apart from 
a mind by which they are evaluated or willed. Lotze thus sug-
e gests that we look for a quality of mind a s t h e good-in-itself, 
of which the goodne s s of things is but a reflection. He offers 
1. MIC, I, 400. 3. ~'liC, I, 392. 
2. Tv'IET, II, 319. 4. MIC, II, 719. 
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the hypothesis that the quality of mind which may.:~be called 
good-in-it s elf i s benevolence--th e sacrificing of worth for 
I self for the sake of worth for others. He say s: nThe only thing 
that is rea lly good is that Living Love t hat wllls the blessed-
nes s of others."1 Lotze's i dea of the intrins ic goodness of a 
benevolent mi nd is as follows: 
This, havlng rea lity as a movement of' the whole living 
mind which fe e ls, wills, and lmows i:e s elf, is .just on that 
account not merely a formal general condi t ion t he f u lfill-
ment of which by any othe r would entitle that othe r to t h e 
appellation of good, with ou t t he condition itself being 
good, but this it is y,rhich alone in the true sense has or 
is this worth, and all else--resolves, sentiments, a ctions, 
and s pecial directions of the will--all these sh are with it 
only derivatively the one name of g ood.2 
In the activities of human beings, benevolent love may b e mis-
directed because of defective foresight, s o heed must be g iven 
to the regulative commands of a tra ined conscience. However, the 
divine source of reality needs n o such guidance, for nothing is 
prior to it, neither eternal truths, nor i mmedia te rea lity , nor 
"North. Divine Living Love or the .Supreme Gooa. unfolds itself in 
one movement which to finite cognition a p:pe a rs as t h ree realms 
l or as p ects of t h e Good, which is the movement's end, the con-
structive i mpulse of rea lization, and the univers al tru ths t hat 
are means to the end. 3 
1. MIC, II, 721. 
2. MIG, II, 721. Dr. Brightman bases h is rrone vigorous argu-
ment for ilmnortali ty 11 on the basic truth t hat "va lue is 
p eT'Sonali ty at its b e s t. rt Thus if God is a good conserver 
of valu es, h e must a lso be a g oo d con server of persons, 
without whose i mmort a lity there would be a g reat lo s s of 
the h i ghest i nt rins ic values • .See Bri ght man, POR, 400-404. 
3. MIC, II, 722. 
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Lotze thus binds the three elemental realms of reality in 
terms of a lofty faith. His conclusion is that the Supreme Good 
is the only ba sis for the validity of value determinations, and 
for that matter of all metaphy_sical axioms. He thinks that all 
of reality is brought forth 11 tn order t h at the ••• Hi ghest 
Good may become for the (finite) s pirit an object of enjoyment 
in all the multiplicity of forms possible to it.nl 
All bein~ , all t hat we call mode and form, thing and event, 
the whole sum of Nature, can be nothing else than the con-
dition for the realization of Good, can be as it is only 
because th~s in it the infinite worth of the Go·:>d manifest-
ed it s elf. 
Hence cognition of value, however i mperfect it may be, is ob-
jective and meaningful, for the universe itself has eternal 
value. In fact, in p erceiving the i mport of things, their forms 
of destiny a!ld t h eir contributions to the sum of reality, we 
possess t h e essential truth of thing~; Lotze holds that "it is 
I 
only for the realization of this tru th that things exist."3 
He likens human cognitive powers to the a pprehens ion of a s p ec-
tator at a t h eater, whose main enjoyment and edification lie in 
an underst anding of the significance of the performance, com-
pared to which a knowledge of the mechanics and machinery o p er-
ating the sta ge changes is entirely unessential.4 It is through 
co gni t ion of value that man may, and indeed must, a pply himself 
to that labor which constitutes his eternal calling: 
As in the great fabric of the universe the creative spirit 
imposed on itself l.mchangeable laws by which it moves the 
1. Of.IIET, 152. 3. MIG, II, 356. 
2. MIG, I, 396. 4. OMET, 152, 159 •· 
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world of phenomena, diffusing the fulness of the Highest 
Good throughout innumerable forms and events, and distill-
ing it a g ain from them into the bliss of consciousness and 
enjoyment; so must man, aclmowledging the same laws, devel-
op g iven existence into a knowledge of its value, and the 
value of his ideals into a series of external forms pro-
ceeding from himself.l 
Lo tze stresses t ha t t h is me aning of reality, this Highest 
Good, cannot be described so easily as it s derivatives, which 
are made clear to us t h rough their manifestation in exp erience. 
Nor can t h e Highest Good be re garded as a p rinciple from which 
all metaphysica l truths may be deduced; for our human minds, a 
deduction of the world of forms from the world of v a lue s is 
i mpossible.2 Lotze writes: 
The very name, the 'Highest Good,' designates t h e content, 
the es s e n tia of t h e highest principle, but not t h e form of 
e x i s ten ce which we must attribute to it in order to com-
prehend it as a conditioning cau se of t h e world of phenom-
ena.3 
The conclusion, t h en, of Lotze's axiological strand of 
thought i s t hat " the substantial ' Ground' of the world is a 
Sp irit, whose essence ou r co gnition were ( ~:de] able to desig-
nate only as the living and exi s tent Good. 114 For him, furth er 
p ro gress in metaphys ics lie s wholly in the union a n d elabora-
tion of three postulates: 1}- t he thought of the Infinite Grou nd 
to which ontology leads , 2) t he thought t h at all genuine real-
ity is spiritual, and 3) the thought of the Hi ghest Good as the 
reason for the forma t ion of the world. 5 
1. MIG, I, 401. 4. OMET, 154-155. 
2. OivlET , 15 3; MIG , I, 3 9 6 • 5. OMET, 154. 
3. 01'-IIET, 154. 
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4. Natur a l Evil and 
E. s. Brightman's Doctrine of' 11 The Given11 
Lotze makes no pretens e of' his axiolog ical conviction that 
e the three elemental realms of ex pe r ience, namely , f a cts, l aws, 
and v a lues, a re reflections of three realms of reality, and that 
t he se realms of r ea lity are not merely disjointed processes, but 
rather are three unified aspects of a teleologically unfolding 
monis t ic Good. Such is what he call s his 11 living faith 11 in this 
.. 
hypothe s is, that any other a ccount of the three realms of ex -
perience is, for h im, ~mintelligible. 
vVhat factors are evic1en tly· i mplicit ~hi · Lotze's . axiolog ical 
faith? We should not deny that quite pos sibl y Lo tze's aesthetic 
disposition in some measure contri butes t oward the fo1~ation of 
such a lofty hypothesis . But we should maintain that any such 
i mmediate ae s thetic influence is not neai'ly i mportant as t vro 
factors which demand serious philosophical cons ideration. The 
f i rst i s the assrunption that human experience is in some measure 
a true reflection of the obj ective co smic processes. With out 
this assQmption, the outcome, as Lotze percreives in his intr o duc 
tion to h is Metaphysics, is positivistic nihilism. The second 
factor is h is philosophical criterion of truth. When he cont in-
ually i ns i st s tha t it is unintellig ible that reason whould rise 
out of what is not reason, wha t does he mean? He does not me an 
e that it is incons istent to think so, but rather that it is only 
on the assunwtion that the ob jective processes are the activitie 
of one purposive Spirit that we can underst and or make coherent 
our own existence, and that the asslJJnpt ion of' a conf idence in 
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in reason is fully justified. Impersonal views of reality can-
not a ppeal to such a criterion; they have in fact none. The 
are better or closer to truth than the personalistic view. 
Thus Lotze's postulate of an unfolding monistic Good rests 
mainly on a serious a pneal to the criterion of intellig ibility 
or coherence. But now is it really coherent enthusiastically 
and unreservedly to assume a monistic Good as the source of all 
existence? Should not the e:~dst ence of natural evil g ive cause 
for at least some hesitation? 
Lotze "\78.S always fully aware of the problem of evil. How-
ever, he was never satisfied enough with the absolutistic ap-
proach to offer a whole - hearted defense of it. In the l'.!Iicro-
cosmus, he confesses that there appears to be an irl ... e concilable 
contradiction between the omnipotence and the gooc1ness of God , 
and that "we do not understand the solution which we yet 
believe in. rrl He writes further: 
I might ••• appeal to the fuller dimensions of true reality 
in which may be reconciled supreme goodne s s and the exist-
ence of evil, which in our view must always conflict; but 
al l that I should accomplish with such a juggle of words 
would be to veil the admission which we must frankly make , 
that we cannot even imagine the direction in which th~ un-
kno\vn conciliation of the difference is to be sought. 
In the first edition of his lectures on the philosophy of reli-
g ion, he e;oes so far as to say that "we must take seriously the 
statement which we often hear made : that the reason for a meth-
1. MIG, II, 717. 
2. MIG, II, 718. 
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I od of guidance which we do not understand lies in the inscru t-
able wisdom of God."l However, in the second edition, represent 
ing probably his final thought, he pronounces the problem to be 
an enigma_, made bearable only by a prac tical religious faith 
which he ca lls "a deed that is to be ac credited to character ."2 
Lotze's pe r sonalistic followers have almost without excep-
tion accounted for evil on the absolutistic basis of t h e 
idea l wh ole. In recent times, however, Dr . E . s. Brightman has 
formulated an unusual theory of a finite God, which wou ld in 
lax•g e me a sure mitigate Lotze's theoretical hesitancy . This the -
ory h a s greatly influenced contemporary personalistic idealism 
and has re c eived much attention in theo logical discussions. Dr . 
Brightman ascribes evil not to the will of God, but to the hin-
drances imposed on God's will by certa in e ternal , unwil l ed, a nd 
uncreated elements or processes present within God's unity of 
consciousness.3 These non-volunta1~ consci ous processes as well 
as the voluntary r a tional and non-rational forms of activity 
are included in wh a t Dr . Brightman calls "The Given." The Given 
consists of 
the eternal uncreated laws of reason and also of e qu ally 
eternal and uncreated processes of non-rational conscious -
1. OPRl, 145. 
2. O£'R2, 128 . 
3. This view may be regarded as a s pecia l c a s e of Yihitehead's 
general suggestion that "the temporal V:iOrld is to be con-
strued in terms of additional formative elements v1hich are 
not definable in the terms which are applicable to God 11 
Dr. Brightman vwuld alter this to rea d:-" ••• not defln-
able in the terms which are a pplicable to God's rational 
and good will. 11 See Vf'ni tehead, RIM, 99. 
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ness vihich exhibit all t h e ultimate qualities of sens e ob-
jects (qualia), disorderly impulses and desires , such ex-
periences as pain and suffering, the forms of s pace and 
time, and whatever in God is the s ource of surd evil.l 
Go d , according to Dr. Bri ghtman, controls The Given in the 
sense t hat he uses the rational as pects (like Plato's Pattern) 
as instrument s of experience in fa shioning the non-rational as -
pec t s (like Pl ato's Receptacle ) in s o f ar as poss ible f or i deal 
v a lues.2 11 God's will is limited both by eternal necessities of 
reason a n d by eternal experiences of brute fact. 11 3 Dr. Bright-
man stresses that it is only in this res pect t h at God is fin ite; 
in g oodness a nd love ( as well as in durat i on) he is infinite. 
Thus all n atural evils--global disturbances , mental illnesse s , 
a nd nmnerous terrible bodily diseas es --are the outcome of God's 
struggle vvith Th e Given.4 This struggle is one of eternal and 
inexhaustible 11 perfectibility11 (i. e . never re a ching static per-
fection ). 5 
In reply to numerou s objections which have been raised re-
garding The Given, Dr. Brightman has g iven ·what seems to us to 
be a most convincing defense .6 Since then, however, Dr. L. H. 
DeWolf has advanced a fresh challeng e. Dr. DeWolf's arr;uments, 
found in h is short but excellent critique of nee-ortho dox ir-
rationalism, cons i st in 1) the c ommon absolutistic appeal to 
human limita tions of lmo vvl edge, and 2 1) the obj e ction 
that the doc trine of The 
1. Bri ghtman, POR, 337. 4. Brightman, Art . (19 32)2, 
2. Brightman, POR, 338 . 135 
3 . Brightman , POR, 300. 5. Brightman, POR, 340. 
6. Bri ghtman , Art.(l932 )2. 
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Given does not explain evil.l Dr. Br i ghtman has ade quately an-
swered t he first.2 Renee we need briefly notice only the second. 
Dr . DeWolf writes: 
Actually the me aning of an event is not one whit further 
exnlained when it has been attributed to The Given, but then 
the very pos sibility of any e xpl anation ever oeing found has 
been denied. For all explanat ion i mplies intellig i bility . 
what is inherently non-rational can neither be i n tellig i ble 
wi t~1 in itself nor c an any inference be made from its ex i st -
ence re$a rding the cau sa t ion of such and such f urther 
even t s.u 
In this pas sage, Dr . DeWolf manifests a speculative rationalis-
tic a pproa ch to a philosophical defin ition of expl anation and 
intelliGibility. His criticism of The Given is thus wholly ex -
ternal, for Dr. Brightman's idea of explanation r es ts, like that 
of Lotze, on more empirical grounds. Certainly, if "the real is 
the rat ional," then evil is eithe r unreal and irl.,ational or it 
is expl ainable entirely in terms of rational ptu•poses. However, 
emp irically the r e are non-rational factors such as value s and 
sens a tions in experience, and we may hence infer t he p r es ence of 
such f actors in God's experience. Therefore, if the empirical 
philoso phical approa ch to evil is true, The Given mo s t c ertain -
ly is an explanation, and, in so far as is empirically possible, 
mal-{es evil i ntellig ible; It seems then that Dr. DeWolf, by rea-
son of h is rationalistic restric t ion of explanation, falls short 
of refuting the Given. His second ob jection presupposes t h e 
truth which the fir s t seeks to establish, namely, that evil is 
1. DeWolf, RRR, 183 . 2 3. DeWolf, RRR, 183 . 4 . For Dr. Bl~:i,ghtman, to · ex 
plain means to "inC"l u de .. 
ln cohe rent cont ext ·, ·n.ot 
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2. See Bri ·ght man, Art. (1932t, 141, 
whe r e he answers Knudson's 
fourth argmnent. 
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part of an ideal rational whole. 
We should also mention F. H. Ross's main thesis a gainst 
The Given. He thinks that Dr. Brightman's doctrin e i mplies a 
meta9hysical dualism, for t h e reason that The Given is present-
ed as a definite force in addi tion to the force of God's will. 
Since Dr. Bright man holds that God's will and his na t ure are 
inseparable, The Given cannot be included in God's nature with-
out also be ing included in his will.1 The force of Ross 's rea-
soning comes from the assumption that God's will expresses his 
whole nature. Emp irically, the grievous character of evil con- -
tradicts this assuL"lp tion, so it must g ive way to the pos sibility 
that God's nature conta ins non-volunta ry processes. It is just 
this possib ility that Dr. Brightman exp).oits to avoid metaphys-
ical dualism, while at the same tj~e accounting for evil. 
Is the finitistic hypothesis an answer then to Lotze's 
hesitancy? It wo uld certainly seem so. In fact, it is quite sur-
prising tha t although Lotze held a serious regard for the abso-
l ut istic possibility, his many-sided probing did not lead him to 
entertain the finitistic view as an equally serious possibility. 
It seems to us t hat one cannot be conside red wi thout bring ing to 
mi nd the other. Evil is surely real and terrible bey on d all rea-
son--this is an empirical fact sufficient enough to lead one 
immediately to a finitistic view of God. On the other hand, we 
cannot lightly put aside the remembrance of our limitations, and 
also that strong axiolog ical hope within, that would li:_ e to see 
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all e x istence without exception traced back to one Good. This, 
vvith soinev,rhat le ss force, keeps us mindful of the absolutistic 
hope. These are the two choices b~f.ore us i gnorant mortals. As 
Dr. Bright man say s: 
The choice is not between divine i mpotence a nd human igno-
rance, but rather between two faiths for us i gnorant mor-
tals. V!e must c hoose bet·we e n the faith that God t s will does 
not produce the evil in question, yet can make all thing s 
vmrk t o g ether for an i n creasing good, and the faith that 
God p roduces both t he evil and also a perfectly ideal out-
come from it.l 
What choice shall we mal~e? Empirically , there is little 
reason to doubt the ade quacy of t h e finitistic hypothesis . It 
is, a s we see it, the task of philosophy to adjust itself to the 
f a cts as we lmow them now, a n d not to 11 adjust 11 t he f a cts to a 
speculative rationalism or to a revelational do gmat ism or to a 
mate rialistic reduction b ased on a fanatical faith in experi-
ment . Philosophy ought to be a down-to-earth regressive investi-
gat ion and not an inflexible leg islat ive int e rpretation of the 
facts. As Lotze suggests, we must al ter all starting notions 
which cannot be held with out contradic tion when our thoughts are 
systemat ized, but which can without contrad iction be rep lace d 
by o thers . Now since natura l evil contradicts our ·i dea:.. or love, 
we mus t alter the general sta rting notion of a monistic all-
begetting Good. He can without contra diction as s 1.:une that evil is 
due to non-voluntary processes within the monistic personality 
of the Good. This, therefore, must be our c h oice. 
1. Brightman , Art .(l932 ), 1 41. 
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Why did not Lotze, especia lly in viev.r of' his admirable em-
pirical methodology, make this choice? Could it possibly have 
been that he was so engrossed in the poetry of his beautiful 
metaphysical monism that he was too insensitive to the brutal 
prose of evil to carry his reasoning in this matter to a defi-
nite empirical hypothesis ? His c onsistent fineness of thought 
and his exhaustive handling of problems make this possibility 
practically unthinkable·. The reason appears to be simply that he 
felt that the a pplication of a thorough empirical methodology to 
the p roblem of evil would lead to a compromise regarding his 
optimistic axiological ideals which would be even more unl)ear-
able than the aQmitted uncertainty of an absolutistic view. In 
support of this conjec ture , we should quote B. P. Bovme , who we 
think was one -...vi th Lotze on theodicy, and who gives a very ex-
plicit statement of his own unwillingnes s to adjust to the facts 
of evil: 
If any one had. an interest in maintaini ng the opposite h~o­
thesis of unwisdom and evil in the world-ground, much might 
be said for it ••• Of course, a purely objective p rocedure 
would demand that we take all the facts into account and 
strike the average. Such a study of the facts would leave us 
in great uncertainty ••• The outcome would probably be the 
affirmati.Jn of a being either morally indifferent, or moral -
ly imperfect, or morally g ood, but limited by some insuper-
able necessity which forbids anything better than our rather 
shabby univers e. But the mind is not satisfied to take this 
road . It will not allow its ideals to collapse without some 
effort to save them. It prefers rather to maintain its faith 
in the ideal , and to set aside the conflicting facts as some-
thing not yet l,mderstood, but which to perfect insight would 
fall into harmony.l 
1. Bovme , THE, 257-258. This passage harmonizes well with 
Lotze's thoughts in Art.(l880), 150, which we have quoted 
on page 8 of this thesis. 
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Re garding Dr . Brightman's definition of The Given , we 
should be more satisfied if the factor "disorderly impulses and 
desires 111 r1ere omitted. This factor is doub tless a s sumed to 
account for global dis t urbances . But why not charg e a ll such 
disturba nc e s to an unknown non-volunta ry "wha tever i n God is the 
source of natural evil 11 ? Then there vmuld be less cause f or an 
objec tion like Dr . DeWolf's, that The Given (i.e. the sources of 
evil in The Given) is 11 a p rojec t ion of confus ion and frustra-
tion within our e x perience to t h e be ing of God himself . 11 2 It 
Y/ O: . .:t l d seem b est not t o press the finitistic vie ·r for concrete 
analo gies, especially since vre obviously do not posse s s creative 
wills (ex c ept perhaps in a very remote sense, as manifest in 
artistic creation). Thus any analogy which might seem a ppro-
priate would g ive lit tle insight into the rise of evil, and 
vJoul d give needless cause for c h arges or anthropomorphic ''pro-
jection. 11 Vie should be content to as cribe all natura l evil to 
a unique inscrutable proce ss in God's being, and to rest the 
hypothesis on the abse n ce o f d isverificatory evidence3 regarding 
l. It is of interest to note tha t t he factor 11 disorderly 
impulsesrr is closely related to Plato' s 11 Recepta cle, 11 the 
primordial chaos of spa ce, a nd discordant and disorderly 
motion . See Bright man, POR, 339 . 
2. De\Volf, RRR , 172. 
3. E . \1. Hall emphasizes the sig n i ficance of disverificatiori in 
metaphysics. He wr ites: "We must remenber t h at disverifica-
t6ry ins tances a re far more significant in decidin g between 
t h e claims of rival metaphys ical hypothese.s than are verifi-
c ator;,r ; tl:ms we shou ld constru.ct our hypothe s es with this in 
mind, and cons tantly be alert in v1eighing them a nd in ad-
vocating t h em for disverification." Hall, Art .(l947) , 191. 
Se e also . h is d iscus sion of the r e lative i mport ance of dis -
verification in s cience and in metaphysics (189-191). 
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the mutu a l c ompat i b ility of this hypo thes is with the personal-
i stic me taphysical which, as we shall s ee, seems to be such an 
inevitable outcome of a conside ration of t he phenomenon of 
r e ciprocal a c tion. 
Before · c oncluding this section, we 13hou ld notice Dr . P. A. 
Bertocci 1 s interesting criticism of The Given. Dr . Bertocci has 
suggested t h at it might be more desirable to c a ll on l y "th e 
chao tic r etardi ng f a c tor· in God's experience" The Given, for the 
reason that we cannot know t hat the rational laws a re immutable 
necessities or a log ical pri~ to God's activity.l This p ro pos-
ed a lteration wou l d be in a ccord wi th Lot ze's argu.rnent a gainst 
the doctrine of pre-mundane truth.2 Th at is, we have no a priori 
right t o subs u..rne this particular vvo r ld under the e asil y con-
c e ivable genera l c at e gory 'all pos s ible worlds ,' and from this 
to infer an i mmutable prius to God ' s rational a ctivity . For who 
c an tell what would be if t h e world we re o therwis e re a lized? 
This seems to us to b e quite tru.e; 1ve must at lea st lea ve open 
/ 
the p oss i b ility t hat there are o th~r possible mo de s of rational 
rea lizat ion by God, and hence that there may be no lo g ical 
ius. 
1. Be rto cci, EAG , 279 . 
2 . VIe are h ere, o f cours e, not conc erned with vthat Lotze was 
pri marily int e re sted in refuting ; namely, the view that 
rat i onal truth is an auth orit a tive rea l m apart from the be ing 
of Go d . Dr. Bright man's doctrine of The Given p ose s only the 
questio n of log ical priu s. I t i s well to note a lso that Dr. 
Bright man does not i nc lude rea son as a phase of The Given in 
Th e Problem of God (1 930). This s ynthesis fir s t a ppe a rs in 
The Find ing of God (1931). 
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On the other hand , we see no reason vnLy the absolute 
necessity and validity of the forms of r eason as we know them 
now ·should not be an acceptable empirical basis for the hypo-
thesis that God truly has a rational given. On such a basis, we 
should judge that Dr . Bri ghtman's idea of The Given is amply 
substantiated. In any c ase, howeve r, the doctrine of a non-
l untary g iven as the source of natural evil is unaffected. 
The above discussions bring us to the con clusion of our 
xamination of the finitistic view as a possible answer to 
hes ita ncy regarding the problem of evil. It seens to us , 
that the finitistic view is the only poss ible consistent 
of the empirical methodology whose p rinciples Lotze 
so admirably formulated. Strangely enough, however , he 
even entertain the idea of such a solution. The assump-
a finite Go d is a re as onable outcome of a serious 
to account for the facts here and now, and , contrary to 
1 s fears that religious ideals vrould be undermined, it can 
Dr. Bri ghtman 's philo s o phy demonstrates) be stated in such 
way as to be fully compatible wi th a rich and wholes ome 
ligious faith. Lotze's over-opt i mistic doctrine of an unfold-
ng monistic Good d iffusing itself throughout rea lity is certain 
y what we t:wuld lik e to be true, what we c e rtainl y mu st wish 
or; but the fact s as we know them now (not as we mi ght know 
inexorabl y to point us away from ou r likes and wishes 
toward a far less poetical actuality. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE MONI ST IC I MPLICATI ONS OF' RECIPROCAL ACTION 
In the preceding chapter we followed Lotze's axiolo gical 
strand of thought to the postulate of a monist ic Good--the 
source of all r eality. We s hall now turn to t h e ontolog ical 
strand, through which Lotze, · employ ing a sens itive and penetrat -
ing dialectic that subjects every i d ea to a mo st comprehensive 
criticism, arrives at the concep t of a n i mmateria l monistic 'M 
a s mediator and susta iner of all interaction. 
1. The Essence of a Thing 
According to Lotze, the primary fact tha t con cerns meta-
ph y sic a l inquiry is change, which dominates the whole range of 
existence.l Now h ow does Lo tze 's do c tr ine of change be g in? At 
the outse t, h e, in agreement with the or.dinary view of things, 
acc epts what sensuous e xperience p resents , namely , a multiplic-
ity of c han g ing and interacting things. This changing r eality 
is ordinari·ly t aken to have a persistent existence entirely 
indep endent of any obs erver, and it is this very i ndependence 
that e s t ablishes rea lity as objective. If we now ask what it is 
that constitutes the true essen ce of actual thing s as distin-
guished from those me rely imag i ned, the most convincing answer 
would seem to be t ha t it is just the objective reality of t h ose 
1. lVIET , I , 2 • 
conne ctions which a c tually bind t hings . 1 This answer v e ry n a t-
urally presupposes i nde pendent centers of relations to which 
the changing states of an i ndividual and also its changing re-
la t ions wi th o the r thing s attach.2 From the standpoint of this 
cornnon view, Lotze raises two of the mos t i mportant questions 
of ontology : 1) vTI1at is the peculiar nature of the objective 
relations connecting t h ing s?· 2) How must we conceive t h e being 
of these centers of relations about which the chang ing states 
of a thing adhere?3 
In answer to the latter, Lotze opposes himself to the 
notions of "pure being" and creative "putting ." He regards them 
as mere verbal indications of the somehow co1nmon character of 
all existence, but certainly not ontolog ical explanation s of 
this chara cter. Here, as very fre quently in his discussions, he 
detects in such notions that curious and vain attem~t to show 
h ow reality came to b e as it is, where a s t h e p roper study of 
metaphysics is only reality as g iven, assuming of c ourse t hat 
there was an i n comprehens ible orig inal "creative breath 11 that 
gave things t h e common cha:b'acter of existence "vhich we seek to 
make theoret ically explicit. 4 Lotze argues that it is much more 
p lausib l e to assume t ha t r eality with all its relations came 
i nto b eing in a single a ct, and not according to those succes-
s ive strat~ which our abstractions all too easily suggest.5 
Certain l y , holds Lot ze, we must g ive up a ll ideas of homoge-
1. 
2. 
4. MET , 
5. MET, 
MIG 
195-196. 
40-46; 
580-587. 
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neous centers of' "pure being ." Lotze objects to Herbart's idea 
of' a simple supra-sensible determinate quality posited in crea-
tion as the essence of' a t h ing , f'or the reas on t hat it does 
not explain the f o r m of' a c h ang ing t h ing at a ny g iven ins tant. 
That is, the s imple quality C, which supposedly is t h e e ssence 
of' the thing in all its succe s sive forms a 1 , a 2 , ••• , ~' cannot 
unreservedly be identif'ied with a ny single ap, which e x cludes 
all o t her fo rms.l Rejecting a ll such attempts to arrive at a 
simple "core" of things , to explain the change able by what is 
11nchangeable, Lotze turns to t h e view advocated in ancient 
times by Heraclitus, that all exi s tence is flux, t hat rea lity 
is process, and tentatively suggest s t ha t the unch ang eable 
e s sence of' a thing lies in a certa in pattern of cha n g e. 
Thus, it may b e sta ted as a general truth, t hat o u r idea 
of t ha t which makes a thing wha t it is con si s ts only in 
the thought of a certain regularity with which it c h anges 
to and fro within a limited circle of states whe ther s pon-
taneous l y or under visible external cond itions, without 
pass in~ out of t h is circle, and without ever having an ex-
istence on its own a ccount and a part from any one of the 
f o rms which with in this circle it can assume. 2 
He cautions against g r oun d ing the poss i b ility of t h is regular-
ity in any authorita t ive realm of g eneral l aws, like the Fate 
of early Gre e k spe c u la t ion; or in a ny realm of Pl a tonic I d e a s. 
And in a ccordance \Yith Hu.me, we mu st not think that our lmowl-
e dge of t h e regul a rity afford s us an exhaus tive re p r e senta tion 
of t hat a ctual conne c t ion of reas on a n d consequent in virtue of 
which t h ings chan ge.3 But if t h is is s o, h ow can we cons ider 
1. MET , I , 6 9 • 
2 • IVIET , I, 77 • 
3. IviET, I, 110. 
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r egularity or law as t h e rea l living active e s sen ce of a chan g -
ing t h ing? By wb.a t con crete form may we rep resen t t hi s true 
essence? 
Upon closer examinat ion of t h e n otion of cha n ge, Lotze 
finds t hat the te rra is not wh olly satis factory in describ ing 
a t h ing as it assumes succes sive forms; for wh en the t h ing in 
s t a te p p roceeds to a new state q, no r e siduum of p is carried 
over to which t h e a ttribute 'ch ange' may properly be p redicated. 
Th e s t a te p r eally becomes a new a nd different q, which rises 
ov.t of the complete extinction of p. However, Lot z e emph a sizes 
t h a t h e doe s not me a n to assert an absolu te becoming . The forms 
a 1 , a 2 , ••• , an can not be re garded as self-conta i ned motionless 
be i ngs such t hat t h ere is some ins t a ntaneous inte rva l of time 
between them during which the t h ing cea s e s to exist. Thes e 
s y:rnbols a re merely ou r way of conveniently re pr e senting what is 
re a lly a continuous bec oming , 11 a c ontinuity according to ·which 
every l a te r ph as e in the becoming , instead of merely coming into 
being aft e r the earlier, i s s u es out of it."1 Lot ze cites 
/ ) / 
Aristotle' s con ce p ts of c$v'ICJ~..rl'~ and E"~~:reux. as clea r ex-pres-
. 
sions of t h is kind of becoming.2 For Aristotle, a t h ing as 
potential is no t a mere po s sibil~ty of thought, but an e x istent 
r eality wheneve r c ondition s for it s ris e to a ctu ality a re 
1. MET, I, 114. 
2. Prof. J. Wild, in his article entitled ''The Stru cture of 
Cha n g e " concludes t ha t "at the p resent time, and in the 
pre s e n t s t ate of philosophy, Ari s totle's a ccoun t of the 
stru c t ure of ch ange a n d b ecoming h ave for us a n i mportance 
ex ceeding that of merely academic ••• study ." See V'lild, 
Art.(l94l), 5 9 . Lotze clearl y r e alized this . 
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actually contained beforehand in someth ing else already exist-
ing ~v£~~~~ •1 Lotze thus comes to the fullest formulation of 
the· problem under consideration: V'lhat must this essence of a 
thing be in order while existing at any g iven instant in a stat 
ap to contain as potential all future states ap+l' a pt2, ••• , 
ap+n' and yet again to hold all states a1 , a 2 , .•• , ap+n' as 
Lotze says, ttas its ~' and thus to maintain itself as a gainst 
them. 11 2 The possibility of this kind of an identity in change 
we find, according to him, in the s pecial nature of only one 
being: the spiritual subject. 
It is only through the fact t hat our attention, bringing 
events into relation, comprehends past and present in mem-
ory, while at the same time there arises the idea of the 
persistent ego to which both past and present belong, that 
we become a,,vare what is meant by unity of being throughout 
a change of manifold sta tes, and that such a unity is pos-
sible ••• Thus the proximate conclusion to which we are 
forced would be t h is: If there are to be things with the 
~vro:perties vve demand of things, they must be more than thing 
Only by sharing this charact er of t h e spiritual nature can 
t h ey fuJ:.fil the general requirements which must be fulfill ed 
in order to constitute a ~hing .3 
2. The Connections Between Things 
i. The Concept of Commensurability. Regarding the prob-
lem of the peculiar nature of the objective relations between 
things, Lotze distinguishes two kinds of relatedness: 1) the 
commensurability of all t h ings, which renders them members of 
a system having one univers al truth, and 2) the connection of 
caus e and effect.4 Commensurability provides especially for the 
prediction of f uture events. Lotze writes: 
1 • MET , I, 10 7 • 
2. :MET I 118. 
3. 1\IIET, 
4. MIC 
223-224. 
587 ff. 
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If' once we drop this primary conviction, noth ing any long -
er r e qu ires explanat ion and nothing admits of it; f'or that 
mutu a l dependence would no longer exi s t ·which the explana-
tion consists in pointing out ••• And just because of this 
the mere fact of a constantly r epeated coincidence would be 
no p roof' of the presence of' a universal law, by the help of 
which a further forecast might b ecome possible as to the ye t 
unobserved cases that lie in the future. It is not until the 
connection of manifold facts according to law is establish-
eel as a univel"'sal principle that any standard can exist f'or 
distinguishing a poss ible from an imp ossible, a probability 
from an i mprobability .l 
Nothing then cou ld be more basic to experimental research t han 
this CO YlCe p t. 2 
ii. The Possibility of' Reciprocal Action. The fact tha t 
the events tha t form the cou.rse of' the world can be predicted 
as consequents from lmovm antecedents points to a p rimary unity 
of' all thing s. However, Lotze finds more positive grounds f'or 
such unity in the second kind of relatedness: reciprocal c ausal 
action. The primary question here is, what condition must be 
f u lfilled if in any relation C, ·whatever its form, things are 
to affect each other causally~ 3 
One p ossibility t hat easily and naturally suggests it s elf' 
is that t h ere is some kind of transeunt action. Lotze sho·ws in 
some detail how this idea is hope lessly involved in endless 
difficulties (e. g . the nature of the entity t ransferred , what 
determines its direction of travel, how the entity c a n act on 
the object and be absorbed into it), and ends by presupposing 
1. MET, I, 6-7. 
2. tffiT, I, 7. E. E. Thomas finds three direc t ions in Lotze's 
que st for unity: 1) the log ical unity of commensurability, 
2) the all-inclusive unity making interaction p o ss i b le, and 
3 ) the unity of a changing thing. See Thomas, LTR, 55. 
3. NIET. I, 1 34 . 
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what it set out to explain. But now if the pa s sage of influ-
ences i s incredible, the only alternative - is to attempt an ex-
lanation "INithout such fruitless presuppositions.l 
Lotze gives specia l attention to one such a ttempt , namely, 
Leibniz's notable system, in which the individuals of the uni-
verse are simple super-spatial im~aterial monads or force-
substances, 11 without windows 11 and acting in completely deter-
mined harm.ony pre-established by God, the all-inclusive monad .2 
Lotze finds two main difficulties in this unusual attempt. 
Firstly, why d id God c hoos e to give objective reality to the 
''best of all poss ible worlds ," instead of simply allowing it to 
_remain as a thought? He says: 
To give reality to an idea of a world was only worth doing 
if the sum of the Good was increased by the sum of those 
who mi ght become independent centre s of its enjoyment; if, 
••• the beings, of whom the i mage and conception were in-
cluded in the approved plan of a world , were enabled them-
selves to think it and have experience of it in their 
lives.3 
This could hardly be consistently provided in a sys tem where 
the inner development of each monad takes place in a parallel 
independent course in which the successive states are complete-
ly indifferent to each other. Lotze's second objection is tha t 
Leibniz does not explain the nece ssity of general l aws as a 
condition of that perfe c t ion of the viOrld which renders it wo1 .. -
thy of existence. It is not self-contradictory to suppose that 
general laws are entirely al ien to the realization of perfec-
tion, and that e a ch moment of reality may well be unique, con-
1. MET , I~ 146. 2~ Windelband, HOP, 425. 3. IviET, I, 154. 
I 
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forming on ly to the import of the whole, whatev~r ae s t h etic or 
poetic basis t h at might have. 1 
Lotze gr ants that some such pre-established s ympathetic 
connection between indep enden t inner developments of thing s 
affords a possible solution to the p roblem of reciprocal action. 
However, h e sh rinks away from the thoroughly consistent deter-
minism involved, and cling s to the insuppressible hope (justi-
fied by those all-important axiolog ical principles which we 
di s cussed in the previous chap ter) "that the cou r s e of t h ings 
in which we live admits of events being initiated, which are 
not the necessary consequ ences of p revious development."2 
Accordingly, he believes tha t all idea~ of indep endent centers 
connected either by external or by occasionalistic ties must be 
g iven up. 
Lotze i n stead offers the postu late that the state of a 
thing can be ch ang ed only by some pass ion or living fe e ling 
arising within itself. Only in so f a r as thing s can produce 
passions in e a ch other can they interact. Lotze adds t hat 11 the 
ch ang e which we assume in one must ~ a d irect passion in the 
other. n3 11 The reality of one state is the direct and im-
mediate condition of the realization of another." 4 We must, he 
holds, assume as the ground of this po ss ibility the substantial 
oneness of all thing s, and mus t take interaction to be one of 
e "th o s e simple facts t hat compose reality."5 In the follo Yring 
1. 1\I ET, I, 160-162. 4. !viET, I, 164. 
2. ~lET, I, 163; MIG, II, 597. 5. MIC, II, 599. 
3. MIC, II, 596, 636. 
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pas sages we have a clea r summary o£ this crux of Lotze's n1eta -
physical monism: 
There c annot be a multiplicity o£ inde pendent thing s , but 
all @~ements , i£ reciprocal action is t o be possible be-
tween them, must be regarded as parts o£ a single and real 
Be ing . The pluralism with which our view o£ the v1orld be gan 
- ~ has to g i ve pla ce to a monism , through which the 'transeunt' 
o perat ion , alwa y s unintelligible, passes into an 'immanent ' 
o peration.l 
(sic) 
It i s only if individual thing s do not float independent/\ or 
left to themselves in a vacm1m across which no con_ne c tion 
c an reach--only i£ all of them, being finite individuals, are 
at the same time only parts of one single Infinite Substa nce, 
which embraces t h em all and cherishes them all within it-
self, t hat their reciprocal action, or what we call such, is 
possible. For only then c an the change which any one of them 
experiences be at the same time a state of the Infinite, so 
t h at it is not necessary for its influence to extend across 
a gu lf which c an never be filled up, in order to produce 
this sta te; only then can the result which this sta te pro-
duces in the Infinite, in accordance with the truth of its 
OV'lil nature, a ppear at the same time as a change of other 
i ndividual things without t h ere being any ne~d of some fresh 
proces s by which it may be produced in them. 
3. The Oneness of All Things 
Two general problems now presen t themselves: 1) How can 
the Infinite One contain the plura lity of finite thing s in its 
unity; that is, is the notion formally self-consistent? 2 ) Un-
der wha t concrete form may we in thought represent this all-
embracing Be i n g?3 
i. The Formal Natu_re of t h e Irmnanent ltr. The substantial 
unity which Lotze finds to be a necessary presupposition of ·re-
ciprocal action he designates by the symbol M. This M somehow 
reso~ves itself, relative to our faculties of observation, into 
1. MET , I, 165. 3. MIG, II, 598. 
2. MIG, II, 598. 
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a plurality of i ndividuals. According to him., if we take any 
two particular things , A and B, and call the remaining mul t i-
plicity R, then M can be considered the function g(A,B,R). Any 
change in A will i mmediately affect M, and since B and R are in-
eluded in M, they will be i mmediately subject to change. This 
is vvhat Lotze calls "only an immanent operation of M upon M. nl 
He points out however that the intens ity of relations in g may 
vary greatly. For example, a change in R may result in the pro-
duction of a P, leaving A and B unaffected; or a change in R 
may affect only B; or a reciprocal action between A and B may 
leave R unaffected. In all cas es the kind and degree of relation 
reali zed is due solely to the import or plan of M, whose unity 
may be likened to a piece of polyphonic music in which the 
voices are not ex t ernally related, but are simultaneously pre-
sent as blended yet distinct in one complex s ound wave.2 A 
thing is wha t it is and acts as it acts only t hrough t h e com-
mis s ion g iven it by t h e monistic M as its part in the fulfill-
ment of the e quat ion M-=M. 0 
Lotze shows that the law of identity does not by any means 
preclude predicating both unity and multiplicity of M. However, 
M is not g in the same neutral sense that M""'M; M=g rather "in 
the a ctive sense of bringing it forth and being present in it." 4 
In short, reality is much deeper t han the bare copula 'is' of 
log ic. Lotze writes: 
1. MET, I, 168. 3. MET, I, 198. 
2. NLET, I, 171, 193. 4. MET, I, 177. 
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S is ¥ and S is not P are irreconcilable with each other; 
but t he propositions S is ¥ and S is non-P are reconcil-
able unti l it is established as a matter of fact that there 
is no non-P=Q. • .1 
Lotze defends his doct rine of M as immanent in all finite 
thing s a gainst a Leibnizian sepa ration of thing s and God. He 
t h inks t ha t Leibniz, in thus separating the worl d from the mind 
of God, deprives the world of that very inner connectedness and 
richness, which, encompassed by the living presence of God, is 
the ultimate reason for its realization. 2 He gr ants that the 
de s ire to p revent distinctionless blending of God and t h e world 
is surely justified. HovYever , the vvay to do this, he ho l ds , is 
simply to recognize that 
what in this t h eory is presented as a me re poss ibility and 
preliminary suggestion (to the mind of God) is in fact the 
full reality, but that nevertheless the one remains differ-
ent from
3
all the manifold, which only exists in and through 
the one. 
Fina lly, Lotze warns against taking the truly existing M, 
the complex of all thing s, as a motionless object of contempla-
tion. It is entirely unlike the unmoved Mover of Aristotle. 
Rather, since exn erience testifies to the reality of continual 
becoming, we ought to assume that M is in a process of eternal 
development; 
It is not therefore as a stationary identity with itself, 
but only a s an eternally self-sustained motion that we h a ve 
to recogniz.e the given being of t b_a t which tru l y is. And as 
given with . it we have also to recognize the direction wlaich 
its motion takes.4 
1 •. rilET, I, 175. 
2. MET , I, 186. 
3. MET , I, 186. 
4. MET , I, 197. 
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ii. The Immanent M as Idea or Thought. In regard to the 
concrete form of M, Lotze immediately turns to a comparison of 
the doctrines of idealism and realism. He represents his 0 1vn 
teleological idealism by the equation M=g (A,B,R), and realism, 
the opposing view , by the converse: g(A,B,R)=M.1 These equations 
very effectively bring out the basic contrast of the two views, 
for the former means that M is the inde pendent variable,2 the 
developing living Idea whose import is the 11 form-giving priusrr 
of the world. The latter, on the other hand, presents M as the 
de pendent variable, the resulting form which the material world 
assumes. Realism explains the many marvellous organic and in-
organic activities of adaptation to ends with the rather arbi-
trary ass1rr.qption of a g iven harmonious arrangement of all ele-
ment s. This arrangement might have been otherwise or not at all, 
but, once given , it leads to the resulting ends in accordance 
with general laws. Lotze's chief criticism, therefore, is that 
realism appeals to two independent principles which it has no 
way of uniting: 1) the authoritative genera l laws, and 2) the 
given arrangement of their points of applica tion.3 
For idealism, the idea R is a concrete rea lity, not condi-
tioned by any pre-mundane truth, but ma intaining teleologically 
the order of development of its forras as well as forming the 
1. MET, I, 208. 
2. This is of course the exact opposite of ordinary mathematical 
convention. In the equation y=f(x), y is ordinarily called 
the dependent variable, and x the independent variable. Never 
theless, Lotze's illustration is quite clear and useful. 
~ . 1ffiT, I, 218 . These objections would, however , not aPply to 
a t heistic · realism. -
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tiplicity of elements. By its unconditioned act of determina-
makes each preceding phase of its development the condi-
the realization of the following phase, a s its nature 
onstantly progresses to new fo1~s. Lotze emphasizes that we 
s t never think of the Idea as an unformed being apart from all 
possible forms of rea lization. It does not figuratively dip 
to a repertory of possible forms, clothing itself with those 
orms required for a possible series. The Idea is real only in 
definite form.l Lot.ze' s notion here is like that which we 
continually stressed by Hegel--the self-identical Universal 
vThich God maintains his "absolute, per:rnanent founda t ion" is 
an abstra~t moment, and nothing apart from the rich full-
of concrete Spirit, which alone really is.2 Lotze points 
t further that due to our habit of thinking of all thing s as 
tances of kinds, we are easily liable to imag ine M and some 
Mas instances of the general cate go~r 'All possible worlds. 
according to him, is the root of those abstra ct doctrines 
p re-mundane truth.3 
Now how does Lotze reconcile this teleolog ical process of 
e realization of M with the universal validity of natural law? 
does so by the postulate that t he chang e in M from phase to 
se comes through a combination or resultant of many uniform 
ffects, which, considered in then1selves, are unchangeable and 
de pendent of the phase in which t h ey happen to be c ontempo-
• MET, I, 212-213 • 3. 1'IET, I, 210 • 
• He gel, POR, I, 91. 
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ry. Thus there is a universal mechanism of realization which 
ecessarily impels M from foi'l11 to form, and yet each rnechanis-
tic realization conforms exactly to the import of M. The follovr-
ing passage enables us to connect t h is outcome of Lotze's onto-
bgical stra nd of thought with the axiological considerations 
f the first chapter: 
Such is the fact: such is the nature of the concrete Idea, 
and such the manner of its realization at every moment, that 
everything which it ordains in virtue of its ovm import must 
is sue as a necess a ry result Ln ordered succession from the 
blind co-operation of all the several movements into which 
it distributes itself, and according to the general laws 
which it has imposed u pon itself.l 
iii. Space and Time in the Oneness of Things. For the 
ake _of _·rounding out this presentation, it would be well to add 
v ery brief statement of Lotze's views of s pace and time in the 
nistic M. As regards space, there are two main questions: 
How can space h ave a reality of its ovm such that it exists 
or to its possible content? 2) How c an the existence of real 
ings in space be conceived~According to Lotze's doctrine of 
ternal relations, the answer to the first is that space is 
ely phenomenal; relations exist only a s idea s of reflective 
t, or as inner states of the interacting elements of exis 
However, this does not mean tha t s pace is a mere semblance 
eferring to nothing in the rea l world. For Lotze, spatial de-
erminations are secondary qualities which real relations pre-
our min'ds .3 That is, it is the total presence in con-
• ~lET, I, 215-216 • 3. IvlET, I, 258 • 
• "MET, I, 246. 
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ciousness of ~he effects of things changing states a ccording to 
relations that is the direct cause of our spatial idea.l 
Time is a much more-difficult concept , for, unlike space, 
yresentation of change in consciousness presupposes a real 
uccession of events. Lotze shows conclusively the contradic-
ions involved in the notion of a timeless changeless reality 
hich;~ produces only an a ppearance of temporal change in finite 
ds. His view is rather that the ordinary belief in an empty 
Lme in which events are said to take place is an illusory ab-
traction of the real process of becoming which is the develop-
nt of the monistic M. Actually, time is sui generis ; becoming 
ing s forth time, and not vice versa. 2 Lotze holds tha t the 
tolog ical realization of M takes place as an eternally chang-
1present.13 Regarding the relation between the actual sue-
e s sion of the phases of M and our consciousness of the succes-
ion, this, thinks Lotze, is a difficult matter , for our con-
ciousness of the passage of events dep ends on the peculiar 
ture of memory, VJ"hich enables us to make a timeless comparison 
f 'present' and 1p ast .r4 
1. MET , I, 260. 
2. MET, I, 334. 
3. MIG, II, 713. 
4. rdET, I, 335 ff. This difficulty is expressed in the Scriptur-
-·-al saying: "A thousand y ears in thy sight are as yesterday." 
Ps. 90:4. See also 2 Pet. 3:8. 
4. The ·Doctrine of 
Causality in Logical Positivism 
In opposition to Lotze's monistic ontology of interaction, 
the scientific s pirit of our time has raised a strong protest. 
The positivists, standing on Hume' s ·well-lmovm position, 1 deny 
that causality i mplies any t h ing n1ore t han a regular succe s sion 
of events, conveniently s~nbolized in functional relations. And 
the naturalists have taken up ~new that 11 comrnon s ense" rea lism 
which James so energetically championed at the beg inning of the 
century. In this short thesis we cannot give a very full account 
of these agressive tendencies. We shall discuss several repre-
sentative t h inkers and _shall try only to bring out decisive 
is sues bearing on Lotze's assumption of a monistic M. 
M. Schlick, one of the leaders of positivism,2 does not 
deny that the r e may be a peculiar 11 int i macyn between cause and 
effect. However, for him verification is made only by sensuous 
observation, and he adds: nvVhere there is no definite verifica-
t 'ion, t here can be no definite meaning . 11 3 Therefore, succe s sion 
is the only possible meaning of causality. To think of any me-
diating "tie 11 (e. g . Lotze's M) is to exceed the logical limits 
1. See Hume, E1TQ, 75, wh ere he says: nAfter a repetition of 
simila r i n stance s , t he mind i s car ried by habit, upon the 
appearance of one event, to e xpect its u sual attendant, .and 
to believe t hat it will exist. This connexion, the r efore, 
which we feel in t h e mind, this customary transition of the 
imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the 
sentiment or impres s ion from which we form the idea of power 
or necessary connexion. u 
2 . That is, until he was tragically assassi.nated in 1936. 
3. Schlick, Art.(1932), 101, 103. 
of linguistic usag e and to en ter t he realm of nonsen se. Schlick 
says: 
After the scientist has successfully filled up all t h e gaps 
in his c ausal cha ins by continually interpolating new events, 
the philosopher wants to go on with t his pleasant game after 
all the gaps have been filled. So he invent s a k ind of g lue 
an~ assures us that in reality it is only his glue that holds 
the event s together at a ll. But we can never find the g lue; 
there i s no room for it, as t h e world is already com£letely 
filled by events which leave no chinks between them. 
B. Waters in the same s p irit declares t hat the product ive t h eory 
of causation is no t hing but the imagina ry endowment of nature 
with t he exchanges of poetical or art istic feelings.2 
Before asking h ow t he positivists establi sh regularity of 
succe s sion, we would again point out t ha t the arbitrary limita-
tion of verific a tion and me aning to sense data is not at all 
justifiable. It is said that we must abstain from a ll non-
sensuous i n ference s regarding c ausality . But, as J. Loewenberg 
reasons, such abs tention is an imp erat ive i nference which must 
be j u s t ified ; a nd yet , on positivis tic grounds, nothing can 
justify it but the plainly self-contradictory i nference tha t 
t h e caus al rela tion allows of no non- s ensu ous inference.3 
Now regarding the problems of i nduction and p robability 
the f amilia r question is this: How is i n du ction possible with-
o u t the as st~ption of a rea l uniformity in nature, or, as Lotze 
as ked, a co~mensurability of all things ? V. F. Lenzen, an emi-
nent philosopher of science, frankly admits t hat acceptance of 
causality as a meth odolog ical principle of science i nvolves the 
1. Schlick, Art.(l932 ), 109. 3. Loewe nberg , Art .{l932 ), 36. 
2. Waters, Art.(l938 ), 91. 
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presupposition of a uniformity of nature, "whose justification 
lies beyond science. " 1 However, Schlicl{: and Waters both insist 
that causal law does not indicate a necessary determination in 
nature. Laws are only "abbreviated expressions of the order in 
which events do follow each other. 11 2 As H. Feig l ins ists, we do 
not have to ground induction in any higher principle, for it 
itself is the rock-bottom ground of inquiry. V!e try, try, and 
try a gain to g eneralize from past ex perience, and if there is 
a regu lar order of events in n a ture we shall discover it.3 But 
we can never be sure of the future--knowledg e, as Reichenbach 
I puts it, c a n be interpreted o.nly as 11 a system of posits or 
I wagers . " 4 How many times must observation o:r succession 
to establish causal law? There is no rule. According to 
be ma de 
the 
pos i t ivists , a function is constr u cted on t h e basis of observed 
data and then tested on new data. If the function succeeds, the 
I 
scientist gains greater confiden ce in his wager . Schlick writes: 
· If observat ion shov1s that the function fits the new data 
• • • h e will believe that it express es the real l aw . • • 
He wi ll believe it; he will never be absolutely s u re, be-
caus e new data may c ome u p in t h e future which will not fit 
into the formula. But, of course, his faith will g row with 
the number of verifications .5 
But we would here i n terrup t 1.7ith a g r ave objection: Is not 
this faith that seems so important f o r the establishment of 
causal l aw mere n onsense? i!Jhy shou ld any number of successes in 
formulating t he events of nature g ive us believing confidence 
1. Le nzen, Art.(l932) 96. 
2. Sch lick, Art.(~932), 114 ; 
Waters, Art .(l~38), 93 . 
3. Feigl, Art.(l947), 389. 
4. Reichenbach, EP, 404. 
5. Schlick, Art.(l932), 119. 
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in the future if we really left it a n open que s tion whether 
there i s a uniform continuit y in nature? As Lotze reco gni zed, 
t h e idea of probability wou ld then be me a ning less, and it would 
be no more li1probable that n a ture should always chan ge uniform-
ly, yet wh olly a ccidentally, t h anthat there should be a com-
pletely disorderly s u ccession of events.l Causal law would be 
a me a ning le s s terin, a nd f a ith in our formulat i ons wou ld at best 
b e hardly any t h ing mo r e t han an irra tional "stab in the d a rk. 11 
VJe wou ld thus be brou ght to t h e l a st stage of a denia l of e x -
p lana tion. Fortuna tely, this positivi s tic procedure of wa ger-
ing , in virtue of it s irrationality, cannot justify itself ob-
jectively as the best h ypothesis either for experimenta l 
science or for wider fiel ds of inqu iry. Ra t h er we should a ssume 
t hat a judgment that eve:nt Y succeeds X accordine; to cau sal l aw 
I i mplies an inward ontolog ical proce s s in X by which Y is active-
ly de te rmi n ed. Only when this unifo r m p rocess is p r e s upposed 
c a n cau s al law b e fo rmulated, a n d only when this same inwa rd 
p rocess is a de qu a t e ly inferred can the c a usal relation be con-
s idered philosophic ally e x p l a ined. 
1. MET, I, 7. This is t h e stumbling block to Russell's correla-
tion t h eory of p red iction . Re ga r dle s s wha t g r ou p ing or 
correlation of events ha-s · ·been :f d'rmula ted mathema tically 
from the d a ta of past e xperience, evern..J predic t ion will be 
a leap into total da r lme s s, unless there i s assumed some 
ontolog ica l basis for an invaria ble causat ive action. See 
Russell, AM, 81:1 . 2q and Loewenberg , Art. (19 32), 31-32 . 
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5 . The Naturalist ic Onto l o gy 
of Sellars, Hofstadt e r, and Wi nn 
But n ow wha t is adequate i nferenc e regar ding the c ausal 
relation? Thi s quest i on brings us t o a. sharp cleavage of thought 
i n re c ent philo s ophy. On the one side are the natur a l ists , who 
as c ribe product i ve causality t o a giv en material complex of 
proc esses called "nature; 11 and on the othe r are the i deal i sts, 
who , l i ke Lotze , see mediating spirit as t he ontological condi-
tion of the possibil ity o f causal i ty . 
The naturalists vvould cut Lotze off , as James might say, 
11 without a shilling . " They see no reason for leaving conc rete 
r•common sense 11 realism and solid experimental method in order 
c ' / to s p e culate on the ol~ ~L of things . Let us , they say , be 
' 
)/ 
" 
11' but ' / c ontent with U)6 EG'T't." and perhaps 1'"l ECS'"Tl V . t o ask OLO(. Tl 
' 
is , according to w. R. Dennes , only t o "waste the light of day , 
and to miss what we might have seen o f the landscape. ul vVhat 
is this lands c ape or "naturen? Natural ists are far from united 
on a consi s tent and prec ise definition of the term. 2 How·eve r , 
the chara cterist i c notion seems to be the. t exp ressed by Y. H. 
Krikorian : 
"Nature" means wha t empirical scienc e finds it to be a nd 
wha t a completed empiric a l scienc e would find it to be . 
Emp iric a lly nature includes physic a l ob jec ts a nd l iving 
beings , inc lusive of hmnan beings and the i r ideals . 3 
1 . Dennes , Art .( l932) , 176 . 
2 . See Brightman, NV, 31-34 f o r s ome outstanding exampl es o f 
this surprising defic iency . 
3 . Krilmrian, Art . (1944 ) , 243 . In cormnent, we shoul d remark that 
it t a kes much faith to believe that experi mental metho d will 
some encompass the se l f and its ideals . 
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R. Sellars holds t ha t the world, including mind, is basically a 
sul)stantial 11 texture 11 which we may p enetrate thoroughly by in-
duction.1 All thing s are more or less complex substances, com-
posed of units of matter v~1ich are extended, structural, and 
massive.2 1v-1ind, according to him, emerges as a complex nnon-
atomic kind . 11 3 For Hofstadter, 11 existence 11 is 11 denotative of the 
conditions of structure, behavior, and society ."4 ns tru cture is 
the actuality of process and is potentiality for activity. 11 5 
There is no need of an extra agency to make possible st~ucture; 
all that is needed, argues Hofstadter, is 11 that conditions be 
ripe for it. 11 For him, the terms Force, God, Mind, and Nature 
are all symbols re presenting the fact that whatever happens does 
so only according to "natural conditions and circumstances. " 6 
But is it not really astounding that matter should in it-
self provide those 11 natural conditions , j which integr a te nature 
into a harmonious 11 structure 11 ? We should judge even befoi'e going 
further into naturalistic ontology that naturalists do not take 
Lotze's objections a gainst realism seriously enough. They are 
content, like William James, to t a ke conjunc t ive and di s junctive 
relations as given 11 primordial element s of fact, 11 and to con-
sider the world as a collection of elements simply 11 hang ing t o-
gether. 11 7 The conditions for "hang ing together" are na!vely ex-
plainecl siinply by reference to "nature" or to such phrases as 
1. Sellars, PPR, 373, 396-397. 5. Hofstadter, Art . (1935), 14. 
2. Sellars, P.f'R, 286. 6. Hofstadter, Art. (1935), 14. 
"" Sella rs, PPR, 295, 401. 7. James, PU, 349, 358. C:J. 
4. Hofstadter, Art. (1935~, .. l4. 
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"the e xecutive properties of matter."l This seems lik e much too 
easy a way to make ontolog ical explanations. 
On their nontologic a l prejud ices,rr the naturalists make 
shoPt \-rork of the problem of unity in change. For Sellars, a 
thing i s a complex secondary endurant c omposed of units of mat -
ter c alled " p rimary endurants.rr2 The thing is one and the s a me 
in so f a r as there is "persistence of organization through 
c h ange." 3 He writes : ''A thing may chang e in this respect or 
that, the limit being that of breaking do'WTI or dissolution. 11 4 
I dentific at ion of a thing is possible because through memor y we 
ge t "a valid c ate gorial scheme of self-endurance or identity 
through time , which vre a :,op l y to other things. rr5 Thus the mind 
is able to translate on tolog ical similarity into "concep tual 
identity ."6 
A. Hofstadter declares that the problem of the unity of a 
thing rr solves itself. " 7 The following passage best su.rnmarizes 
his reasoning: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
The individual and the unitary are identical; an individual 
is a subs t ance a n d substantiality is indiv i duality . • • The 
puzzle of iru1erence is avoided. The substance is not a g roup 
of qualities taken together and s ubs isting in something else, 
but is the group of q"l,_ali ties c onst ituted in a determined 
:manner. Constitution i s essential to the being of qualities , 
or, substa nce is the s u pport, the unifier, the source of 
qtlality ••• The f a ct t hat s11bstance i s structural behavior 
in concreto; i.e. the const itution of an a ctive entity im-
plies the fact that a substance is a complex event ••• It is 
not suggested here that a substantial even t is made up of 
Sellars , PPR , 378, 405. 5~ Sellars, PPR , 305. 
Sellars , PPR, 303-304. 6. Sellars, PPR , 382. 
Sellars, PPR, 307. 7. Hofstadter , Art. ( 1935 ), 14. 
Sellars, PPR, 303. 
64 
diverse o ther events; the s o-ca lled qu a lita tive events are 
all the same event , the substa nce, t aken in different 
res pects.l 
R . B. Winn als o finds the problem relatively e asy . The key 
t o h is solut l on lies in h i s con cep t of s pac e and time relat ions. 
For h i m, these relations are as real as the relata of matter; 
howeve r, they are i nactive and non- s u bstant i al. Winn says: 
nRelations a lone are responsible for the continuity (i.e. s p a-
tial and temporal) of both objects and the intervals among 
t he:m . " 2 Thus he thinks it is wrong to s p e ak of interna l and ex-
ternal rela tions; thes e adjectives are a p plicable only to re-
l a t a . The function of relat i ons is "to c onst itute the continu-
ity of t h e world, not to be in it."3 Now the relata or thing s 
are, ac cording to Winn, co!Uposed of u ltimate par•ticles or "pri-
mary relata 11 (like Sellars ' 11 primary endurants 11 ) which may be 
e ither sizeles s 11 punctual atoms" or indivisible units, like 
vVh iteh e ad 's 11 prima tes. 114 An organization consist i ng of two or 
more relata bound together by a relat i onship i s c a lled a 11 struc-
tum.n5 All structa are "psy cholog ically segregated situations" 
or 11 isola tes. 116 These c oncepts , Winn thinks , solve the paradox 
of the one and the many , and show that the p rob lem is only an 
illusory pro du ct of the mind. He concludes tha t the passage in 
the mind from the one to the many is possible only becaus e 
"rela tions unify and bind, while relata invariabl y separate."? 
5. Winn, Art.(l941), 32. 
6. Winn, Art .(l941), 33 . 
7. Winn, Art.(l941), 3 2 . 
1. Hofstadter, Art.(l935), 15. 
2. Winn, Art.(l941), 28. 
3. Winn, Art .(l94l ), 29. 
4. Winn, Art .(l941), 26. 
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Re l a ta a re dou btless many. But relations a re always whole; 
t h e y tend to fuse to gether, no mat t er how many relata y ou 
are willing to include in an isolate. Conse quently , when 
y ou stress rela ta in y our experience, you have many; when, 
on the other han~, you succeed in isolat ing a bit of rea lity 
and s tress relat1ons, you have one. Thus depending on what 
y ou emph a size, separateness or structure, you have one or 
many in what is essentially the s ame (i.e. the struct'Lun) .1 
VIe are very much imnressed by the technical and involved 
terminology of Sella rs, Hofstadter, and \-linn. However, as much 
as we struggle to realize t h at they h a ve g iven us the re a son-
a ble solution to the problem of unity in change, we rath er feel 
that t h e real issue has been quietly avoided. What we mean when 
we ask how can a thing be one, is not how can it be one at each 
g iven i ns t ant. Certain ly, wha t is at an instant is one rela t ed 
g ro u p of elements. 2 Wh at we mean is how can it be one in a tem-
p ora l s u ccession of cha n g es? Sellars a lone comes to grip s with 
t h is is sue in h is doctrine of the trans latability of ontolog ical 
simila rity into conceptual identity. But he remains with only 
lan ontolog ical s i milarity, not unity. Equat ions like Hof-
sta dter's subs tance:aunity and Winn's relations=s patio-temporal 
continuity~one are wholly tautologous. We honestly cannot see 
wha t real insight they convey reg a rding any of the terms in-
volved. 
It seems to us tha t n a t u ralism can be cons i s tent only by 
denying a real unity to the thing s of nature--identity in chang e 
1. V!inn, Art. (19 41), 33. 
2. William Jame s would go no furt h er with the problem. He s ays 
of the thing : "Its unity is a borig inal, just a s the mul ti-
p licity of my successive taking s is aboriginal. 11 But we might 1' 
remark that ever•yth ing under the s un is a borig inal in a sense 
The question is. in wha t sense? See Jame s . .t'U. 357. 
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can only be a strange product oi' the mind. The terms !lrelations,11 1 
,
11 
continuity, 11 11 concep tual identity, 11 and n substance as unii'ier'' 
are but restatements oi' the problem. The most that naturalists 
l ean say is that things are merely ontologically similar (why, 
who Jm.ows?), but that in some unimaginable way, the same 11 exec-
utive capacities" that miraculously permit matter to emerge into 
an example of true unity in change, na:r:1ely, the seli', also en-
able the self to bind together t he d ii'i'erent phases of a mys-
terious ontological similarity into the concept of one thing. 
'He thus see the fruiti'u l significance oi' Lotze's hypothesis: Ii' 
a thing (or nature as a whole) is to be a real unity and not 
merely a succession of mysteriously similar becomings unified 
only in~ thought, t h en we can conceive oi' it em~irically only 
as in some sense a spiritual subject. Naturalists cannot deny 
that this is at lea st a valid yossib ility. 
log ically springing up with the notion of thinghood. He say s: 
rrThere is no place i'or the subjectivism of Hume here, for cau-
sality is a process of nature, and perception of it is a v1hole 
experience which is unitary and synthetic. 111 We cannot intuit 
the energy or productive power passing :('x•om cause to effect, but 
we do intuit clues or sensory cues regarding the causal relation ! 
These cues are obtained in the unique elements of causality: 
11. Sellars, P~R, 285. 
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continuity, contiguity, and necessity.l For him, force is a 
11 dynamic capacity 11 integral with the dynamic conception of 
t h inghood. Thus h e writes: "I would acce p t the f a ct of i mpress-
ed force or causal effective."2 
For Hofstadter, causality is simply another name for 
chang e (i.e. either of substance or quality).3 "The word 'caus -
ality' singles ou t tha t character of nature which con stitutes 
its ever-p r es ent interweaving of societies and individuals. 11 4 
He thinks it use less to seek a final cau se which is uncondition-
ed and non-interconne c tion : 
The true meaning of "ultimate c ause" is just that structural 
interconnection, unspecified for any particular case of it, 
eve ryv1here to be seen in nature. Causality is an ultimat e 
cha ract e r of nature; it postulates no extra ind ividuals, en-
tities, ingredients beside thos e d~scoverable in nature by 
the ordinal~ processes of science. 
He adds that it is only Vihen structure is considered ideal, 
st a tic, or devoid of' effectivene s s t hat t h ere is temptation "to 
a ppeal to a new ingredient in stru c t ural situations, called 
Force, Mind, God." 6 Rather effectivene s s or power is for him 
simply a general name for wha t things are as "contributory ele-
ments in t he interconnectedness of nature." 7 Things a re cau ses 
in virtue of their p ower or cap a city for "en tering into natur-
a l occurrences. 11 8 Hofstadter emphas izes t h at t he natural causal 
situation is the concrete active structural interconnectedness. 
1. Sellars, PPR, 376, 5. Hofstadter, Art . ( 1935) , 18. 
384- 385, 481. 6. Hofstadter , Art . { 1935) , 17. 
2 . Sella r s , P.PR, 330. 7. Hofstadter, Art . (l-935), 18. 
3. Hofstadter, Art .(l935), 17. s. Hofstadter, Art • ( 19 3 5 ) , 18. 
4. Hofstadter , Art. ( 1935), 16. 
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However, in a descript ion o~ this concrete situation, the caus-
al as pect is "mirrored'' in the relational terms of the state-
ment, a nd the concrete powers or qualities are 'rnirrored" in the 
terms o~ the verba l relations. Thus , thinks Ho~stadter , when it 
is ~orgotten that abstract linguistic differentiation breaks up 
what is unitary, then "the connections of structure and a c tual 
behavior becomes a mystery the key to which is offered in the 
form o~ some supra or in~ra-natural a g ency.rrl 
Winn s upplements Eofstadter's view of' causality as struc-
t ural chang e with a rich doctrine o~ the ontolog ical me chanics 
involve d in causal c hange. His main theme is that causation al-
ways i nvolves a passage o~ energy ~rom place to place. 2 V-:rith 
this assumption he thinks he is able to solve the traditional 
par a doxes o ~ c ausality ; namely, a ction at a distance and action 
Iacross an interval o~ time. The ~ormer is logically inconceiv-
able without some medium o~ intera ction; and the latter contra-
diets the indubitable truth that nothing can act while it is 
not. Thus it seems necessary to acknowledge the simultaneity o~ 
cause and ef~ect, and a lso a medium o~ intera c tion . But one o~ 
the prime methodological assumptions o~ experiment is that there 
is a func t ional de pendence o~ later events on e a rlier ones, and 
needless to s ay experimental method c a n reveal no medium. Winn's 
! content ion is that both par a doxes can be re solved i~ it is re-
cognized tha t causality involves t wo ent irely di~~erent as pects: 
1. Ho~stadter, Art .(l935), 19. 
2. Winn, Art .(l940), 202. 
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1) a change .in a cer•tain event, which re quires no time, and 
2) the time -con strrning space-consuming transmission of energy, 
duripg which an effect of one event becomes the cause (or one of 
the c ause s) of another event. 1 As an example Winn choo s es the 
phenomenon of a moving photon of energy. While it is moving , it 
i s an "inactive c ause; 11 but u pon striking a particle of mat t er 
it becomes active and cau se s a simultaneous change in the parti-
cle. This change res u lts in outgoing effects or transmissions of 
energy, which are in their turn the causes of other events, one 
of which is ou r apprehens ion, in the sensation of color, of the 
orig ina l s imu ltaneous cha n ge.2 Thus, according to him, all inter 
a ction c a n be explained b-n- two symbolic triads: 1) cause-change-
effect, a nd 2) effect-motion-cause. In rega rd to t h e first, Winn 
states tha t a c aus e is not change-- 11 it is an e xpression of ener-
gy stopped on it s way by matter."3 Change is r ather a si'multane m. s 
process of matter, determined by both t h e caus e and the composi-
tion of matter. Nor is effect the ch ange-- 11 effect is inse parable 
from energy. Lik e cause, effect involves energy in motion, the 
outgoing 1:1o tion. 11 4 Re garding the second triad, the caus e is not 
motion-- 'J'Jinn s ays that it is "oppo s ite to mot ion, f or it signi-
fies t h at a c e rtain specific mot ion (i.e. of energy) has c ome 
through a n impact to a n end.u 5 
Now do these views satisfy us that Lotze's postul at e of an 
M mediating interaction is superfluous and u nwarranted? On the 
4. Winn, Art.(l940), 203. 
5. Winn, Art.(l940), 202. 
1. Winn, Art.(l940), 201, 204. 
2. Winn, Art.(l940), 202. 
3. Winn, Art.(l940), 203. 
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contrary, as in the problem of unity in change we a gain feel 
that our representat ives of naturalism h ave skirmished much with 
the forl.i1idable terms of phys ics and ontology, but have g iven us 
scant understanding of the causal process. Hofstadter asserts 
t hat "causality is an u ltimat e cha r a c ter of n ature, 11 as if t hat 
~ere the unquestionable end of the mat ter. But what i n crease of 
knowledg e does this proposition actually yield? No one denies 
that causality is ultimate in a sense. The i mportant question i s 
in \Yhat sense is c ausality ultimate? Hofstadter is at least con-
sistent in g iving ·what seems to us to be the o n l y possible nat-
uralistic answer. In effect, he says tha t caus ality is ultimate 
simpl y in the sense t hat it implie s causalitiness; interconnec-
tion is ultimate because it i mplie s no monistic M as medium of 
connec t ion but simply nstr u ctura l interconne ctedness. 11 In other 
words, so f ar as exp e riment a l method i s concerned, it mi ght be 
s a id more p lainly and without burdensome etymolog ica l compound-
ing that c ausality i s i r.iscru t'able--i t simply is. 
Sellars and Winn attempt to increase knowledge by their 
doctrine s o f t h e trans eunt action of energies. But what i s the 
substantial status of energy? The photons t hat Winn mentions a re II 
in the pre sent formula t ion of phy s ics not well-established 
facts. Th ey are speculative postul ates made to account for the 
apparently corpus cular behavior o£. light. Unfortunately, light 
also has an e qually p o s i tive wave-like behavior. And in clas si-
cal me chanics, ene r gy is no obs ervable entity --it is a u seful 
term enabling us to i magine the remarlcably conservat ive i nter-
ii 
II 
action of the element s of nature. But let us, however, g r ant 
tha t energy has some substantial status--p erhaps a "neutra l en-
tity. 11 Even t h en, naturalism a sks us to believe that thing s h a ve 
some way of receiving energ ies, storing them, and s ending them 
forth. And not only this, but things must also have the capaci-
ties for directing energ ies in conformity with the marvellous 
!uniformity of nature. Further, energies themselves mus t have 
e qually remar kable capacities for ,;follovdng directions 11 accu-
r at ely a nd uniformly.l What, may we a sk, are these divine all-
1mowing capacities on the part of things and energies if not 
pure magic? 
As Lot ze lon g a go discerned, t he telling imidequ.acy of nat-
turalism is its appeal to two independent p rinciples which we are 
asked to accept without qu e stion as g iven: 1) the general laws 
of nature, and 2) the capacities of things that enable them to 
act in harmony with the laws. Naturalism is cons i stent with the 
facts ( s o f ar as vve know them) only in virtue of a foundatio n of 
credulity which seems to us to re~1ire much more f aith than does 
1 the acce ptance of Lot ze's hypothesis of a monistic M. Thus truly 
if we c a nnot believe t hat the vrorld is held to gether by a monis-
tic M, we c an only put our tru st in empty words like 11 structure 11 
or "inte r c onne ctedness. rr Vie see then the convincing force of 
Lotze's monistic view. Dr. P. A. Bertocci well puts this p ostu-
late: 
See Bovme, MET, 77 ff. 
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That the order which cons titutes "Nature'' resembles an 
order characteristic of mind at its best is an hypothesis 
which is closer to the facts as we 1mow them than any othel"' 
hypothetical explanation of order.l 
We conclude then that naturalism does not preclude Lotze's 
M, but rath er it itself most certainly though t a citly p re-
s upposes a me diating agency (eviden t in its assumption of the 
validity of genera l laws). However, being averse to any super-
natura l trans cendentalism, the naturalists, by a grea t leap of 
faith, merge the concrete form and function of M into a myste-
rious "Nature." This procedure is entirely consi s ten t with an 
experimental methodology , but it adds little to metaphys ica l 
lmowledge, and when elaborated tends towa rd obs curity and verb-
al ps eudo-simplicity. In view of the many metaphysical incredu-
lities 1ovhich the naturalistic leap of faith heaps upon us, 
Lotze's metaphysical monism seems in ou r estimation to be a 
much more acceptable explanation of the f a cts of reciprocal 
action. 
1. Bertocci, Art.{l947), 85. 
,, 
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l 
CHAPTER III 
TEE PERS ONAL NATURE OF THE I'lONI ST IC M 
We shall now consider the :".capstone of Lotze's ontolog ical 
stra nd of thought: the metaphysical principle of personality as 
it applies to t h e monistic M. His theme here is that the idea 
of divine personality, far from being merely an emotionally en-
l thusiasti~ anthropomorphism, is in truth the result of a very 
reasonable a pplication of the fundamental assumption that per-
sona lity is the key to metaphysics.l Indeed, this fundamenta l 
assurilption is Lotze's guiding light in all of his inquiries. In 
this respect, personality is not only the cap stone but also the 
all-important corner stone of Lotze's metaphysical monism. 2 
1. The Metaphysical Deduction 
of the Personality of the Monistic M 
In the 1-.licrocosmus, Lot ze unexpe ctedly breaks of'f his met-
a physical discussions and passes d irectly to the concept of' a 
personal God found fully developed in relig ion.3 He stat es in 
passing that t he metaphysical middle terms of his reas oning can 
readily be supplied by the rea der. And indeed they can, for we 
1. See Dr. E. s. Brightman's lucid article on the me taphysical 
p rinciple of p ersonality in Brightman (ed.), PIT. 
1
2. A. C. Knudson shows high rega rd for Lotze's ma sterly u s e of 
t he principle of pe rsonality , a nd considers him still to be 
I
' the chief protagonist of personalistic idealism. He writes: 
I 
11 It is l al"gely to his influence that the revival of t he ism 
I 
during t he pas t thirty or forty y ears is due ••• 11 See 
Knudson, POP, 62. 
3. MIG. II. 659. 672_. 
have only to recall the conclus ion tha t Lotze reaches re garding 
·the essence of a thing. His decision is t hat a c hanging thing 
can truly be one only if it is a spiritual subject, holding its 
successively realized states in its unity of con sciousness. Now 
in the development of the ontology of reciprocal action, we 
arrived at t he postulate of an imn1anent M as idea or thought, 
realizing itself in successive becomings. We must remember that 
this one idea, which we believe to be the very e s sence of M, 
may be only our subjective apprehension of a harmonious order.l 
However, if the idea M is actually able to unite the phases a 1 , 
a 2 , a 3 , ••• , an which!.@_ unify in our t emporal forms, it can do 
so only if it is in some sense a self-conscious person. Thus, 
holds Lotze, the condition of M's being absolutely uncondition-
ed is that it have personal existence. 2 
Lotze stresses the importance of t wo points concerning per-
sonality. Firs t of all, personality always involves, however im-
perfectly, a cognitive i mage of the subject itself. Secondly, 
there must be present the fe e ling that this i mag e is the e go or 
self, which by this self-feeling is "pla ced in a f undamental and 
incomparable opposition to all else. 113 He points out that it is 
this self-feeling that widely separates a living personality 
from a mere personification of an eternally unchang eable self-
cognizant Idea or Tru th. Any such pe rsonification would lack the 
essential condition of true personality: "capacity of suffering 1 
1. Ol:'R2 53. 
2. O.l:'R2: 55. 
Lotze says: 11 Personality can never belong to any unchangeably 
valid truth, but only to something which changes, suffers, and 
reacts. 11 1 
2. Lotze's Criticism of Impersonal Views of M 
i. Infinite Substance. Lotze declares emphatically that 
his argl:tment for the substantial oneness of all thing s in a mo-
nistic world ground connects him only apparently with pantheism, 
ana_ that actually his views are far from those of Spino za and 
1schelling. 2 The former ascribes to the universal Substance in-
numera-ble attributes, of which only two, thought and extension, 
are known to us through their manifestations in existence. The 
world process is not due to an act of will on the part of the 
infinite Substance, but solely to a necessary, eternal, and 
timeless causality. The two attributes, which are not reducible 
to e a ch other, are related in a pantheistic parallelism in which 
exactly the same content of Substance is present in each of any 
t wo corres ponding modes of thought and extension.3 For Schel~ 
ling, the infinite Substance is the common root of thought and 
extension, but both rise out of it as mere consequences and are 
in no way constituents of the root. This for Lotze is a concept 
that s ·urpasses all human powers of comprehension. 4 He cannot be-
lieve that s pirit can rise ou t of what is not spirit, as an iso-
llated blossom growing from a stem of substantial realness that 
1. MIG, II, 682. 
2. IYIIC 2 II, 6 77. 3. OPR , 38; 
Ueberwe g , HOP, 74-75. 
I 
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works unconsciously. He thus comes to this significant conclu-
sion: 
From a metaphysical point of view, we could only agree 
with pantheism as a possible conception of the world if 
it renounced all inclination to apprehend the Infinite 
Real under any other than spiritual form.l 
ii. Impersonal Spirit. Lotze also o pposes himself to any 
doct~ine of L~personal s p irit. For him, the idea of an uncon-
scious Reason, which becomes conscious only in individual spir-
itual being s, is an unintelligible abstra ction from the concrete 
life of reason.2 It is incomprehensible how conscious reason 
could originate from such a source.3 .Further, Lotze thinks t hat 
to hold tha t a t fir s t there exist in the Absolute 11 co:nn110n spir-
itual capacities 11 through which it, as well as finite beings, 
develops its pe rsonality, is a mer6 s peculative curiosity. And 
if it said t hat the Absolute remains impersonal, and finite 
beings alone develop their "s p iritual capacities, 11 then it is 
incredible that the Absolute should p roduce in blindmave~_ 
ment those conditions which favor the development of finite 
capacities while denying realization to it s own.4 
iii. World Order. Regarding world order, Lotze holds t hat 
1. MIC , II, 6 77. 
2. Dr. E . s . Brightman a g rees: 11 The i mpers ona l God is inconceiv-
able when thought through. If h e did exist, there is no rea-
son to suppose that an imp ersonal power for good would be 
better able to e xplain the existence of human consciousness 
than wou ld an entire ly atheistic world order. I mpersonal 
values and imp e r sonal s pirit are mere phr a ses invented to 
e xpress aversion to the word •·p ersonality. 111 Bright man, 
IG:P:2 54. 
3. OPR , 40. 
4. O.PR2, 43-44. 
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the term 'order' can never be a pplied to the being tha t orders. 
The sufficient reason again st world order is tha t 11 the order 
mu s t ever be a relation of' something vv-hich exists, af'ter or dur-
1 
ing its e :x:i s tence. 111 Thus order can never precede the ordered 
I material as a conditioning or c reative cause. But, Lotze writes , 
1 it might b e said that to seek in order an ordering being is to 
fail to understand true reality, which without any residu:u.m is 
through and through a living activity, determining itself'. He 
here anticipates what is a militant theme of modern naturalism . 
His answer is that this enthusiastic notion, when clearly ana-
l lyzed, leads bac k to what it seeks to avoid . For how can we con-
ceive of' universal laws which command and things which obey ex-
cep t in terras of' a s p iritual unity of' reality?2 
And , for Lotze, the idea of a moral order leads even more 
inevitably bac k to a p ersonal deity. For ho vv should vve reason-
ably imag ine a blind a ctivity establi shing a dominion of' g ood, 
an activity unable consciously to order thing s or t o distin-
guish between the bad and the good, yet acting as though it 
could?3 
iv. The Problem of' the Ego of' God. A :far more subtle 
dif'f'ic u lty presents itself' in the objection that God c a nnot be 
a person, for ego necessarily implies an alien non-ego. Lotze 
distinguishes three possible me a ning s in this objection: 1) The 
ego is thinkable only in reference to a non-ego. 2) The ego 
1. MIC, II, 674. 3. MIC, II, 676. 
2. MIC, II, 674-675. 
cannot be e x perienced without the presence of the non-ego. 
3) The existence and active influence of the non-e go is a nec-
essary condition for the development of the e go.l 
Lotze. a g rees with the fir s t, but only with the qualifica-
tion that t h e e go, 'i."!hich is the i n de penden t member of the con-
tra st, presupposes a being having a natu re such tha t the deter-
mination of t h e e go is g rounded in tha t nature before the con-
trast with non-e go arises. In other words, he means this: the 
bare s yn1bolic contrast of the notions 'ego' and 'non-ego' can-
not alone account for conscious experience. If neith er of t h e 
notions h a d any fixed me aning a part from the contras t, t h en the 
question which of the c ontra s ting contents, of which the notions 
are symbols, shou ld be e go and v1hich non-e go would be meaning-
less. One could be c a lled e go jus t as well as t h e other.2 Thus 
Lotze argues t h at personality is not found exclusively in the 
act of ideation by which the self cognize s itself as ego apart 
from non-e go, but more primarily in a special n a ture with ou t 
which it i s i mpos s i ble for a being to be an e go. The following 
pass age i ndicates Lotze' s conception of this s pecial nature: 
It may be that only the being who in thought contra s ts with 
hims e lf a non-e go from which he a lso distinguish e s h i ms e lf, 
can say I to h i mself, but yet in order t h at in t hus distin-
guishing-he should not mistake and confound himself with the 
non-e go, this discriminating thought of his must be guided 
by a certainty of self vvhich is i m..lJlediately experienced, by 
a self-existence which is earlier t h an t h e discriminative 
relation by which it becomes e go as op p o s ed to the non-ego • 
• • . All self-consciou s n ess r es ts upon the founda t ion of 
1. MIC 2 II, 678. 2. OPR , 62-63. 
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direct sense o~ self which can by no me a ns arise from becom-
ing aware o f a contrast with the externa l \vorld, but is it-
self the reason that this contra st can be ~elt as unique, a s 
not comparable to any other distinction between t wo objects. 
Sel~-consciousness is only the s u bsequent endeavour to ana-
l y ze with the resources o~ co gnition t h is exp erienced ~act.l 
Lotze is thus directly o pposed to the second raeaning of the 
objection. 
The third p os s ible me a ning re presents, according to Lotze, 
t h e most serious ~orm of the objection. The implication is tha t 
no p ersonality can develop without receiving those impressions 
o~ an external world which supply the contents o~ ideas and the 
occasions ~or the immediate experience o~ sel~, for "the ~eel-
ing s in vJhich the e go, e x isting ~or s elf, can enjoy sel~ with-
out as yet being conscious o~ ••• contras t to the non-e go."2 
But Lotze cautions a gainst transferring these finite co n ditions 
to divine personality. It must first be remembered that the ex-
ternal world, which the non-eg o reflects, as such never enters 
co n sci01;.sness; it merely provides, through the senses, t h e in-
fl u enc es or e xcitations which occasion the forms of activity or 
inner cons ciO't).S states t h at flow from the inner nature of t he 
spiritu al being it s elf. It is only in opposition to its ovrn 
state s t ha t the sub j ect a ppreh ends itsel~ a s I. 3 And once inner 
states have been occasioned, :much tha t is new is developed with-
ou t fresh stimulation. Lot ze points out that in reflection, im-
agination, and conflicts of p a s sions the finite being achieves 
a great amount of living development, t h ough this of course is 
1. MIG, II, 679-680. 
2. MIG, II, 681. 
3. MIG:2 II, 683; 
OPR , 64-65. 
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limited by the necessity of continually renewed orientat ion, 
lf by a ction and reaction ·with the whole . in which it is compre-
hended.111 
3. God as Perfect Personality 
The conditioning of inner life by itself which takes place 
only imperfectly in the finite personality, is wholly unlimit-
ed in God, for he needs no stimulus from an external world. His 
train of thought is, according to Lotze, an eternal inner move-
ment, having never been quiescent.2 
Lotze as s erts in a manner that is very -oertinent in our 
a g e of impersonal materialisms in which any thought of divine 
personality is explained away as f anciful and wishful dreaming, 
that, on the contrary, the natural step s of an adequ ate meta-
physics lead us to the idea of a uerfect Personality, of which 
the finite mind is seen to be but a "feeble reflection."3 Per-
sonality, for him, is not a mere human phenomena, but the very 
ouuosite--it is the maiestic and unfettered essence of the 
.).. ... t ... 
divine Beiftg~ The finite spirit, in reflecting upon itself, 
finds the pOIYer of the Absolute only as an obscure germ in its 
ovm inner being. Lotze say s: 
This power it is which works through and through them (i. e . 
finite spirits), and, witho'.lt their own assistance, pre-
scribes for t h em the universal forms of their s piritua l ac-
tivity , their sensa tion, imag ination, judgment, etc.; and 
which permits them only ·within narrow limits to dispose fur-
ther of this dowry, and to pursue their s pecial ends.4 
3. MIC~ II, 685. 
4. OPRi::::, 67-68. 
1. MIC, II, 684. 
2. MIC, II, 685. 
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Lotze maintains t h a t t h e finite psyc h ic forms are actually 
ob sta cles to a p erfect inner development. The l a ws o f p s y chic 
mecha nism are such t h a t ideas inh i b it one ano t h e r• and only a 
v e r y s mall n.tu.-nber can be present at one time in conscious n ess. 
Thus we c a n neve r bring tog eth er in cogni t ion ou r whole nat u re 
at any one moment, much le ss t he u nit y of its v1hole t emporal 
de velopment. We a ppear to ourselves from a one- s ided p oint of 
view, anc1 ou r action much of t he time is carrie d on under the 
i nflu ence of fragme n t a r y f e elin g s or groups of idea s which h a p -
:pen to be p re s e n t in con sciou s n ess, and wh i ch a f terward , when 
we have collected ou r though ts more coherently, we can h a rdly 
r e cogni ze a s ou r own. Also i ndividua l moo d s seem perma nently to 
e s c ape memory; y ou thful e nthusiasms , which once seemed to part 
o f ou r very be ing , s eem later to be u nint ellig i b le aberr a t ions.l 
Th e divin e p e rsonality contains none of these obs t a cles. Lotze 
t hus concludes: 
In p oin t of 
p e r sonality 
all tha t i s 
Infinite •• 
fact we h ave little g r ound for s pe aking of t h e 
of finite beings; it is an i d e a l, which, like 
ide a l, belon~ s uncond itionally onlv to t h e 2 ~ - u 
. 
Perfect Pers onality is in God only ; to all fin ite mi n ds -
t h ere is allotte d but a pale copy thereof; t h e finiteness 
of the finite is not a p ro ducin g condition of t h is Person -
ality , but a limit and a hindr a n ce of its development.3 
1. OPR2, 68. 
2. MIC, II, 687. See also Brightman, IG.P, 54, "~Nhere Dr. Brightman 
vvrites: "Ins t e ad of t a king p ersonality to be too h uman a 
category to apply to God, it wou ld rea lly be more log ical to 
tak e it a s too divine a c a teg ory to apply to man. • • It is 
this i d e a l of a perfect pers on which ·we u se in think ing about 
God, not t h e a ctu a l hu.,.'i!an person vlith all h is limitat ions." 
3. MIC, II, 688. 
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4. H. N. Wieman's Idea of God as Creative Event 
For the purpose of evaluating Lot ze' s application of the 
principle of personality to the monistic M, we have chosen for 
considerat ion two interes ting mo dern doctri:n.es rega rding divine 
p ersonal ity. The one, thn t of H. N. v'i!ieman, is representative of 
relig ious naturalism, accord ing to which p ersonality as a cos-
mic metaphysical principle is unaccep table. In this view_, the 
traditional Hebrew-Christian conce ption of a spiritua l God is 
reinterp reted as a symbolic or pictorial relig iou s reference to 
an unconscious axiological tendency in nNature. 11 The other doc-
trine, C. Hartshorne's social panentheistic realism, re p r es ents, 
as we shall see, a me taphysical attitude toward personality 
which is in sharp c ontra s t with that of Lotze. 
\Nieman 1 s ont olog ic a l assumptions are the same as those of 
t h e naturalists "I"Th6m> we considered in the previou s chapter. For 
him, reality or Nature is made up entirely of substantia l events 
composed of qualities and r e l a tions ( Viieman says tha t 11 rela-
tions !I i s another term for 11 structure 11 ).1 All values, of which 
the highest are to b e found in relig ion, are, a ccord ing to Wie-
man, to be interpreted in terms of " str u ctural events and t h eir 
possibilities. 112 
He defines God as n creative event. 11 Vfua t does he mean by 
this term? Firs tly, t h e creat ive event is an event; tha t is, 
any one of the continuously changing 11 structu r es 11 of nature. 
1. Wieman, SHG, 6. 
2. Wieman, SHG, 7. 
83 
Now all events are material, but by 11 ma terial 11 ·wi eman means not 
:merely ''pellets of i nani mate matter , 11 but a lso biolog ical, so-
cial, and h isto r ical forms of existence.l Furth er, an e vent is 
not on l y material, unique, and · chang ing , but it is ~lso mult i-
ple, for it c an b e anal yzed into sub-events or included in s ome 
mo r e inclus ive event.2 Ordinary natura lism, or 11 contextualism" 
as Wi eman c alls it, cons iders everything to be in a process of 
transfo r mation--the unities of st ructure come and go c ont inua l-
ly. Wieman, however , finds that t h ere is in this proce s s o:f 
events an exceptional and abiding agency . This is 11 creativity, 11 
which is a charac ter , or structure, or form of certa in events 
which 11 bring a new stPuc ture whe reby the human mind distinguish-
es and relat es events in such a way that there is more richnes s 
of quality in happenings as they occur ••• "3 The creat ive 
e v ent is one that p os ses ses "crea tivity ." 
Now the creat ive event can be anal y ze d i nto four sub-
events , a ll of ·which must be p r es ent to make possible creativ-
ity : 1) emere; ing awareness of qu.alitative meaning derived from 
other p ers ons through conununication, 2) integrat ing the se nev,r 
me aning s with others p reviou sly acquired, 3 ) e xpanding the rich-
ne ss of quality in the appreciable world by enla r ging its mean-
ing , and 4 ) deepening the conmmnity a mong those who partici:pate 
in this total creat ive event of intercommunication. 4 V/ ie:man 
emphas ize s that the "-ings 11 mean that t he creat ive event or· the 
1. YJieman , SHG, 8. 3. Wieman, SHG, 68 . 
2. Wieman , SHG , 299. 4. Wieman , SHG, · 58 ff. 
84 
creat ive good is an event in p roc e ss--it is 11 the source of' hu-
man g ood. 11 Its finished produ cts are 11 created intrinsic g ood," 
which is cu l ture, and "created instrumental good," which is 
teclL~ology .l The creat ive good is a l ways and absolute l y g oo d in 
the sense t ha t it a l wa y s creates valu es.2 
One of t h e most important cond itions und er · \vhich the crea-
tive event occurs is 11 the self- g iving of t h e individual himself' 
to such transfo r mat ion. tt3 The following passag e sho·ws well Wi e -
man ' s idea of the f unction of the creat ive event: 
The c reative event. • • weaves a web of me anin g between in-
d ividuals and g roups and between t h e organism and its en-
vironment ••• In weav i ng t he web of me aning , the crea tive 
event transforms the individual p erson so that he is more or 
a person. I n t h e b e g inning it creates the human pe rson ou t 
of the living organism of t he infant . Lik e wise, it creates 
and progressively transforms human conrrnunity and the course 
of h i stor y .4 
Like R . B. Perry·~ Wieman declares that h i s Go d . is much more 
than a person . For him, to say eith er that Go d is like man or 
tha t God is a perfect p ers on and man only an i mperfe ct i mage is 
really to a omit the sad truth that both are very d ifferent :rrom 
e a c h other.6 Thus personality c anno t be a n actual attribute of 
God. He cons iders the Christian idea of a lovin.g Person to b e 
merely a myt hical symbol rep resenting wha t alone is real--the 
c reat ive event. Here is how he expl ains t h e rise of t h i s 
c ommon s ymboli sm : 
1. 
2 . 
3. 
Since creative good at the level ·where it saves and trans -
forms human pe r s onality always wo rks in the f orm of inter-
'i'lieman, SHG, 68- 6 9. 4 . Wieman, SHG, 20. 
'Nieman , SHG , 299. 5. See Perry , -·GTV; '685-686. 
'Nieman , SHG , 20 . 6 . Wieman, SHG , 266 . · 
85 
action b etween persons , we must deal with p ersons to deal 
with it. Further more , t he persons are much more easily appre 
hended than the deep and subtle and mi ghty working of t h is 
creat i ve event. Therefore, what is more natural than to rep-
resent the reality humanly . • • As previously noted, the pe r 
sons "vv ith vrhom we deal when crea tive trans formation is most 
p rofound and regen erat ive are, for the most part, not vis-
i b le and not even knovvn, having died long s ince. • • The 
conclusion is obvious. The relig ious man who cormnits h i m-
self in worship to the source of hQman good will most nat-
urally thi nk of this rea lity as an inv isib le, transcendent-
al pers on, v1ho somehow pervades the universe ••• 1 
Wieman thus grants the pr i nciple of personality only a practic a 
usefulne s s in the relig ious worship of the creative event. 
We are pleased to see that Wieman's c reat ive event, like 
Perry's trpe rsonal and social i ntegration, 11 2.· is so inseparably 
related t o personality, and also that he considers relig ious 
values to be the highes t. Afu1irable also is his emphatic aim to 
provide a truly objec tive answer to the all-important quest ion, 
vrhat is value? 1:Ve are , hovrever, not convinced that the doc trine 
of the creative event i s an adequate solution. I t is p r a c t ical-
l y incredible that there should be an i mpersona l be ing which 
cannot cons ciously provide for the generation of values, yet , so 
far as we can judge empirically, a cts in every way as though i t 
c oul d . Even if experimental s cie nce had reached s u ch fantastic 
heights that it could show h ow personality might actually be ex-
1. Wieman , SHG , 267. 
2. For Perry, as for Lotze, v alue objec t ivity p re supposes a di-
vine benevolent will. However, he t hinks of this will as a 
npersonal and social integration, 11 which i s not a mere com-
munity of interest, but rathe r a unique union a ccomplished 
through the haYJnonious fulfillment of all interests . This 
real integrat i on const itutes Perry's i dea of God. God is a 
union o f persons; to conceive o f him a s a person is only t o 
confuse the meaning o f the term . Hi s God as living love, he 
tells us , means 11 somethi n g more than that Go d is a loving 
peT•son . 11 It me ans a mora l control "of a ll persons, by all per-
sons o )erson.s 11 P-_ ~ 
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perimentally produced from a s pecific mixture of inanimate 
ing redients fashioned under specific condit ions, it would still 
be more reasonable and credible to assume in impersonal Nature 
a cons cious "creative event ;' as guarantee of value ob,jectivity. 
In other words , why assume that an impersonal Nature can pro -
duce hmnan pers onalities and not such a co smic personality also? 
As i t stands, we cannot consider Wieman's creat ive event 
to be anything more than a hypostatization of the abstract 
universal 11 creativity11 which has been abstracted from the data 
of value experience. Indee d , we doubt that the idea of an lia-
personal God can be expressed otherwise. Actually , the question 
should not be whether there is a personal or an imp ersonal God, 
but rather this : What do we actually believe when we ach'TIOY!l-
edg e that values are truly objectively g rounded? If this be the 
correct way to put the question, then we s houl d hold that many 
so-called 11 athe is ts 11 who are sincerely commi tted to noble 
social and moral ideals believe in a personal God~ in the 
sens e that they c annot show concretely and meaningfully that 
they do not tacitly p resuppose a cosmic personal Ground. 
Attempts to avoid this presup!)Os ition cannot progress very 
far beyond a bare statement of dislike, an emp ty negation, 
1. That is, logic~lly or, better still, coherent;hy s peaking, 
such men believe in God. Psy~"'2~~o~ically, they of course do 
not, o r at leas t give little evidence of it. Nevertheless, 
in virtue of their sincere conunftments to high ideals, we may 
just as fully and validly i mpute belief to them; as we may 
logically and coherently i mput e disbelief to those who 
psycholog ically believe in a personal Go d , but who · deny him 
by committ ing themselves t o t.mcharitable, intolerant, and 
uncircumspect ways of life . 
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denoted by the terms "atheism" and "impersonal God. 111 These 
terms symbolize t he vague s ) eculative gu:e·ss tha t value norms 
somehow nee d not be grounded in a personal Ground. How an i mpe r-
sonal Ground (i.e. if it ·were possible to show that the term has 
positive meaning ) could be more desirable and richer than a lov-
ing Pe rsonality we cannot begin to conceive. 
Of c0 11rse, it is entirely p ossible . that pe rsona lity is 
only the foam of the breakers of a great i mpersonal sea, and is 
confined solely to human beings. Against this poss i bility, we 
can only offe r our 11 ontolog ica l pre,judice 11 ; we, with Lot ze , see 
something wonderfully unique in human personality, and have the 
ine radica ble faith that would have, as Hockin g puts it, "Mind 
in c harge of f ate ." 2 The naturalists, on the other hand, ascribe 
ruling powe r to 11 natural events, 11 of which personality is me re-
1. This seems to be Dr. E . S. Br i ghtman's a pproach in his 
criticism of Bertrand Russell's philosophy of religion. 
Russell ostensibly denies the knowability of v a lue-norms, 
the eternal worth of personality, and the e x i stence of God. 
But these theoretical denials are flatly contradicted by his 
obviou sly sincere and whole-hearted devotion to s p iritual 
and social ideals. Russell's main efforts are so s pent in 
righteously indignant but rather emotional outburs ts a gainst 
the trappings of religion, i.e. s pecific distorted sectar-
ian dogmas, the clergy , formal church organizations, etc., 
that he unfortunately never gets to a serious and systematic 
consideration of the truly positive a r guraents for theism. 
In Dr. Bri ghtman 1 s words, Russell's ·quest fOT' t h eoretical 
certainty has crowded out a ll cons iderations of empirical 
adequacy. See Brightman, Art.(l946), and also (in the same 
volume) Russell's a cknowledgment of Dr . Brightman 's very 
charitable style of criticism. Russell, Art.(l946), 725-727. 
2. Hocking , Art.(l950), 7. Dr. P. A. Bertocci once remarke d in 
a directed study discussion tha t the issue between natural-
ism and idea lism boils do\m to a simnle alternat ive: Either 
we believe that personality is too good to be true (i.e. of 
t h e cosmos), or we believe that it is too good not to be 
true. This certain l y seems to be the issue in a-nutshell. 
ly an incidental result. Tn ey have the a pparently ineradicable 
faith that e xpe rimental method is universally a pplicable, and 
can and will someday complete ly explain in impersonal tems its 
presuppo s itions, nrunely, personality and the uniformity of na-
ture.1 However, we should point out that the fact of the matter 
is that experimental method has a long vmy to go in laying bare 
the inner working s of nature. Indeed, until much further prog-
ress is made in accounting for personality, we cannot but re-
gard naturalism as a highly s peculative venture, whose mili-
t ant claims to truth rest on the dubious unempirical grounds of 
v1h~lt h a s yet to be achieved.2 Thus , on their f a ith, the n a tural-
1. See , for example, Y. H. Krikorian ' s p lain statements to this 
effect in Art .(l9<±4), 242 . He writes : ''F'or naturalism as a 
philosophy, the universal applicability of the experimental 
method is a basic belief." 
2. It may sound odd to call naturalists highly spe culative . Do 
they not claim to be but simple and modest adherents of ex-
perimental method , intensely opposed to metaphysical cosmo-
log ical speculation? But if this were so they would make no 
normative philosophical l eg i s lations; they would simply and 
modestly be content to g ive a st e p by step account of the 
p ro gress of exp erimental science as it relates to philosoph-
ical problems . They would never deny that there is_ a p erson-
al God--they would. simply record the truth tha t science has 
not yet f ound one. 'rhey would never hold that personality is 
nothing but the behavior of an organism--they would state 
that behavioral stu dies have resulted in an experimental bod-
y of knowledge abou.t persona lity. But no one, much less a 
philoso '}her, could limit himself to such an uninteresting 
role. With their postula te of the universal a pplicability of 
e x perimental me thod the naturalists enter upon speculation 
just a s s u rely as the most s peculative idealist. They dog-
matically proclaim that exp e riment is not simply an abs t ract 
descriptive method, but the true philosoph ical crit erion. 
This p roclamation g oes h and in hand vii th a definite cosmo-
log ic a l s peculation: the material structure of reality. In 
thus s peculating on the ultimat e significance of experim::mt-
al method, t h e naturalists, it is importa.nt to see , re s t on 
nothing more than a f a ith in such ultimate significance . 
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ists are able to wield t he ir concep t of Nature a l most lik e a 
magician~s hat: To e x p l a in c ausality it is said that Nature h a s 
!! s tructu r a l inte rconnec t edness. 11 Unity in chan g e is accounted 
for on t h e bas is of the 11 structural unities 11 of Nature. In re-
gard to mind, it is a "non-atomic 11 p roduct of an eme r gent Na-
ture. Finally , the divine function of axiog ene s is is assigned 
to a 11 crea tive even tn in Nature. Nothing seems too difficult to 
e xplain; all · ..t h at is needed it seems is an a mple store of a ppro-
pria te terminology.l And for all we know Nature may be such an 
all-pro ducing impersonal womb. We who trust in a more empirical 
explanation of reality can only wait in hope t h at t h e mo dern 
ent husiasm for an imp ersona l order of thing s will, as exneri-
menta l me t h od itself gradually makes p l a in its great limita -
tions, eventua lly s u b side and make ample room for Lotze's per-
sonalistic p o s tula te. 
5. c. Ha rtsh orne's Social 
Panp s y c h ic Prin ciple of Personality 
Ha r tshorne opposes the Th omis t ic idea of an a bsolu tely in-
de pendent God, as well as any doctrine of e x ternal relat ions 
which p recludes a trans cendent deity. His sta rting - point is the 
convic t ion t hat b enevolent social pa r•ticipation is the v e ry 
metaphysical e s sence of rea lity .2 He mainta ins t h at self-enjoy -
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ment and development are realized only when one goes beyond 
oneself and t ake s a sympathetic, a ltruistic, and benevolent in-
terest i n other persons. This pa rticipation in the vicis s itudes 
of others, called by Hartshorne nthe bond of social rappoi't,n 
ex tends to a ll forms of ex i s tence. 1 Thus when we have feelings 
of we ll-being, we ma::r , ac cording to him, assume that the cells 
:1 of our bodies consciously participate in their ovm f a shion in 
our pleasure.2 
The bond of social rapport is the social panpsych ic princi-
ple u pon ·which Hartshorne ba.ses his idea of God. He reasons that 
/ if the social panpsych ic principle is to have objective axio-
1log ica l validity, it can only be on the assumption that there is 
in nature a reliable i mmanent tendency guaranteeing the fruit-
ful functioning of the principle. 3 For Hartshorne , t he possibil-
ity of theology depends on our conceiving this tendency as the 
supreme instance of social benevolence; as the purposive Person-
ality indicated by the Scriptu.ral phrase 11 God i s love. n4 This is 
ji the core of his doctrine of God. He asserts t hat meta;:;hysics 
! 
either leads to a nsocio-s:rmpatheticn deity or "evaporates into 
thin air. 11 nrf the cosmo s is not held together by love, it is 
held to gether by empty words, like causal ity ••• n5 Lotze would 
!unreservedly assent to this statement. 
I 
11 Hartshorne's reconciliation of his view with tradi t ional 
absolutism is t h is: He considers God to be absolute and inde-
1 ~·. Hartshorne, MVG , 155. _ Hartshorne , IviVG , 152. 4. Hartshorne, ~NG, ix, 144. 5. Hartshorne, MVG, 346-34'7. 
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p endent in his unchanging, p er:f:'"ect love (this is God's 11 pri-
mordial natu.ren); but, in order to be so absolute in love, God 
must be aware of and must include in his being the joys and 
s u ffering s of h is who le universe. Hartshorne holds that God is 
p erfect i n love only because he i s perfect in appreciation of 
and participation in the interests of h i s c reatures (God's 
consequent or n anenthe istic or supremely relative--rtsurrelativerr 
. ) 1 
--n a -r;ure • 
Snat now is Hart s horne 's ontolog ical conception of this 
divine social Personality? He tells us that this c an be con-
ceived only by analogy from human experience. According l y , he 
fastens his attention on the assumed fact that the human b ody is 
like a world of individuals and that the mind is usomething 
like an indwelling God." 2 The world then c an be cons idered to be 
liter•ally God' s body. However, God exercise s i nnnediate and di-
rect control over it, much in the same \vay as our minds imme-
diately influence a nd are influenced by the brain c e lls. Hart -
shorne strong l y denies that this doctrine of divine personality 
is in any way anthrop omorphic , for God's direct control of his 
entire bo dy is metap hysic ally uni que .3 In the s ense that God has 
an eternal and unchang ing i mmediacy of avmreness (omniscience ) 
and control (omnipotence), he is abs olute. But in the sense that 
his all-inclusive avmreness and control conne ct him with all 
existence, he is wholly re l ative and de pendent. Furthermore, 
1. Hartshoi•ne, IviVG , 159. 3. Hartshorne , DR , 31-32. 
2. Hartshorne , IEVG, 177. 
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holds Hartshorne, the supreme relativity o:f God is his concrete 
living character, which alone makes possible and is superior to 
his abstract absolute asuect.l 
... ,. 
In .connection with Hartshorne's idea o:f God's control o:f 
his body, v1e might also add that in place o:f crea t ion ex nihilo, 
he accepts the doctrine o:f the eternal development o:f the 
world.2 Creation, :for him, is 11 supreme in:fluence upon growth," 
according to the supreme adequacy (not sovereignty) o:f God's 
omnipotence.3 
Hartshorne agrees very closely with Lotze regarding the 
doctrine o:f divine benevolence. As we s aw in the :first chap ter, 
Living Love is, :for Lotze, the very essentia o:f God's person-
ality. Hov1ever, regarding the :form o:f existence o:f God, they 
di.f:fer radically. Both to be sure ascribe personality to God, 
but Hartshorne :feels tha t Lotze's doctrine o:f an ontolog ically 
monistic God implies the abolition o:f all distinction between 
included and including.4 There:fore, he has applied his social 
p~inciple o:f divine personality not to an immaterial monistic 
M, but rather to a divine being whose nature is analogous to the 
human mind-brain cell structure. He thus arrives at a panpsychic 
theistic realism. 
This view lends itself' easily to concrete imag ination, and 
would seem tQ be a quite proper doctrine o:f divine personality. 
l. Hartshorne, DR, vii. 
2. Hartshorne, MVG, 230. 
3. Hartshorne, MVG, 193. 
4. Hartshorne, DR, 92-93. In the 
next chapter, we shall g ive 
detailed attention to this ob-
jection. 
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However, we unfortunately c annot avoid a grave metaphysical de-
fect which accompanies any such plausible imagery of a living 
divine Organism. How is it that any int e raction at all is pos-
sible between God's mind and his b o dy? Is there not required 
son1e addi t ional media ting a gency? It seems that if we are to 
car~J t h roug h comp l etely Hartsh orne's mind-brain cell analogy , 
we must carry over to the being of God that agency M ·which make s 
po ss ible human cerebral intera ction. This ob jection seems to us 
to b e sufficient reason for r endering wholly untenable Hart -
shorne's analog ical dualism. The only way out of the difficulty 
wo:1ld be to say tha. t there is an inscrutable g iven external c on-
n e c t i on, and that there i s neither any need to analyze this 
connection further nor any need for a connecting agenc y --su ch is 
t h e s t~ucture of God ' s be ing . This kind of answer , i mp lici t in 
Hart shorne' s doctrine, is e x a ctly the same as tha t fo1.m d in the 
nat '..-l r a listic doc trine of a g iven inte r connected stl"'Ucture of' 
Nature. For a more em1:; irica l philosophy , like Lo tze 's, s uch a 
way out is a s peculative unempirical way. Empirica lly , we c a n 
onlv 
in some degree truly explain the possibility o f' connection~by 
taking up appa rent external connection into r eal internal con-
nec t ion with in one divine cons ciousness. 
We thus see in Hart shorne ' s applicatio n of' the principle of' 
personality very clearly a nd concretely why Lot .ze more than once 
cau tions against construing his immaterial M to be a web or net 
of int e llec tual relations connecting thing s .1 For if :M be a web, 
---·----
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\Ye must ask what makes possible the action of' the 1.•1eb on the 
things enmeshed in it. This, however, plainly leads us into a 
baf'fling and fruitless infinite regress.l 
Vie have now presente d the general structure of Lotze' s 
metaphysical monism. Let us go ahead to inquire into a question 
which has been pe r s istently pressing f'orward in our thoughts. In 
this chapter, we have seen that inste ad of thinking that God is 
like man, it r ather behooves us to realize that man is like God, 
lik e him only roughly and imperfectly. The light of personality 
which shines brilliantly in God flickers very weakly in the 
finite s pirit. But nov1, what is the exact metaphysical status of 
this ·weakly flickering light? Is it a ctually possible for the 
finite s pirit to have any re a l light of its own? In the ne x t 
chapter; we shall attempt critically to discuss this interesting 
~roblem in the light of our previous evaluations. 
1. In Beyond Humanism (Ch. 12), Hartshorne argues that the only 
intellig ible explanation of causality is in terms of pan-
psych ic 11 sympa t het ic I'apport 11 or 11 soc i eti sm'1 or 11 organic 
sympathy.'' He writes tha t this involves a 11 pre-e stabl i shed 
harmony ," which, however, is not absolute , but 11 very rough 
and fle x i ble " (210). One thing acts on and:>th er by contributin: 
to the feeling of it (208). Regarding God, he say s: n ~;-~-e shall 
never understand a God of' love unless we conceive of' him as 
the all-sensitive mind of' the world body. 11 (208) This is 
certa inly cons istent doctrine. Is it, however, not more em-
pirical, with Lotze, to conceive of' the transmission of feel-
ing s according to law in teiTJ1S of' t he activity of an i mmanent 
spiritua l Substance? Then we do not have to wonde r hovf it is 
that one object can know wha t action is r equired of it by a 
certain occasioning impulse, how it can be in rapport with an 
other. It is easier to understand that in so far as ob j ects 
interact, they are not merely God's body, but his very self. 
This is our d1fficulty with Hartshorne' s idea of divine per-
sonality. It seems to us that in order to be more empirical, 
Hart shorne's pluralist ic panpsych ism mu s t g ive vmy, in s o far 
as intera ction is concerned, to monism; God's body must be 
absoro!ed into identi tv with his mind. Rapnort is be s t con-
ceived as t:hA :irrnnanAnT. ::tc_tivi t y of one he~ no-
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CHAPTER TV 
THE STATUS OF THE 
FINITE SPIRIT IN LOTZE 1 S- MONISM 
The central issue in Lotze's philosophy is the problem of 
individuality. As we have seen, Lotze considers interaction to 
be possible only if all things are phases or modes of one 
spiritual Substance. Now does this mean that the finite s p irit 
is n holly absorbed into a s p iritual pantheism? Can Lotze pro-
vide for a real indep endence on the part of the finite s p irit? 
The answers to these questions will enable us correctly to 
deteYmine the extent and significance of Lo tze 's monism. 
1. The Substantiality of the Finite Spirit 
i. Lotze's Transition from Panpsychism to Objective 
I dealism. In his ontology, Lotze, we recall, concludes that a 
thing c an be a real unity in chang e only if it is in some sense 
a spir i tual subject.l Does this i mply that all things, even the 
most minute specks of dust, consciously participate in the de-
velopment of the monistic Tvi? Such is indeed Lotze 1 s conviction 
in the Microcosmus. He grants the possibility that there may be 
self-less things as mere states of the One, but he holds that 
e this is most likely improbable and that really all thing s pos-
1. See pages 43-47 of this thesis . 
I 
> 
e ss selfhood in vary ing de grees of perfec t ion. 1 His 1nability ·to 
thinl{ of any pa rt of the cosmos as a lifeless instrurnent for t h e 
ends of a nother, and his desire t ha t the universe s h ou ld h ave 
the "joy of animation" diffused t h roughout are the main motives 
t h at underlie his conviction.2 In answer to the c h arg e tha t it 
is rid iculous to consider dus t a s having inne r life, Lotze 
offers a stateme n t tha t is difficu lt to gainsay : 
The du st is dust to him alone whom it incommodes; t h e in-
different form of t h e utensil no more lessens the v a lue of 
the severa l elements of ·which it co n sists, t h an a confined 
social p osition t ha t rep resses the outflow of intellectual 
life, d e s troy s t h e high destiny to which even such o p pres s ed 
fra gments of h 1nuanity are called. When we s p eak of the di-
vine orig in and the celestial goal of the human s oul, we 
h ave more cau se to cast a sorrowful look on this dust of t h e 
s p iritu al world, whose life often seems to us s o fruitless, 
whose work so purely a failure. We h ave far less reason to 
deny an inner life to such insig nificant con stituents of the 
outer world, for--uncomely as they may seem to us in their 
accLrr.1ulations--they a t least everywhere and with ou t short-
coming p erform the a c t ions p ermitted to them by the univer-
sal order as modes of exp r essing t h eir internal s t ates.3 
In his l a ter reflec t ions in the Metaphysics, Lot ze leans 
toward a less po e tical outlook. And in his lectures on t h e 
philoso phy of relig ion we find no tra ces of pan p s y ch ism. He 
everyvvhere make s a s harp dis tinction between the world of creat-
ed s p irits and the world of inanimate thing s, which a re mere 
thoughts of t h e monistic M and possess no substant iality of 
the ir o~m. Aft er all, he asks, is it necessary to maintain the 
real s p iritua l e x i s tence of thing s wh ose activities do not in 
the lea st g ive clea r evidence of a supposedly hidden life? 
1. T·H C, II, 647. 3. MIC, I, 361. 
2. MIC, I, 362. 
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Cou ld not the creative s p irit dis p ense with this rou ndabou t 
way and g ive r ise directly in spirits to the phenomena which 
it was intende d to p resent to them? Could it not p resent that 
form of a world which was to be seen wi thout t h e i ntervent ion 
of an m1seen world which cou ld never be s een as it would be 
if unseen? And this powe r being in all spirits one and t h e 
same, why shou ld there not in f a ct be a corresp ondence be -
t ween the several activities which it e xerts in those s p irits 
of such a k ind that while it would not be the same world-
i mage that vms p resented to all spirits but different i mage s 
to d ifferen t spirits, the different p re s e n t a tions should y et 
fit i nto e a c h other, s o that all spirits should believe them-
· selves p l anted at different positions of the same world and 
s h o u ld b e able to adjust t hemselve s in it, each to each, in 
the way of harmonious a cti8n?l 
Th e above pas s age is interes ting not only a s an ind ica tion of 
Lot ze's objective ide a lism, but also as an introduction t o his 
1doctrine of t h e status of the finite s p irit. He reasons furthe r 
that the assumption of real (ina nimat e) thing s would hav e no 
advantage over the view t h at things have no independent me ta-
phys ica l reality , being on l y " elementary a ct i ons of the one 
Be ing which forms t h e g round of the world. rr2 This then would 
seem to be Lotze's final view. Instead of holding, as he did 
earlier in life, t hat a ll that is real is s p irit, h e would 
a ff irm that enly spirits are real . Let us now inquire into 
Lo tze's idea of the reality of the s p irit, and it s relat i on to 
t he reality of the i mmanent One~ 
ii. The Unique Cha rac teristics of the Finite Spirit. It 
would be well t o begin t h is section with a brief exp l anation of 
1 Lotze's psycho log ical t e r minology . For him, ' s elf , ' 'sou l,' 's p ir-
it,'' person' are synonymous terms, a nd applica ble to man and 
1 • lc'IET , I , 2 2 5 • 
2. MET, I, 226 . 
brute ali:<:e. However , the human s p irit ha s c erta in definite 
features ·which distinguish it from t h e a nimal soul, and which 
just ify our c a lling it a ' mi nd.' These ma in fe atures are two in 
n~~ber : 1) t he reflec t ive ide a of valid and b i nding truth, a nd 
2 ) the moral sens e of univers a l right or binding duty . 1 Anima ls 
a re able to i d e a t e, but on ly man c an di s cern in co gnition "the 
p resence o:f l aws t ha t rea ch out i ndefinitely b ey ond the partic-
u l a r c ases ."2 Lot ze s ays that " t he c apacity o:f b ecomi n g con -
sc i ous of the I nfinite i s t he dist i ngui s h i ng endovrraent of the 
human mind. 11 3 By this he means the c a pacity of the mi nd t o 
J 
I I 
strive for ends , not s i mpl y i nst i n ctively , but by reflecting on I 
and methodic a lly ga thering tog ether the mo st complex and hetero- i 
g eneous me ans.4 
vrna t are the reasons for a p:9l y ing the abov e ter:rns to a 
de finite subjec t of menta l life? Lotze thinks t here a re three: 
1) the :fre edom of ment a l life, 2) the i n c omparability o f inn er 
pro ce s ses with observed states of inani mat e mat ter , and 3 ) the 
1'-m ity of cons ciousness . 5 The first two a re i mportant, thinks 
!Lotze , but not suff icient to establish the uniqueness of a 
!s p i r itual su ject; fo r, fir stly, the free d om of inner life is 
~ifficult to define p reci s ely, a nd, secondly , t h e me re fa c t of 
p.ncorilparability does not r u le out the materialist ic p oss i b ility 
uha t menta l life is somehow the r esultant of an i n teraction of 
!physical forces . 6 
~ · MIC, I, 713- 714 , 
. rue , I, 674 . 
4. MIC, I, 645- 646 . 
5. W!ET , II, 1 67-169 • 
~ . MI C, I, 714 . 6. MET, II, 1 68-169. 
Lotze would rest t h e fact of the unique substantial exist -
ence of t h e sou l on the third reason : the unity of' co n scious -
ness . He emphasizes, ho'.7ever, that this f a ct of' unity does not 
de pend on ou r c onscious of any unity . The i mportant point , 
a cco rding to h i m, i s that if anything can appear to us , even the 
c o gnitive i mo..ge t h at the soul is an unconnected p lure.lity , vie 
ma y f'rom this inf'el'' the active presen ce of a truly unified sub-
,iect .l For the real me a ning of' unity of consciousnes s lie s in 
the a ct of r e lating a nd comparing in a timeless synthesis b..,r 
which the contents of' cons c,iousness are not simpl e fused t o-
g eth er, like physical co:::npositions, but rather are so combined 
that a ll r etain t he ir peculia r char a cteristics, while the sub-
ject , the e go, so to speak stands a part and focuses its aware -
ness u p on them . 2 Such a wonderf'u l relating a c tivity presup yoses 
the i n divisible unity of' the soul. Lotze says : 
It must be one and the same thing which forms the idea 
of' a , then that of b , a nd which at the s ame ti!l'le is 
cons cious of t he n a ture a nd extent of' the d iffe rence 
between them .3 
His conclus ion, then , is that the unity of cons ciousnes s 
i mplies that the soul i s a simple substance . But by this soul 
sub stance he of cours.e doe s not me a n any sort of h a rd atom . The 
term ' substance' is, for him , simply a des i gnation of any i n -
de pendent center or subje c t of co~scious a c t ion or reaction . 4 
\'Je must not think of this substance as any kind o f substratum 
1. MIC, I, 157. 3. ~ffiT, II, 170. 
2. MIC, I, 164. 4 . TI'IET , II, 175, 1 81 , 316 . 
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v1hich mi ght be the ground , means , or cause of the s ou l's activ-
ity.l Just as when we ask wha t any inan i mat e thing is, our 
answer must lie in a description of it s activity, so also the 
substantiality of the soul is, according to Lotze, 11 wha t it 
shows it self to be, unity v1hose life i s in def i n ite ideas, feel-
ings , and efforts. 11 2 
The f a ct of t he unity of cons c iousnes s is eo ipso at once 
the fact of the existence of a substance: we do not need 
by a proce ss of reasoning to conclude from t he former to 
the latter as the condition of its exi stence,~-a fallacious 
p rocess of reasoning which seeks in a n extraneous and su-
perior substance supposed to be knovm beforehand, t he s o 1.1rce 
f rom which the soul and each part icular thing .wou ld acquire 
the c a pacity of figuring as the unity and centre of manifold 
actions and affections.v 
iii. Lot ze ' s Criticism of Kant ' s Treatment of the 
Pa ralop; isms. In order to ill us t r a te and r.1a1~e clenr h is ide a of 
substantiality, Lot ze examines Kant's famous arguments . Accord-
ing to Kant , 11 the c onc ept ion of subs t a n ce always relates to 
lintui ti6ns, VIhich with r1e c annot be other than sensuous. n4 For 
him, the p resent :3.tion of a manifold of i ntu itions in cons cious -
ness p resupposes the synthetical m1ity of the manifold. This 
unity, called by Ka nt the 11tra n s cendent a l unity of a ppercep tion, 
is the basis of the 11 I think," t he identity of appercep tion, 
which ac companies a ll represent a tions in consc iousness .5 His 
ma in theme aga inst the paralog isms i s that this identity of 
ap percep t ion, t he !, _is never p resent a s an i ntuition of the 
internal sense , a s an object of experience, but only as vvhat 
1. MET, II, 174 . 4. Kant, CPR, 242. 
2. MET , II, 181. 5. Kant , CPR, 82 . 
3. r,mrr ~ II. 175 . 
he calls a 11 perfectly conten tless representation. 11 1 
We can l ay at the foundation of this sc ience (i.e. of the 
p a ralog isms) nothing but the simp l e and in it self perfect-
l y contentless representation I, which c annot even- be c a ll-
ed a con c eption , but merely a consciousness yn~ich a ccom-
pan ie s all concep tions . By this I or He or It, who or whic h 
thinks , nothing more is represented than a transcendental 
subject of thought=X, which is cognized only by rneans of the 
t h oughts t hat a re its predicates, and of which, a part from 
these, we c annot form the least conception. Hence we are 
oblig ed to go round this representation in a perpetual cir-
cle, inasmuc h as we must al~ays employ it, in order to frame 
any judgment res pecting it. · 
Thus, according to Kant, wh en one takes the transcendental tmi ty 
of cons ciou snes s to be an intuition of the transcendent subj ect 
(i.e. t h e thing-in-itself), one f alls i nto error , for the 
cate gories of the understanding c an be applied only to objects 
of poss i ble ex? eri ence. This is the plain f a lla cy of the para-
log isms. Actually , we c an knoYi nothing regarding the tb.ing-in-
itself which lies at the foundation of the empirica l ego--for 
a ll we lmow , t h ere may be a p e rmanent plurality of such real 
noumenal substrata , or even a continually chang ing s e quence of 
thing s-in-themse lves (as Kant's interesting illustration of the 
colliding spheres suggests).3 
In corm11erit upon Kant 1 s reasoning , Lotze expre s ses doubt 
re garding the s i gnificance of the ide a that some thing-in-itself 
lies beneath t h e concre t e emp irical content s of anything, and 
that this subst r atum is in any way useful to or consolidates the 
reality of the object, and , further , tha t it is . i mportant to ask 
whether this substratu.rn is one or many . For h im, all that is 
1. I~ant , CPR, 239. 3. MET , II, 177-178. 
2. Kant, CPR, 2 39-240 . 
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Pequired for substantiality is the identity of the subject: 
So f ar and so long as, the soul knows itself as this i dent i-
cal subject, it is, and is named, simply for tha t reason, 
substance. But .:: the attempt to find its c apacity of thus · ·know-
ing itself in the nmnerical unity of another underlying sub-
stance i s not a p roce ss of reasoning vnlich me rely f a ils to 
reach an admissible aim; it has no a i m at all. That which is 
not only conceived by others as unity in multiplicity, but 
knows and makes itself good as such, is, simply on tha t 
a ccount , the truest and most ind ivisible unity there can be. 
But in Kant's mind, so at least it seems to me, the pre -
judice is constantly recurring, that a thing may in a cer-
tain peculiar: ' sense be unity, and that this is metaphys ical-
ly a nmch prouder achievement than merely to make it self 
good as Q~ity, s ince this last c apacity may perhaps also 
belong to . that which is not really or numerically one.l 
Lo tze holds, then, that Kant was right in oppos ing traditional 
soul substance theories, whi ch made the substance a medius 
te~ninus, from which, for instance, i mmortality was inferred ; 
but he was wrong in thinking that no meaningful idea of soul 
su.bs t antiali ty could be inferr.ed from inner experience. 
2. The ·· Independence of the Finite Spirit 
Let us now proceed to relate Lotze's concept of the sub-
stant i a lity of the finite s p irit to t h e idea of that one real 
Substance, the monis t ic M. If the l atte r is i nnnanent in all and 
embraces all, is there any s i gnificance in the notion of a 
finite substance? 
i. The Soul as Being-for-s e lf. In the Microcosmus ( Bk . IX, 
h. 3), Lotze makes an i mportant distinction between 'reality' 
(Wirklichkeit) and 1 realness 1 (RealitHt). This distinction is an 
indispensable key to an underst a nding of his doctrine of 
179. For Lotze, substantiality does not de pend on 
subject. The soul is existing substance 
t; ~ 
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the indep endence of the finite spirit. Wirklichkei t is a gen-
eral category designating all action and existence, while 
Reali t!:!.t is a special kind of Vlil"klichkei t which is attributed 
to being s that are s p iritual, tha t experience and reco gnize 
this e xpe rience as their ovm} The Reali tHt of the finite 
s p irit is s y non}rmous with its self-ex istence, its being-for-
self, and it is just in .virtue of this Realiti1t that the :finite 
spirit can be considered to be truly independent of or detach-
ed from the monistic M. The detachment of the finite s p irit is 
proportional to the intensity of it s Realitgt, that is, to the 
richness and complex ity of its self-existence. Thus there is 
a g raded scale of detac hment a ccording to which the ·whole 
world of s p irits could be arranged. The lo·wer primitive forms 
of animal life wo uld be but slightly detach ed i'l-lom the One, 
while man would, of cours e, pos s e s s t he greatest i ndependence. 
Lotze writes: 
Vvnatever is in condition to feel and assert it s elf as a 
self, that is entitled to be described as detached f rom the 
universa,l all-comprehensive bas i s of being , as outside it: 
whatever h as not this capability will always be i nc l uded as 
'i:nunanent' vrithin it, however much and for v1hatever reas ons 
we may wish to make a separat ion and o p position be tween 
the two.2 
He therefore who, const r a ined by necessity , regards minds as 
well as things, as being states, thoughts , or modifications 
o f God or of t h e Infinite, y et :: s not serving merely to 
p ro pagate the log ic a l results of the nature of the Infinite 
from uoint to p oint, being connected a mong st t h emselves as 
links of a c hain, but as also feeling that which they do 
and suffer as their states , in some form of relation to self / 
a s events e x perienced by their self--he who ass1..1.mes this, 11 
1. MIC, II, 6-46. I 2. 1/fET ' I' 229. 
and y et believes in addition that for these living minds 
imnanent i n God , he needs to p rove an exist ence ext ernal 
t o God, in order that :-:;hey may be real in the full mean-
ing of the word, does . not, i t seemr. to us, lmow what h e is 
about- - he doe s not lmov1 that he already posse ss e s the ker-
nel wh ole and comnlete, and tha t wha t he painfully se e ks 
is but the shell.l 
For Lot ze, the assertion of rela tive i ndependence on the 
part of t he 'finite s p irit is the e ssence of their substantial-
ity . Spirits a re substances like the one absolute Subs t ance, 
but they are Lmperfect and inc ompl et e in their s u bs tantiality. 
Nevertheless, they a re true substances, becaus e, unlik e thing s , 
·wh ich are mere phenomenal states of t h e One and without any 
unique status of their otvn, s p irits 11 possess the faculty of 
being -for-themselves, because t h e y t h ink thems elves, and are 
not merely though ts in the mind of another . 11 2 Sp irits a lone 
h ave 
a reality which through the o peration of God const itutes 
them not merely t h oughts in Hi s mind, but true and in-
dependent subjects on their own a ccount.3 
Is the s p irit as a whole, then, really to be considered as 
transcendent instead of being i mmanent in the monistic M? Lot ze 
re plie s t hat t h e relations which vre try to i mag ine with the 
n elp of the terms 'irrunanence ' and 'tra nscendence' do not allow 
of such dist i n c t i ons as these s ymbolic spat i a l e x pressions 
sugg est. 
We c annot logically(.si~istinguish from God the humblest thing, 
f or i ndepen dent u ponAGod there is nothing . A thing has a 
real, albe it relat i ve , inde pendence, only wh en and in tio far 
1. MICi II, 646 . 
2 . OPR , 94. 
3. OPRl, 95. 
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as it asserts t h e same. Only a s pirit can so assert its 
i n dep endence. It alone ~e e ls and re presents it s el~ as t h e 
common c entre ·of its ovm states, and so brings itsel~ into 
that opposition to God, who created it, ·which c an onll be 
conceived o~ as existing between creator and created. 
bnuortant point h ere i s that t h e rinite s p irit has only 
rrre lative i nde pendence. 11 By this, Lotze means that besides 
its Realitlit or sel~-awareness, the s p irit has additional 
Wirklichl{eit, which c an in no sense be considered indep endent 
of t h e one activity or t he monist ic M. 
ii. The Orig in o~ the Sou l and Lotze's Doctrine of 
reation . Now how i s it poss i ble for such relative independ-
ence, such being-for-sel~ to arise? And how is t h e sou l ·brought 
into i n teraction with the world of things ? How does it happen 
that a particular soul subs tance is associated with a particu-
e.r body, and at what stage o~ the body ' s development does it 
enter i n to it s p l a ce? These questions a re, ~or Lotze, unansv1er-
exp licitly and in detail , and this for the simple reason 
t t h e 1 h ow1 and ' whence' of SO 'lJ.ls a nd thing s alike is not 
wi th:tn the limits o~ metaphysics. As he often stresses , 
i s not the t ask of metaphysics to construct the world. 
How it can be brought about, or how the creative power of 
the absolu te beg ins to bring it abo1.1.t, that an e x i s t ence is 
produced which not only in accordance with universal laws 
Produ ces and ex-oeriences effects and al t erat ions in its 
~annexion with ~thers , but a l s o in its ideas, emotions, and 
efforts , separa tes it s elf from t he co1mnon founda tion of all 
things, and becomes to a cert a in extent an independent 
center, --th is question we s h~ll no more attempt to ansv,rer 
than vre have oth ers like it • 
• OPRl, 93 • 
• MET , II, 183. 
The problem of the orig in of t he soul can, a cc ording to Lotze, 
be answered only in s o far as we app e a l to the same g eneral 
idea by which we try to make intellig ible to ou rselves the most 
i ns i gnificant int eraction of inanima te elements . This bas is of 
e xpl anat i on is s i mpl y the f ac t that the monis t ic M is wholly 
p resent and a c t ive at the place in question . Lotze says: 
We may regard the p r o ce s s by \vhich t h i ngs that possess a 
life and sou l are fanned as somethi ng unusual and s u p erior; 
but the presence of the abso lute which makes this proce ss 
possib le is no l es s t he basis necessa rily i mplied in the 
mo st ins i gnificant i nterac t ion of a n y t vvo atoms . NoT• a gain 
do · we thi nk of i ts p resence as a mere unifo rm breath v1hich 
p enetrates all p l a ce s and this part icu lar spot a mong them, 
like tha t sub t le, fo rmless , and h omogeneou s e ther from 
which many str ange t h eories expect the vivification df 
matter into the most v arious forms : but the absolute is 
i n divisibly present with the who l e inner we a lth of its na-
ture in this particular spot, and , in obedie n ce to those 
l aws of it s a c t ion which it has itself laid dovm , necessar-
ily makes additions t o the s i mple con junctions of those 
element s ·which are themselves on l y its own cont i nuous a c-
t ion s, simple additions ·where the conjunc t i ons are · ·s i mple, 
additions of g r eater magnitude a nd value where they are 
mo re complicated ••• It i s thus that it g ives to every 
organi sm it s fittin g soul .l 
In har mony with Lotze's idea of subs:tantiality, there is 
no ne e d for t h e absol ute to make a 11 correct ch oice" out of a 
store of souls. This wou ld be the c a se only if t h e sou l we r e 
erroneou sly regarded as a substratum which should enter the 
body at some point in the body's hi story . Since the abso l u te 
is present continuous l y dur ing the ·whole course of t h e develop-
ment of the body g erm, we may , holds Lotze , re gard the fo rma-
tion of the sou l as an e x tended process in time. At t h e very 
phys ical concen tion of the g erm, the s ou l itself would be 
1. IviET II, 1 84 . 
present in its most rudimentary form, asserting itself as sub-
stance and unity in g radually increasing intensity and sigDif-
icance.1 
Lot z e adr.lit s that if we could observe the phy sical develop-
ment of the germ from its be ginning , psychic life would a ppe a r 
just as the materialist thinks. There ·would never be any evi-
dence of a sudden menta l activity, as might be e xpected to re-
sult from the addition of a living soul to the geFm. Signs of 
p s y c h ic life wou ld gradually i ncreas e e xactly as if they were 
merely s ide effects of the phys ical processes .2 Actually, how-
ever, the mental activities wou ld be the manifestat ions of a 
distinct soul subs tan ce. Lotze cons iders it imp ossible that a 
mere configuration of elements could of itself g ive rise to 
such a unique element as the thinking subject. And, for him, 
even Fechner's s uggest ive theory of a psy cho-physical process, 
according to which consciousnes s and unconsciousness are only 
relative quantitative functions of psycho - phys ical motion, is 
wholly unintelligible--it is attractive only because of its 
indist i n ctness.3 By this concept, cons ciousness and unconscious 
ness seem to be neatly reduced to son eth i ng neu:bral, namely , 
mathematical function; but plainly , holds Lotze, we have h ere 
only another way of putting the very old and often expressed 
conv iction that reason can emerge out of v1hat is devoid of 
I reason. For it is not the abs tract fun ction that can determine 
I 
1. wffiT, II, 185. , 3. MET, II, 195. 
2. 'MET, II, 185. 
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c o n sciousness or uncons c iousnes s , but rathe r t h e psyc h o-phys i-
cal mot ion of forces which in t hemse lves are completely un-
conscious •1 Lotze o:pposes hir:1self to any such views and asser ts 
that the s ou l does not arise above , b e tween , or by the s i de of 
phys ical eleme nts ; nor do es it ari se out o f nothing . I t i s a 
ne Y c reatio n r,rhich the monistic M a lone produc es from it s o1m 
nature as a suppl ement to i ts ac t i v ity in the physic a l g enn.2 
To satisfy the i magination we may say it i s from itself, 
from it s ovm re a l nature t ha t the abso l ute p rojects t h e 
sou l, and so adds to it s one activity , t h e cours e of nature , 
that o t her ·which , in t he r u ling p l a n of the abs olut e, is 
it s natural comp letion.3 
For Lotze, the t erm 'crea tion' is me ani ngful only in 
a pplication to this rise of s p i ritual life. So f a r as t h e in-
ani mate world of nature i s concerned, we ga in little oy. try-
i ng to c onc e ive of its rea lizat ion (e. g . as did Leibniz) as 
other a nd f a irer than that which it a lready has in God' s living 
consciousness . Finite spirits a lone a re in any p roper s ense 
actually created . Lotze's definition o f creation is g iven in 
t he followi n g passag e: 
Creation ma y be defined as fo l lovvs : God permitted t h e 
t h ought ·which at first was only His o..-m t o become the 
thought of o ther s p i r its; or He c a used this world of s 1 iri t s 
to arj_se in vrh i ch His continua l i nfluence and op era tion 
causes Hi s own_ co smic thoughts to a r i s e and figure as the 
a ppe a rance of an outer worl~ s urroundi ng t h em a nd capab l e 
of being perceived by them .~ 
The world of thing s , then , i s to be regarded o n l y ~s a 
sys tem o f appe arances , by which the living monistic M s timul at es 
1 • r,TET , I I , 1 9 8 • 
2. I-.lET, II, 195. 
3 . METi II, 186. 
4 . OPR , 92 . 
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finite S!J i r its to a c t ion and re f lec t ion. Furth er, Lo tze ho l ds 
tha t t h e pa rticu lar s y s tem of a ppearances with v.rh ich vre find 
ourselves associated is by no me a ns to be tak en as ex_h.aust ive 
of God's a ctivity . ~e may very well believe that there are 
many other ordered worlds which a ppe a r to other realms of 
finite s p irits. These p lural i ties of worlds do not re a lly 
ex i s t e xternal to e a c h other; a ll are bound togethe r in t h e 
same moni st ic One, and serve their pur poses according to the 
s ame general i mport of the One. Lotze says : 11 God is bound up 
with c reat ion by a p erpetua l s~npathy , that h e fe e ls and lives 
i n it. 11 1 These convic t ions are the foundations of Lot ze's 
philo s o ~hy of history . 
I As re gards t h e destiny of any particu lar finite s p iri t in 
! this complex monistic activity , t h i s , for Lot ze , is not a 
I mat teJ. ... for hu.r.'!an judgment, much le ss a p roper prob l em of 
!metaphys ics. We can permit ourselves to trus t only in a general 
:oro :qos i tion which in our hands is entirely inap~Jlicable to 
concrete i n stances: 
Every created thing will cont inue, if and so long as its 
continua nce be long s to the me a ning of the v:orld . • • 
Eve r ything will :pas s away which had it s authorized p l a ce 
only in a trans itory phase of t he world ' s cou rse.2 
~his is Lotze's doctrin e of conditio nal i wnort a lity . 
. . . . . . . 
3 . 'rl'le r.Tind-Body Cotmection 
Let u s , in conclus ion, briefly ou tline Lotze's most i m-
portant ide a s regarding the mi nd ' s inte r a c t ion v ith the 
1. OPRl, 99. Compare with 
na~e 91 QL_this thesis. 
2. !>.'JET, II, 182 ; IVIIC , I, 389 • 
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:9henomenal s y s tem in which the monistic M ha s cre a ted it . 
First l y , the f a ct of interaction is not prec luded by the 
incomparability of the :9s y chic and t h e mat e rial proces ses . 
Lot ze ' s doctrine of recip rocal action, a s we have seen , shows 
tha t homog eneity of a ppearances does not in the leas t h elp us 
t o a ccount f or interaction . l Lotze argues t ha t though the soul 
is se pa rated from the supersen suous rea lities of t he e x ternal 
world , 11 it is not parted from them by the gulf of tha t in-
sep arability which is suppo sed to b e a bar t o a ll i n t erac tion . 11 2 
As to t h e se a t of t he s oul , Lotze re j ects t h e v i e ws that 
the sou l is d iffu s ed throughout the entire body, or that from 
a po i n t or limited area , the s ou l's i nfluence extends inf i n ite -
l y fa r vii th g r a dually d i mi nishing i ntens ity , or fina lly that 
the s o u l is at o n e p oint and a cts only by d ire c t con t a ct . 3 
He r ather believes t hat the sou l a cts directly u pon a certain 
finite number o f poin ts within t he brain . 4 Thus we may say that 
t he re are li te:L"'ally many seats of t h e soul , and at each one 
the soul is i ndivisib l y pre sent, e x pressing , as Lot z e puts it, 
none of.' thos e d ivers e activ i t ie s which ought never to have been 
compressed into the formless idea of merely a singl e outgoing 
force . 11 5 Th is does not contra dict the f a c t of t he unity of 
cons ciousness , for the soul ' s s yat ial and seeming l y sep a rate 
locations are pure l y phenomenal expressions of its sing le 
sup ersensuou s being . According to Lot ze's me ta physic s of s pace , 
1 . r.uc, 
2 . MET , 
3. l.~ET , 
I , 270-278. 
II , 1 90 . 
I I, 283- 288 . 
4 . MIC , I , 302- 303 . 
5 . MET, II , 290. 
spatial loca t ion is not a condition of a thing's activity, but 
only a phenomenal conse quence. Rather, a thing is where it acts. 
According to Lotze, it is the pur pose of t h e central nerv -
ous organs "to bring about the c ornrnerce of t he soul with t he 
external world."1 As to the i n c omi ng "commerce," Lotze cons ide r 
t he bra in to be most e ssent ial i n the g eneration of the spat ial 
i mage. All bodily i rnpressions a c quire at their points of in-
fluenc e on the body certain suppl ementary qualita tive marks or 
''local signs, 11 through which the soul, u pon generating a s pecif 
ic sensation, is able to p l a ce i ts represent a tion in correct 
spat i a l relation to othe r representations.2 He thinks that the 
bulk of the bra in i s developed exclusively for the pur p ose of 
pre paring "loca lized" i mpre ss ions for direct action on the 
3 soul . 
As r egards the ou t going influenc e of t he soul, the start 
point is with out e x cept ion some feeling ( e ither new or recalled) 
on the occas ion of which the associa ted movement i s brought 
forth with strict necessity according to the Th~iversal mecha-
nism ordained by the monistic M.4 ~ere a lone, for Lot ze , lies 
the true me ani ng of free beg inning s. Not only voluntary resolu-
tions, but a lso involunta r y feeling s and passions g ive rise to 
a coT'responding blind movement, which t alws p lace without ou r 
co-opera t ion or lmowledge .5 Freedom of act ion, then, cons i s ts 
s linpl y in a n i nfinitely v a ried c ho ice and utilizat ion of 
1. MET, 
2. MIC, 
3. iHC 
II, 294. 
I, 309-311. 
I 3 20-321. 
4. MET, II, 304. 
5. MIC, I, 285. 
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e1e~ent ary movement s . 
Finally, t he f a ct that conscious ness is often i nterrupted 
in s l e ep , illness , and i njury leads to an int e r e sting quest ion~ 
·Wha t i s the status o f the soul in such situa tions ? Doe s it some -
h ow st ill exist a s an u nconscious be i n g? Lot ze ' s a nswer i s t h a t 
s ou ls, as well as material thi nc:s , have no i ndestruct i b le ex-
i stenc e ; t h ey are , a ccording to h i m, 
simpl y a c t ions of t h e one genuine be i ng or e z istence , only 
t ha t they are g ifted VJith the s tr.sm g e c a p a city , VJhich no 
knowl edge c an further e xpl a in, of fee ling and knowi n g them-
selves as a ctive centre s of a life which goes ou t from t h em. 
Onl y b ecause t hey do t h i s , only in s o fa r a s they do thi s , 
d i _ we g i ve them the n ame of existence s or substances.l 
Thus, re g 2. rd i ng a s oul which thi nks , fee ls, and wills no thing , 
Lotze te a che s t h a t we ought to have t h e cou rag e to say tha t 
11 as oft e n as t his happ e n s , t h e soul is not . " 2 Of c ourse , thi s 
a lternat ion of existenc e a n d non- exis t ence i s i ntellig i b le only 
on t he bas i s o f the c ont inual a c tivity of t h e mon istic M: 
\Vh y sho .._~ld not it s life be a n elocly with pauses , while the 
primal eternal sourc e st ill a c ts , of v;hich the e x i stence and 
a c t i vity of the sou l a re a s ing l e deed , and from which t hat 
exi s t enc e and a c tivity aros e? Fron it again the s ou l would 
onc e mo r e ar i s e , a n d i ts ne v1 exi s t e n ce woul d be t h e consist -
ent c ontinuation of the old, so soon as those pauses are 
gone b-y , during which the condition s of i t s reap pea r ance 
we re be i ng p r oduc ed by other deeds of t he same ~-:>r ima l bein~ .3 
4 . Th e Ade qua c y of 
Lotze's Doctrine of I n denendence 
- I 
Conflic ts i n philo sophy often rise out of a mi sundersta nd-
ing of defin i t i ons and o f t he meta :9hys ical ba c kg round t h a t 
1. l'!l"ET , II , 316 . 3 . 1¥1ET, II, 31 7 . 
2 . r..TET , II, 31 '7 . 
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condi t ions their particular formulations. Lotze ' s philosophy is 
es , ecially liable to such fu i sunders t a nding . Therefore , i t i s of 
:9rime i mportance that we keep in !D incl the whole development of 
Lotze 1 s monism ~Yhen we undertake an examinat ion of his doctrin e 
of inde pen dence. Otherwi se , v1e mi ght easily be inclined to dis-
r:J. iss h is p sy chology as a fruitl es s attempt to reconcile what is 
irre concilable; namely , his continual en1phasis on an extreme 
monism of interaction and the notion of rea l finite independ-
ence. Be t hen mi ght, for example, readily agree with H. HBffd 
when he writes : 
Lotze 's theory therefore culminates in a s p iritualistic 
monism. He likewise places increas ing emphasis on the 
:immanence of the elements i n a primary Substa nce. On tl"J.i s 
l att er point he stands much closer to the Spinozistic vievJ 
than he i s aware.l · 
C. D. Burns expr>esses the same o ~) inion: 11 Thus the conclusion of 
h is (Lot ze's ) me t a phys ics is in an Absolut ism alrnost like that 
of Spinoza ••• 112 And some of Lotze' s German critics have been 
much mo re pos i tive re e;a r>d ing h is relat ion to Spino za and pan-
theism . Wart enberg , '.vhom Kl"ol1heim di s cusses in detail , writ es : 
Lotzes Eon ismus 11.ebt ' j ede Selhs tMndi gkeit dcr Dinge auf und 
vervvandelt dieselben in blosse Besonderungen der absoluten 
Welt e in_he it.--Dasselbe gilt voni Monismus Spinozas .3 
1. ~-:IBffding , SHI'!IP , 275. This is a modification of Hl:h'fding 's 
earlier conclusions in his larger vro rk on the history of 
philo sophy . There , a lthough he says tha t "Lot ze' s relig io-
nhilo s ophical sta nduoint mav be described as ethica l nan-
theism11 - ( 519 ), he concludes! 11 We shall hardl y be incline d 
to agree ~ith some of his more r e c ent critics tha t in l a t-
er life he modified h i s doctrine Cf the substantiality of 
t he s oul in essentia l points , bringing it nearer to 
Spino zism. rr ( 524) See J-fbffding , HMP. 
2. Burns, GM:P, 2c·8 . 
3 . Quoted in Kronheim, LLED, 53. 
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However , such con clus ions as the s e hav e not b een the outcome of 
our study of Lotze ' :J monism . On t h e contrary, ou r conne cted 
consideration of the who l e of his argument g ives us t h e very 
o pposite conviction: Lotze can be a s sociated with Sp inozism 
onl y superficially, only vrhen some of his ide as are shorn from 
their contex t in his philo s o phy . It would be more correct to 
s ay t ha t Lotze' s theory be g ins with a strict s p iritual moni sm , 
but culmina tes, without ceasing to be monis t ic in a sense , in 
a r ea l s p iritual plura lism. But even this v:ould not be vrholly 
f a ir to Lotze, for we should judge that he neve r r eally began 
wi t h an e x treme monism. All of his references to monism must be 
t aken in a certa in restricted sense which is not i ncompat i ble 
with re a l finit e independence. 
In orde r cor~e ctly to evaluate Lotze's do ctrine of inde-
pendence, it is importa nt that h i s defini t i on of soul subs t a n ce 
be clearl y seen in the •Hider pe rs pectives of h is !.~letaphysics . 
As we reca ll, he does not ~ean by substa nce some inert s uper-
sensuous substratum . Hi s only definition is t ha t 'substance' 
11 s i gnifies e v e r y t h ing v:hich p ossasse s the p ower of producing 
and experienc ing effects, in s o f a r as it p os s esses this 
n o -vve r. 11 1 He states in com::nent u::_)on certa in misunders t anding s of 
his a p •Jlication of the terrn to the s oul, that he uses this t erm 
as a me re name 11 in all innocence,n tha t is, vr ith the n atur a l 
understa n ding that h is re .::t ders vvill judg e h is usag e only in 
a ccordance with the total metaph y sical context. Therefore, he 
1. MET, II, l74 . 
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vvri t es: 
It wou l d have been too absurd to sup pose t h is po~er of 
:?re du c ing and eX~)erienc ing effe cts i :n general to h ave its 
g round in one univers al subst a nce , and then to exne ct t ha t 
a grain of--r5:is s ubstance ' buried in each individ1.:ta l thing , 
would quic k en t his genera l c a pacitv i nto t h e part icu l ar 
vmys of p roducing and e ::.periencinf effects which di s tinguish 
t h at thing from a ll other thing s . 
Thi s is a significant passage, for it points us more directly 
towa r d a cle a r view of t h e so ul' s ind e p endence . Lotze's d octrin e 
of r e cip rocal action , leading to the assurm)tion of one Substance 
as t h e g round of the poss ibility of all being and interaction, 
is continua lly pr e s uyposed in his psychology . The so,_,_l as i nter-
acting being cannot be exempt from this genera l condition of 
exi s tence and a ctivity . Nov1 Y'lhen Lot ze reasons tha t the unity 
of t h e sou l l) re s u puoses a simple substa nc e, he does not me a n 
tha t the one Substan ce someho1N has i mparted some of it s 0\'ilTI s ·ub-
stant i a lity to t h e soul . The One has not literally det a ch ed a 
11 p iecen of itself from itself . Ra ther , by the very fact t 1.at the 
soul is c a p abl e of producing and experiencing effe cts , it is a 
s ubstance, moreover, a substance on its own a ccount and t r u l y 
se pa rate as such from the substantial i ty of the abs olute . How-
ever, i n so f a r as the soul is in interaction with the Tiorld 
(and this is an undeniable fact ), it is as such, tha t is.; in 
distin c t ion from its experiencing of intei'action a s its ovm , 
pothing more t han a state of the one Substance , which makes 
r oss i b l e all i n teraction. For this reason , Lotze holds that the 
r a u l has only 11 relat i ve L --: dep endence . II 
1. 1':b T, II, 174 . 
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We must guard against the tenden cy t o associate substance 
with a hard s patial form if we are rightly t o evaluate Lotze's 
view. It is, of cou r se , se lf-contradictory to suppose a simple 
i ndivisib le being a s such independent of and yet one with the 
Absolute . But it is not inconsistent to assume, as does Lot ze, 
tha t a being can be simple, indivisible, and i ndependent in 
one sens e or as pe ct or a ctivity (self-awareness), and yet one 
with t he Absolute in another a ctivi t y (in tera ction). Lotze' s 
view of the s oul is activistic--a,~ soul, like anything else , is 
what it does , what it appears to be . 1 If a thing simply interac t. 
in the \VOrld syst em with out being capable of self- e xperience, t h(l 
thing has no subst a nce on its own ac count; it is to be cons i dereo 
a mere phas e of the one Substance. But if a t hing shows itself 
to be an experiencing subject , by virtue of t hat activity does i ' 
merit t he title of simple substance . How the Absolute can bring 
forth in creat ion such a soul subs t ance is, of course, beyond 
human ins i ght. This view, no twi t hstanding its a ppeal to mystery, 
seems to u s to be compatible with Lot ze 's doctrine of creation. 
The fundamental ass1.unp tion of Lot z e 1 s philos ophy is that 
only a s p iritual subject can be said t o b~ a substance, to 
possess Realit~t. Now i t wou ld be strang e indeed if h e should 
actually have intended to absorb the very r eality of the spirit-
ua l subject, which h e had used as an empirica l criterion for 
1. See Dr . Bri ghtman's dis c ussion of f our types of views of t h e 
s ou l: organic, monadic, mental i st ic, and a ctivistic. 
Barrett (ed.), CIA, 172-175. 
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det ermining the personal natur•e of that one ful lest s"L,_bstance , 
the monist i c T-IT , wholly i nto the spiritual oneness of the M. 
Rather , when v1e follow Lotze's a r guments about the ground of 
the poss i b ility of reciprocal actio n we must with h i m t a citly 
hold fast to the indep endent concrete re a lity of the finite sub-
jec t , even while assert ing an absolute oneness of all t h i ngs ; 
for this monism i s reckoned necessary only in so far as int e r-
a c tion is to be exp lained. Thus the independent Real i tlit of the 
finite spirit do es not somehow have to be l abor i ously stra i ned 
out of Lotze's monism as a strange a ccommo dation; it is always 
presupnosed as one of the essent i al necessities of the v iew. 
Otherwise, to be sure , Lotze's doctrine of interaction taken by 
it self can e a sil y lead to Spinozism . For i f the realness of the 
finite spirit , whi c h we employ in inferring a sp iritua l monism 
of i nteraction, thereby becomes a mer>e illusion, ·what emp i r ical 
g rounds can there be for saying that the Absolute is i n some 
sens e a s p iritual subject , a being-for- self? Then ther>e c an be 
no vray of deciding r1i1ether the Absolute is a spiri tual subject 
or a blank One, a substance entirely unlike the finite s pirit , 
one which Spinoza , for example, defines as 11 tha t which exists 
i n itself and is conceived by itself, i. e . the c once ption of 
which can be forme d ·without the aid of the concept i on of any-
thi ng else. nl Such a conclusion on the part of Lo tze vvou ld 
contradict h is empiric a l a pproach. 
1. Ueber'lve g , HOP, II, 63 . 
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The great point of difference between Lotze and Spinoza is 
that Lotze's fundamental a s sumpt ion is that a true idea of the 
One can be forme d only with the conception of something e lse; 
namely , the idea oi' the independent reality of the f i nite sub-
ject. The emp irical v al idity of the hyp othesis tb.a t the One is 
a spiritual substance de p ends upon the real substantiality of 
the finite spirit . Therefore, all that Lotze h as in common with 
Sp inozism is the ruere terminology, 1 substance, 1 1 One , 1 and 
'monism.' Really t h ere is hardl y a point of contact metaphys i-
cally; each reuresents an entirely different way o~ a pproaching 
reality. Lotze' s way is empirical, based on the co n crete re a lity 
of the finite s p irit; Sp i noza ' s way is wholly rationalis t ic and 
unempirical. We do not see how Lotze c an seriously be called a 
Sp inozist, unless it is through a failure to keep in mind his 
Jemp irical method and his whole direction of thought . His i nsist -
ence on the immanence of all elements in so far as i n teraction 
is concerned is entirely compat i ble with his ins istence on the 
inde penden ce of t h e finite s p irit. We do not h ave to v1a i t unt il 
Lotze explicitly ( a lthough not too clearly ) brings this out in 
h is p sycho logy . 'rh is c ompat ibility is implicitl-y ass1..uned in his 
l
axiolo .r: ical and ontolog ical strands of t h ought . 
In a nswer to t he question , h ow can the s oul have s u ch a 
double ' a c t ivity, Lotze can only reply that we must assume that 
the monistic M is as a matter of fact capable of producing a 
being which has such a nature . Th e ontolog ical mechanics of this 
0 strang e ca; ac ity11 of the sou l as being- for - self is, of cours e, 
a mystery, but it i s no more mysterious than the fact of inter-
action . All we can say is, as Lotze puts it, that the s oul is 
not creat ed out of nothing , b ut t h at the Absolute brings the 
so1..1. l into being from its ovm real nat1..1.re and as an addition to 
its ovm re a l activ ity as g round of interaction. This may seem 
lik e i n easy way out of the d ifficu lty of conceiving the sou l 
as i n d e !)enden t and yet iTim1anent in the Absolute , but wh at more 
can be done on Lotze's p Pemises? As h e rightly emphasizes , it 
is not the task of philoso phy to constpuct the 'Horld, but only 
to underst and its constPuction consi s tently in so fa.r a s the 
facts permit. Kronh eim sums up well Lotze's s y nthesis of 
h m1anence a nd independence: 
A relative independence comes to thing s in s p ite of their 
i nrrnane nce in God. They do not completely lose their in-
d e p endence as part of the Ab s olut e. For this reason he has 
Zlealously taken p ains to separ a te h is l)hilosophy from 
S~ino za 1 s panthe ism ••• He is t herefore not a pan t heist 
in the ordina ry sense , but a panentheist . Even as parts 
of God , thing s enjoy a certain measure of independence ••• 
Lotze teache s their immane n ce in the Abso l ute only to 
ma k e int e raction compr ehensible . The indep endence of things 
t h erefore becomes, even through i m..l'!1anence , only so far 
abrogated ( a u f r;ehoben), a s precisely the a c tual fa c t of 
i n teraction re quire s , but no furth er.l 
5. The Possibility of 
Interaction on the Pa rt of t h e Soul 
But wou l d it not perh a p s be more a d.equate and less con-
fusing to define the soul or self as cons cious unity of ex-
e perience a nd to say with DP. E . S . BI'ightn1an t ha t 11 the soul is 
I. 
1. Kronheim, LLED, 40. (Tra nslated by the writer.) 
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i ndeed confined to conscious experience; it i s no unconsc ious 
entity OT' mere c a pacityn ?l A rnore mentalistic de finition would 
have the advantag e of clea rly a n d unambiguously mar k ing out t h e 
self and of se ~)arating i t from wha t is not its ovm conscious 
proc ess . However , t h e fact is that the self so clearly defined 
must still i nteract vlith t h e world . But how c an interaction be 
explained if, as Dr . Bright man write s ; 
when a personalist s p eaks of a self or person, he me ans a 
conscious unity; he do es not mean t o i n clude in t he s elf 
its interac t ion vri th what i s no t its consc iousness .2 
In another essay we find t his statement: 
At no time is God absent or inB. c tive; but at no time c an 
the p resence of God be construe d panthe i stic a lly . That i s , 
although God a lways a cts on man and interacts with him , 
no :pa rt~ of man 1 s pe r s onality c a n b e regar d ed as any ~)art 
of God . 0 
'He t al<:e the term nat no time" to mean 11 in no sense. 0 Dr . Bright-
man further holds t ha t ttGod creates and continuallv sustains 
•! 
the being of all other l)ersons and se lves in the 1.miverse . n4 
Is it, h owev e r, possible for God to i n tera ct with v~1at is no 
part of h i m? And c an we conceive of Go d sus t a ining ;.vha t is not 
in any sense a part of him? 
If Lotze's ontology of intera ction is emrirically 
adequat e , t he re can be no i n tera c tion between entirely indep end-
ent beings ; a ll mus t be included in one me dium of i n teraction. 
i ntera c t i on 
In Dr . Bright man's philosophy ,Ais not such a fundament a l and 
pervas ive t heme or foundational reference po i n t. In re gard to 
1. Brightman , ITP , 192. 
2. Bright man, Art.(l943 ), 44. 
3. Brightman , Art.(l950), 4. 
4. Brightma n, Art .(l950), 4. 
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the mind- body p roblem, however, he vvrites t hat ''experience 
s 11eaks in favor of intera ctionism, 11 and that trinteractionism, 
then, woul d a ppear to be the true theory. 111 As to phys ical 
things, Dr . Brightman reasons from the fact that 
al l the work done by "matter" is energy ; the "!)article makes 
no d iffe rence. Its ~;resence adds no thine;; it s absence would 
not be noticed. Such an entity cannot be s a id to belon~ i n 
the system of nature.2 o 
Thus he a ccepts Le i bniz's i dea that the energizing activity of 
matter is an a ctivity of the nature of rnind-- 11 t he system of· · 
thing s is active like a mind .ll3 
In Lotze's philo s ophy , interaction is basic and its ex-
planation is the same v1hether the objects in question are souls 
I or things. For him , the i ndependence of the soul m.ust be 
harmoniously synthes ized with the doctrin e of i m.manence. That 
is, for h i m, souls can interact with each other and t h e world, 
and God c an sus tain them only if they are in some sense includ~ 
led in h is being. Dr. Brightman avoids this compromise with 
monism by defining the self so as to se parate it metaphys ica lly 
from God. The relation between God and the self, for him, must 
in every sense be external. Thus for Dr. Bri ghtman the myste r y 
"!ould be: How can the self be so separate metaphysically and yet 
i nterac t with God and the vmrld? For Lotze, the mystery is 
interestingly enough the conv e rse: Hov1 can the self as i nte r ac t-
ing being, and hence acc ording to the doctrine of i nteraction, 
~me vii th God, possess any real inde pendence? 
~ . Bri ghtman, ITP, 205 - 207 . 
2. Brightman, ITP , 121. 
3. Bri ghtman , IT P , 121-122 . 
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Lotze and Dr . Bri ght man thus a pproach the problem of the 
i ndependence of the soul from t wo different ' directions . In both 
views , hoViever , the ma in con cern is that the i n di vidual must 
not be 11 swallowed up 11 · in a pantheistic absolutism . Lotze p refers 
to attempt to superimpose i nde pe ndence on pantheistic i mnanence, 
while D1 .... Bri ghtman prefers to attel'1pt to reco~1cile i n t e raction 
with external connection . Dr . Bright man 1 s ap ·Dr onch is ';)e r hap s 
safer t ;1eoretically, for there is no ambi guity i nvolved in his 
doctrin e of i nde p endence. 1:1an is n o part of God in any sense . 
On the other hand, Lot ze's "relat ive i nde p endence 11 can easily, 
and surely has been , const rued as rea lly no inde pende n ce .l We 
think , however , that t aki ng Lotze 1 s philosoph y as a vrhole this 
danger is not very great. The advantag e of Lot ze's 2.pnroach is 
tha t the doc t rine of inte1 ... a ction a s he formu lates it i s a mo s t 
rig orous argLL.'1lent for t h ei s m, and is cap able, as we h a ve 
attempt ed to show , of holding its ovm against i mpe rsonal views 
of causality and co smic s tru c ture. 
The p roblem of de cid ing between these t wo ways of regard-
ing the independence of the finite s p irit is not an e asy one. 
We are , h owever, inclined to favor Lotze's explanat ion of i n ter-
a ction on the bas i s of int e rna l relat ions. Thus, a lthoug h it is 
not dirficult to postulate a special inscrutable external 
1. Thus · J . Vlahn thinks that Lotze 1 s monisti c doctriPe of inter-
action take s away :man's freedom: nLotzes panth eistische Er-
k lllrung der Weshselwirkung s p richt dem Menschen die Freiheit 
ab unc1 macht ih_n zum blossen Zuschauer der Gottestaten in 
ihm . 11 ( G~uoted in Kronheim, LLED , 54.) It is true that on 
Lotze's bas is, man is largely a "s pectator" of his states ; 
but to stress this alone is to de preciate unjust l y the wider 
metaphysical significance of Lotze's doctrine of volition. 
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connection between God and the f ini te s pirit, and t hus to es-
tablish finite i ndependence, we wonder whe t h er this is l"'e a lly 
necessary t o insure independence. If Lot ze 's do ct rine of 
a c tion of the soul more simply , wi thout a ppealing t o s pe c~al 
external connec tions vrhich are different frorJ those connections 
between inanimate things. 
Then agai n , Dr. Bri ght man's expl anation of t he subc onscious 
-processes and ')s y ch ic mechanism becomes i nvolved in a C<Jmpl exity 
of e:{ternal r e l at ions o Dr o Brightman says: 
These other ex-;Jeriences , to whi ch the name subconscious is 
g iven, since they a re not i n te g r ated -,d th the norma l self-
exp eriei1Ce , are not a :part of the norrna l self ( for only 
its e x::;e rience be longs t o it), but rather a pai't of i ts en-
virom:1ent , like the phys iolog ica l organi s m, the soc i a l 
order , the world of nature ol 
In another work , he s p eaks of the s u b conscious process as 
a c tually a cons ci oc.~s self' associated vrith the hmnan person.2 
~rhus i n subconsc i ous influence there would have to be an 
external i ntei·act i on by at least three d i s tinct and mutually 
independent se l ves . As regards psychic me chanism, the d iff icu lty 
of conceiving the a c t i on of God is equa lly great, for how c an 
God , who must always remai n with out metaphys ically , contro l the 
p sychic me chanism within ind ividual consc i ous n ess , and how is 
h e re l ated t o memory? 
1. Brightman , I TP , 200 o 
2. Br i ghtman , Art o(l943), 44 - 45 o 
In h i mself man finds s i gns of God and of God's n earness and 
a c tivity . Yet man is always h i mse lf and God is God . They are 
mut1.2a lly transcendent in a sense in which God and natur e are 
not. !\Cost of the states of my mind a1~e, it i s tl~ue , caused 
not by my se l f - determining ~ill, but by God. This is true of 
my sensat i ons and of a ll in me that i s due to phys iolog ica l 
and psycholog ica l me chani sms . Nevertheles s , a ll cons cious 
Pl"o c esses in me , v:hether c aused by God' s pur pos e or. my ow11, 
are paT•ts of my cor.1pl ex , unitary personality, v1hicb., t houe;h 
de Dende nt on God for i-Gs being , i s self-experiencing and, 
vdth in limits, self- deterrni ning . 1 
Can such mutual trans c endence be conceived tan gibly exce1)t in 
t e r ms of a Le i bniz i an pre -determi ned s yr!lpathy? 
On Lotze 1 s viev; the subcons c ious and psyc~'J ic me chanism 
do not have to be gathe red t o ge t h er by God and brought to a ct 
on the sou l in a n extGrne. l f Rshion . For h i m, t he on l y ac tivity 
of' the SO '..ll not i mmanent in God is t h e i ndividual subject 's 
uni que se li' - awareness and consciousness of' the proce sses which 
God , worki ng i n and through the s o ul, y resents to it, and w_1ich 1 
the s ubject to a li..mited e x tent c an call up throush the c apacity j 
I 
o f vol:l tion . 
l!Ianifest ing i tself in the i ndi v i dual mind , and being in it 
and a ll its like the efficient sourc e of t he ir life , the 
I nfinite deve l ops a ser i es of a ct i vities, as t o which how 
they t a k e p l a ce remains i n comprehens i b le to fin ite cons cious -
nes s , whi ch i ntuit s their pro duct • . • 2 I 
Is it re ally l ess mysterious and more c omprehensible t o define 
the self as me taphysic a lly no pa1"t of God , and y et somehow able 
to receive e xternal i ni'l uenc es from Go d? Wo u ld putting t h e 
do ctrine o f i n d e p endence in this manner be s tow on the self a 
more genuine inde p endence , and also se pa rate God more from any 
1 . ·B.rigJ:itY.1~n ·~ . -r:rP, 339. 
2 . MIC , II, 641 . 
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stain of i'ini te eri'or and s in? r'ie cannot convince o; rselves 
that this would be so. Lotze's doctrine of' internal relations 
as reg ards interaction seems to us to be very i'irm ontolog ical 
g round . u p on· n:1.ich an adequate account of' the interaction of' 
the soul may be base d . 
For this reason we should hesitate to acce 9 t Dr . Bertocci's 
sugp;estions r egarding interaction presented in his illuminating 
art icle on Dr . Brightman's theory of' the self.l Dr . Bertocci's 
main point is this: 1iihy consider the body as merely the 
energ izing of God's mind ( as vrould Lotze also ), and yet at the 
same time g r ant sel:fhood to certain zoolog ical creat1J.I'es whose 
a ctiv ities a re certainly not more purposively intellig ent than 
tho s e of the body. The human body :functions as a h i ghl y pur:oos-
ive unit even \Yhen personal consciousnes s is absent . Thus he 
say s: 11 lthy grant the cells . or cell-societies of animals inde-
p endent self - ex9erience and deny it to the cells or cell-
societies of the hunan body? 112 
Up to this point the argu.11 ent is very convincing . But; then 
Dr . Bertocci inqu ires into the relations between God and the 
self. He sums up Dr . Brightman's view: The self is no part of 
God meta ~Jhysically , but has a monadic nwindow 11 open to him. 
Thus the mind- body i nteraction consist s of t·wo st e p s: 1) i nte r-
action with God through it s nwindown 8.nd 2) the altera tion by 
1. Enti tlecl nBrightman 1 s Vi e-rr o f the Self, t h e Person , a nd 
the Body n and published in The Phi losophical For1...un ( 1950). 
2. Bertocci, Art.(l950), 27. 
126 
God of his energizing , which app e a rs as bodily movement. Now 
this seems to Dr. Bertocci to be too roundabout a manne r of 
conc e i v ing i n tera ction! He sugge s ts making it more direct, a s 
f o llows: 
But why , g r ant ing the constant sus t enan ce of a ll finite 
selves (and pe rsons ) by God, i s it not s i mpler theoreti -
c a lly to o pen up another window of t he finite self to 
other selves constituting it s body? :Rathe r t h an ? os tulat-
ing the divine Mi n d as a s pecific i ntermedi a r y for every 
d e fin ite mind-body a c t ion, the indiv i dual self or p erson 
cou l d then i nteract, subject to t he l aws of their created 
na t u res , directly on the s elve s constituting t h eir bo dies . 1 
No w there is certain l y nothing inconceivable about t h is 
way of re garding the poss i bility of interac t ion on the part 
of t l1.e soul, t hat is, r:rh en the poin t of departure is Dr. 
Bri ghtman ' s view of the self a s external l y relat ed to Go d and 
the v;orld . But we sho1:tld ma intain t hat i t s p l aus ibility rest s 
either on 8. fundame ntal obs curity rega rdin g the coh e r e n t 
on tolog ical s i gnificance of the p ictorial te r m 11 wi nclovi , 11 the 
phrase 11 constant sustenance by God, n and t he phrase "the l aws 
of their crea ted natures; 11 or on a simple appe a l to a s pecial 
pOi17er of God as a matter of fact to make suc h external conne c-
tions , Yihich these some~'L.lJ.at v a gu e terms (i. e . in t hemselve s a nd 
out of an ex·91icit metaphys ical context ) symbolize , possible . 
Does Dr . Be rtocci mean a Leib nizian 11 wi ndow11 ? '>7e are quite 
sur ·e that such pre.:. de termined sympathy i s f ar from h i s i n ten-
t ion . But we are not quite certain that this manner of 
se parat i ng t h e self f r om God metaphysically, and finally of 
1. Bertocci, Art.(l950), 27 . 
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separating the inte raction of the self ( 11 a ccording to the laws 
of its created nature '') with other selves from the media ting 
e activity of God can be ela borated in a complete metaphysics in 
another vray. l 
Lotze's doctrine of interaction seems to us to be adequate 
enough to make unnecessar~r such assumptions of external 
connec~ions . Interaction is more intellig ible if the elements 
in q_u.es ti '_)n are 111et;a1Jh~rs ically one Stlbs tar1ce . Thus the fil"li te 
selves viill never be vrholly separate metaphy sically from the 
me d hun of inte raction; their inde p endence nmst be so construed 
a s to leave them in some sense within the :medium. It is this 
necessity that Lotze struggles to express tan gibl y . Only on 
this basis can we , with Lotze, make clea r to ourselves the 
me a ning of the notion of law. This is why \7e have considered 
Ha r tshorne' s mind- brain CBll a nalo gy leading to his idea of a 
divine Social Personality externally related'to its organic 
11body " of selves to be untenable metaphysically . Vie sh ould 
maintain with Lot z e t h at the mind- brain cell connection does 
not merely involve t wo terms, but r a ther three, the third be ing 
the mediw.11 or i n teraction . J.q-ot only the m.ind-body interaction, 
but also the God- mind relation seems to us to be better ex:olain 
ed by Lotze 1 s doctrine of imrnanence. 
6. Concluding Derinition or Lotze's Monism 
If t h en , for Lotze , the indep enden ce of the f i nite s p irit 
1. In this res pect we a wait with great anticipation Dr. Bright-
ma n 's treatise on metaphy sics . A sys teruatic presenta tion of 
the nersonalistic view of interaction is needed . 
is a g enu ine Realit lit, what must we con clude rega rding Lot ze's 
philo s ophy as a vvhole? It is, we sho1J lc1 rep e at , a monism only 
a s regards i nteraction and as regards the fact that t here is 
on l y one eternal and abiding Substance, the monist ic lJi . Bt1t so 
long as fi n ite s p irits a re create d and assert themselves as 
di s tinct being s-for-se lves, there is no strict monism, but more 
g e r:teral..Ly and properl y a s p iritual :9luralism. This , we sho·uld 
ma intain, is wha t Lot ze always intends to convey in a ll h i s 
d i s cus sions , a lthough unfortuna tely he does g ive good cause for 
confus i on a nd misundersta nding. Our main criticism of Lotze is 
that he lay s too much stres s on the monism of interac tion 
t h roughout h i s writing s . He would h ave done better i f h e had 
at every point balanced h is one - sided absolu tistic i n terac t ion-
ism with h is c ul mina ting view o f the finite s p irit as not 
merely an interac t ing being but a genu inel y i ndepe ndent being-
for-self, a n d as such wholly dis tinct from God . Then he n ou ld 
hav e been le ss liable to misinterpretat ion . 
As h i s reflections stand, it is e asy t o g e t t h e i mpres s ion 
that he is an abs olu tist in essence . Thus , for exampl e , G. T . 
Ladd concludes: 
The method of Hegel wa s , i ndeed , a l ways oppo s ed by Lotze ; 
and he endeavored to make good vthat he considere d t h e de -
ficie n cies of He gel by s ubst ituting for a movement of 
Abs olu te Thought , a movement of Abso l u te Life , as the centre 
and S1..11Tl of a ll rea lity . But , with 8.11 the differe n ces in 
both method and con clus ions of. t he two thinkers , Lot ze 
teaches something like the same spiritu a l Monism as that i nto 
which many v1ho have leai'ned in the s choo l of Hegel a re lead-
ing t he way.l 
1. OI',lET , x ii . 
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And J . E . Pratt includes Lotze with such absolutists as Green 
and Royce •1 v:Je s h ould ack<1owledg e that these conclus ions are 
plausible, e s ,;ecially when based on the many p assages in n hich 
Lotze stresses extreme monism. These passag es must be balanced 
lJy s ta tements v.,rhich are moi'e characteristic of his philosophy 
as a whole , as , for e x ample , the follo·wi ng : 
True reality tha t is and ought to be ••• is t h e living 
p ers ona l s pirit of Go~ and the \70rld of personal s ·)irits 
wh ich h e h a s created. 
The real poin t of differenca between Lotze's v i e w and 
Hegel ' s a bsolut i s m is that Lotze's main aim i s to save the 
real freedom and indep endence of the finite s pirit, wh e reas 
in He g e l, the finit e s p irit is e x~'Jlicitly and with out a pology 
absorbed into t h e d ialectical s weep of the Absolute Spirit . 
Thus we find in He gel suc h statements as these: ni t is e qually 
true tha t God e x i s ts as finite a n d t he Eg o a s Infin ite." 3 "Vfua t 
seems to b e my act is t h en God 1 s . " 4 Th is ruling power of the 
Absolute is 11 t h e cunning of Reason" -- "God lets men do as they 
p lea se ••• but the result i s the a ccomplishment of--not their 
~J l ans , bu t His ••• n5 Accordi n g to He gel, Absolute Spirit s e ts 
u p t h e 11 i llusion 11 of finite i ndep e n d e nce or se paration by 
differentiating itself into an "oth er . u Then 11 its action con -
sists in ge tting rid of the illv.sion which it h a s crea ted. 11 6 
This a ction of the Absolute in the mind is, for He gel, the 
nillusion under which ·we live. 11 7 
1. Pratt , PR, 216 . 
2 . MIG, II, 728 . 
3. He g e l, POR, II, ~~Z· 
Ll. HetZel .POR 2;::;·r. 
5. Wallace, LOH, 350. 
6 . Wa lla c e , LOH , 352. 
7. Wa llace , LOH, 352 . 
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I Such deprecia tion of the finite i ndi vidual, and, further , 
an extreme em~has is on deductive method i s u tterly forei gn to 
Lotze ' s view v1hen it i s seen as a whole. Conse quently , t here 
is a wi de gap between the Absolute of Lotze and t ha t o~ He g e l, 
the ga p that s epar a tes extreme rationalism from empiric a l ideal-
i sm . Lotze's Abs olute should perhaps really not be c a ll ed an 
absolute , but as W. P . W8.rren suggests , "the Sul) r eme Be i ng 11 to 
'--· ' 
avoid t h e panth ei s tic irn:plicat ions of absolutism . 1 
V.lhat , then, wou ld be our fina l definition of Lotze' s 
mon i sm? YJ e s h ou l d , as ou r d i s cu ssions h a ve ind ica ted, co nclude 
that alth ough Lotze, even in t he midst of his p s y cholog ical 
development of t h ought , freque ntly refers to h is tr monist ic 
viev1 , 11 t h i s shoul d a l ways be uno.erstood as limited t o t h e 
phenomenon of interaction. His philo s ophy as a whole, we sho u ld, 
e l abo rat ing Kronheim ' s suggestion, define as p lura listic 
s p i ritual panentheism. Lotze' s metaphys ical monism is that 
i mportant as pe ct of his ~)luralistic s p iritu a l panentheism which 
constitutes the bas is of explanation of intera ction in gene ral, 
i n cludi n g intera ction between s p irits.2 
1. Warren, PNT, 27. 
2. For the sake of p reciseness, the t e rm 'between' should per-
haps be r epl a ced by 'of.' That is, there is really no meta-
physical gap 'be t ween' interac ting spirits; as interacting 
they are simply the one unified activity of God . This leads 
to a further distinction, which is implicit in ou r above 
di s cuss ions: We must be careful no t to abstract the substan-
tiality of the finite spirit (i.e. its active self-awareness) 
consider it ln itself apart from the total Wirklichkeit of 
the spirit, and then to ask hov1 Go d can interact with this 
substantia lity (which, according to Lotze, is relatively in-
dep endent ; tha t is, relative to the total Wirkl ichkeit), as 
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if God does or should so int e ract. Since, on Lotze's p remises 
the prop o s ition that God interacts with something or mediates 
interaction 'between' thing s means simply that God is that 
something or those interacting things as intera ctin-g; such a 
quest ion vvould inquire into the possibility of wha t is i m-
po ss i b le, for by definition the substantiality of the finite 
s p irit is not t l1.e substantiality of God. To ask h ow God can 
intera ct with finite substantiality as such, then, is to ask 
how God's substantiality can be finite substantiality, and 
Lotze' s ans wer is t hat by definition it is not. The question, 
t herefore, can only resolve it s elf into the unans,Nerable 
query: How can God bring forth out of his one subs tantiality, 
h is one activity, a finite s pirit which is one with himself 
as regards interaction, and vmich ye t has a unique substan-
tiality of its own, by virtue of v1hich it is able actively to 
assert itself as relatively independent of the common Wirk-
lichkeit of all interac t ing thing s? This, Lotze emphas izes, 
brings us to an impenetrable myste ry. According to him, no 
human lmowledge can furthe r explain the possibility of this 
11 strange capacity,H this double activity, with which the s oul 
is g ifted. 
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CI-IAPTEH V 
CONCLUSIOIJS 
We shall now b ring tog ether the main conclusions which 
we have reached in our examino.t ion of Lotze' s metaph y s ical 
monism: 
1. Lotze has laid solid foundations for a thoroughgoing 
emp irica l philoso:9hy . Vie are in full a ccord with his confidence 
in reason . It seems to us that faith that nature and reason 
are harmoniously 8.nd objectively related is necessary if v'le 
are to avoid positivistic solipsism and nihilism. We are al so 
in a greement rri th Lotze's empha tic teaching that ~'Jhilosophical 
prog ress must always be conditioned by the particular facts in 
quest ion, and not by a deduc tive a priori 11 lo gical calculus.n 
This is an admii•able a p proach to me taphys ics. However, ·whether 
Lotze throughou t his philo s ophy follows his professed me.tb.od-
ology is another question. 
2. We have found that Lotze does not attain empirical 
adeqlJ.a cy in h is doctrine of an unfolding monistic ontolog ic a l 
Good as the source of all existence . If the Good is diffused 
t hroughout all t hings, as Lot ze tells us, then the inference 
tha t natural evil is illusory is ~tite obviously valid. But is 
this vrhat the particular facts of evil indicate emp irically? 
Our con clusion, therefore , has been that only a finiti s tic view 
of God viOuld in some measu1 .... e permit a retention of Lotze r s 
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·l valu able axiological idea of' a teleological oneness of' the 
t hree r e a l r:1s of reality, and a t the same time most adequately 
a ccount :for the empirical concreteness of' natural evil. 
3. Lotze's ontological strand of' thought based on a 
consideration of intera ction is, in contrast to his a x i o lo g ic a l 
stra nd of t h ought, a thoroughly cons istent and adequate 
a pn lication of his empirical methodology . His idea of a monistic 
M mediatin g interaction is, as we have attempted to show , a f'a r 
more credible hypothesis than eith er positivistic 11 succession11 
theory or naturalistic "structure 11 theol''Y • Further, the 
as s umption of personality as a metaph y sical p r i nciple, vvhich 
underlies this rigorous development of monis t ic interactionism, 
is e mpiric a lly jus tified in tha t it not only makes possible a 
concrete understa n ding of how the s u ccessive c h ang es of things 
a nd the v1orld processes can be unified, how interaction 
a ccording to law can take p lace, but it also makes the rise or 
consciousness and reason in the cosmo s truly intellig i b le. 
Impersonal views of nature a re not intellig ible; they a re valid 
pos s ibilities but t h ere is n o vmy of ela borat ing them positive-
ly--they can be ex~ressed only a s mere negations of the 
per so ~1alistic hypothesis . 
4 . The conclusion which we h a ve reached re garding Lotze's 
doctrine of individu ality is not quite so clea r cut, for it is 
in regard to this p roblem that Lotze falls short of' his usual 
cle a rness and fine analysis . Lotze does not devote s u fficient 
discussion to t h is i mportant topic as such, and , as a result, 
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a variety of dif:ferent interpretations becomes quite p os s ible. 
And some oi' his statements--i'or example, when he says tha t he 
woul d a g ree with pantheism if it were spiritu a lly c6nceivedl __ 
quite definitely seem to contradict our interpretation. Still 
we should judg e that the implicattons of such p a s sag es a re 
e x traneou s to the essential structure of Lot ze's philosophy and 
to what he really i n tends to convey , These passag es are the 
unfortunate results of his mis leading emphasi~ at times on 
extreme r.1onism . If vre keep in mind his whole metaphysical con-
tex t , it will be plain that Lotze g ives more than sui'ficient 
evidence that his prime aim is to provide for the real i nde p end 
ence of the :finite s p irit. The real diffi cu lty lies in his un-
willingness to ma ke the finite s ::'J iri t an excep tion to what he 
considers to be necessary condit ions of interaction; namely, 
i1mi1anence in the One. lfl e have , however, con cluded that his 
activi s tic t h eory of t h e self a nd his dis tinction between 
RealitM~ and Wi rklichkeit make po ssible a consistent and ade -
quate s :;-nthesis of i mmanence and trans cendence. Therefore , 
Lotze's philosophy as a whole must not be called a monism or 
a panth eism, but rather a plural istic s p irib ... lal panentheism . 
1. MIG, II, 677. 
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LOTZE'S METAPHYS.ICAL MONISM DEFINED .. AN-n EVALUATED 
ABSTRACT 
For Lotze, metaphys ics must be a "regres sive investiga-
tion n based on the confidence that nature in some me asure re-
flects objectively the processes and necessities of reason. 
Since we find ourselves not in the ontological source and center 
of t h i ngs , but at a rather remote periphery , our emphas is, he 
teaches , must be on induction rather than on deduction, on an 
empirica l approach in VIhich the mo st i mportant factoi' is the 
I'ticular fact in question rath er t han on any spe culative 
The goal of metaphysics can only be a very 
dest one; namely, to harmonize reason with itself and with 
facts in so far as our limited position allows , to 
vide a coherent basis for humble satisfaction in an o p timis-
faith . 
There are, according to Lotze, three distinct realms of 
xperience, not log ica lly deducible one from the othe r: 
)ne c essarily valid truths , 2) i mmediately g iven facts of real-
t y , and 3 ) determinations of worth. Now, for him, it is unin-
ellig i b le that these realms of expe rience should reflect a 
which is in itself absolutely wi thout some b ond of unity 
his axiolog ical faith in the cosmic primacy of purpos-
ve intellig ence t hat he cannot consider the rea l ms of reality, 
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although this axiolo~ical faith in a monistic Goo d is an in-
tellig ible ne c ess ity , we c an n ever use the princip le of such 
a Good 
!manner 
unify ing the three rea l ms o f reality in a s pecula t ive 
I 
within 
It o it. 
I 
But now is this opt i mistic a bso l ut i stic :faith ade quat e as 
r egards an account of the facts of natural evil? Lo t z e acknowl-
edg es thi s to be a very thorny problem, and h is discussions of 
it a mount to a p l ain and frank confession that he i s unable even 
to be g in a reconcilation of the fact o f evil wi th his idea of 
a monistic Good. At this po i nt , i t is evident that he is unwill-
i n g consi s tently to app l y h is admirable methodo log ical princ i p le 
hat if a g iven fact contra dicts a hypothesis, the hypothes is 
fnus t be a l tered to a ccount fo1~ the f a ct harmoni ous l y . A con-
I' i s tent e mp i r ica l a pproach , as we h a ve attempted to i n dic a te , 
r ould have led Lotze to a finitistic v iew of Go d similar to that 
pf E . s. Bri a:htman . Su ch a finitistic v iew is quite CO!IJ.Dat i b le 
b_Tipirica lly vfith firm f a ith in a wholly benevolent d ivine will. 
T>!Tetaphy s ical monism is, for Lo tze , not on l y a n axiolog ica l 
nmplication of a cons iderat ion of t h e t h ree re a lms of experience 
II 
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but it is also the conclusion of a rigorous anal ys is of t h e 
phenomenon of r eciprocal a ctio2:1 . How can mutuall y i nde pendent 
ent i t ies i nteract? This is Lot ze's starting- point, and from thi s 
he proceeds to crit ici ze various possibilities . Firs tly , h e 
s hows t ha t when interac t ion is conceived in terms of the pa.s-
sag e of i nfluences a hope l ess m1111be r of i ncredulities be come 
apparent . For h im, the re a r e onl y two consi s tent possibilities . 
i1 e may , on the one hand, take i nte r actions i n terms of a 
Leibnizian pre - de t ermined monadi sm . But such deterr:1 i ned a ctivity 
would negate the freedom of the individual, and therefore , s ince 
Lo tze' s pri me concern is to maintain t h e concrete fre e dom of 
1t h e i ndividual , no such pre - establlshed sympathy can ever be 
acc e ptable a s an explanat ion of interaction. But we may , on the 
othe r hand, conceive of the interac ting entities not as meta-
1phys ica lly separate , but as s tates or modifications of a s ub-
stant i a l oneness , in '\"That Lotze calls a Hmonistic Iv1. 11 Inter-
act ion does not take pl a ce across any metaphysical gap , but is 
rather to be conceived as an activity of and wi thin one div i ne 
cons c iousness . The relat i ons of i n teract ion are thus , a ccording 
to Lot ze , wholly int ernal. The feeling of one finite sp il•i t does 
not have to be transmit ted over any s Pat i a l distanc e i n order to 
!i n f l u ence another spirit. Rather , i ts fee ling t akes pl a ce 
iJnrnedi a tely wi thin the monistic M, and the M g ives il'nmediate 
ri s e, according to t h e i mport of its activity and i ts universal 
feeling with in the~ mechan ism of realization , to a corresponding 
finite s p i r i t which is t o be i nfluenc ed . 
II 
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Lotze's :moni st ic hypo thes is is, in our estimation , better 
than pos itivist ic 11successiorl1 theory of interaction, because 
this l atter, although it explicitly disavows ontolog ical 
a ssump tions, must p l a i n ly pre su:opose an objective uniform activ-
ity in nature to make meaningful the probability cha r a cteristics 
jof mathemat ical functions in the predic tion of future events. 
Hi s monism is a lso more adequate than naturalistic ;r s true tural r; 
accounts of intera ction, because naturalism must either a ppea l 
to the g iven inscrutable continuity of a material nNature," and 
expl a i n causality by wb.olly tautolog ous terms , or it must 
postula te t he -pass ac;e of influences, and thereby fall into those 
i ncredulities i:Yhich Lotze cle a rly perceived. 
In re ga rd to the personality of the monist ic M, Lotze 
s tre ss es the fact that d i v ine p ersonality i s not to be con-
sidered a rnere anth ropomorphic reflection or projection of man 's 
p ersonality . The truth is exactly the converse: hmnan pe rsonal -
i ty is but a feeble reflection of the ? erfect divine Personality 
When ':re postulate the co smic p rima c y of pers ona lity v1e do not 
create a God after our image , but r ather, by l ayi ng down t h is 
basic metaphy sical principle, we affirm faith that vre and the 
world reflect , however imp erfectly , the rational processe s of 
the div ine Mind. Only on this assm11ption 
conceive the unity of a thin0 in change, 
of the succe s sive cha nges of the cosmos . 
can we empirically 
1 and , further, the unity 
1 
Imp ersonal views of 
nature l a ck concrete empirlcal foundations , a nd , conse quent l y , 
c an be ex-oressed onl;r as negations of or aversions to the 
II 
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/pers onalist ic view , as s peculat ive guesses t~at t h e co smos is 
l so ~11ehow held tog ether by vvha t is devoid of reason , and as such 
i s so1;1ehovr able to g ive r i s e to i ntelli.g ent be ing s . Lotze re -
jects such i mpe rsonal views as i n credible; they are unin-
tellig i b le abs tra ctions from the concrete life of reason . 
Finall y , and most i mportant of a ll, as to the status of 
the individual in his moni sm of interact ion , Lotze i s far from 
unamb i guous l y clear. Our inter~)retation of h is doctrine i s based l 
on the two :orinciples which seem to be most p rominent in his 
doctrine: 1) The monist ic ontology of interaction is universally ! 
v a lid, a nd 2 ) yet the individual must have r eal freedom and 
~~ independence; he must not be absorbe d as a mere int eracting 
.state of the One, as is an inanima te thing . The key to Lotze ' s 
view is his idea of substantiality . For him, ' substance' means 
11 ever y thing which possesse s the p ov'lei' of prodv_cing a nd expe -
riencing e ff e c ts , in s o f a r as it p osses s es this p ower." 
( MET , II, 174) Thus only s p irits are substan ces and as such 
are not mere i nteracting sta tes of the One . As substances , they 
are wholly distinct from the sub s tantiality of the One . Theil" 
Realiti!t is uniquely their ovm . But this is only a "relat ive 
i:~'ldB !)endence , 11 for as an intel~acting being, the soul cannot be 
lwb.olly i n depe n dent of Go d . The Wirklichke i t of the soul must 
always include both Realiti!t , that is, indep endent substantial -
ity, and i :rmnanence in the One. This is an a ctivistic view of 
the SOTJ_l--it is what:; it does. In so f'a r as it e!.npirica lly 
\as s erts itself as a unique center of thoughts and f'eelings , as 
sel~-consciousness, so is it being-for-self and not being-for-
the-One. But in so far as it shows itself to be an interacting 
being, so is it one with the monistic M. How can these t wo 
antithetical activities be combined in one being? How can tl1e 
monistic M g ive rise to such a being which is within itself 
and yet capable of detaching itself in a relative independence? 
These p roblems are, for Lotze, ultimate riddles; he does not 
pretend to have an answer to them. 
VIe have concluded that this doctrine is consi s tent and 
most satisfactory. Lotze quite definitely does not cause the 
individual to be absorbed and dissolved in the internal rela-
tions of interaction. It is, then, not proper to call his 
philosophy as a whole a s piritual monism or a pantheism, for 
the real uniqueness and independence of finite s pirits, which 
Lotze teaches, implie s, albeit in a relative sense, a true 
spiritual pluralism. Therefore, Lotze's system as a whole 
ought rather to be called a pluralistic spiritual panentheism. 
His metaphysical monism may be defined as that basic as pect of 
is p luralistic view which constitutes an explanation of inter-
action. 
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